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Abstract 
 
   Regional headquarters can be defined as an intermediate organisational unit that is 
hierarchically situated between headquarters and subsidiaries. The corporate headquarters has 
given a certain mandated role for regional headquarters with a high decision making autonomy 
concerning the subsidiaries under its management in a definite geographical area. 
 
This thesis focuses on the Finnish subsidiaries with regional headquarters mandate that foreign 
multinational companies have established over time. The purpose of this research is to find out 
how many regional headquarters identified in 1999 in Finland still continue operations in 2010 
and whether the regional headquarters mandate still exits. The study seeks to find out if some of 
the subsidiaries have lost the regional headquarters mandate, have discontinued operations or 
have relocated the regional headquarters out of Finland. 
 
The study analyses the ways in which the regional headquarters mandate can be lost and possible 
reasons and motives behind the decision for the subsidiary to lose its mandate or relocate out of 
Finland. In addition, the study examines the decision making level of the organisation hierarchy in 
the multinational company when making the decision for the subsidiary to lose the regional 
headquarters mandate or relocate out of Finland. The lifespan of regional headquarters mandate is 
examined in the research, as well as, the relocation target countries. 
 
The empirical research is qualitative and longitudinal in its approach based on the large sample of 
regional headquarters population in Finland. The data collection method is structured survey 
interviews for the managers of the Finnish subsidiaries.  
 
The study recognizes three ways in which the regional headquarters mandate can be lost: regional 
headquarters responsibility transfer to the parent, termination and relocation. Regional 
headquarters relocations out of Finland to some other country are found to be common. The study 
finds that the most common motives behind the regional headquarters mandate loss are parent 
multinational company’s reorganisation, regionalisation, growth of markets and acquisitions. The 
decision of the regional headquarters mandate loss is made most often in the company 
headquarters, but the Finnish subsidiaries also participate in the decision making. The thesis 
argues that when the subsidiary loses the regional headquarters mandate, in many cases it can be 
considered as a more neutral phenomenon than failure and finds evidence that sometimes it is a 
relief from the subsidiary’s point of view. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Aluepääkonttorit määritellään välitason organisaatioiksi, jotka sijaitsevat hierarkkisesti 
pääkonttorin ja tytäryhtiöiden välissä. Aluepääkonttori toimii pääkonttorin valtuuttamalla 
mandaatilla, ja sillä on korkea autonominen päätösvalta tytäryhtiöissä tietyllä maantieteellisellä 
alueella Suomen rajojen ulkopuolella. 
   Tämä pitkittäistutkimus käsittelee monikansallisten yritysten Suomeen perustamien tytäryritysten 
aluepääkonttoriasemaa suhteessa ulkomaisiin tytäryrityksiin. Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on 
selvittää, kuinka moni vuonna 1999 identifioiduista aluepääkonttoreista on säilyttänyt asemansa ja 
jatkanut toimintaansa Suomessa vuonna 2010. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään, kuinka moni suomalainen 
tytäryritys on menettänyt aluepääkonttoriasemansa, lopettanut toimintansa tai kuinka moni 
aluepääkonttori on sijoitettu uudelleen Suomen rajojen ulkopuolelle.  
Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan eri tapoja, joilla aluepääkonttoriasema voi päättyä sekä mahdollisia 
syitä, jotka johtavat aluepääkonttoriaseman loppumiseen tai uudelleen sijoittamiseen. Tutkimuksessa 
tarkastellaan myös monikansallisen yrityksen organisaatiohierarkian eri tasoja, joissa tehdään päätös 
aluepääkonttoriaseman päättymisestä tai uudelleen sijoittamisesta. Tarkastelun kohteena ovat myös 
suomalaisten aluepääkonttoreiden elinkaaren pituus sekä kohdemaat, joihin aluepääkonttorit ovat 
sijoittuneet Suomesta pois muuttaessaan. 
Pitkittäistutkimus on laadullinen, ja tutkimustieto aluepääkonttoriaseman kehittymisestä on kerätty 
haastattelemalla suomalaisten aluepääkonttoreiden johtoa 222 yrityksessä. 
    Tutkimuksessa havaitaan, että yrityksen aluepääkonttoriasema voi loppua kolmella eri tavalla:  
 1) aluepääkonttorimandaatti voidaan siirtää pääkonttoriin 2) aluepääkonttori voidaan lopettaa ilman, 
että mandaatti siirtyy muualle 3) aluepääkonttorimandaatti voidaan siirtää monikansallisen yrityksen 
organisaatiorakenteen sisällä ulkomaille.     
    Tutkimuksessa selviää, että suomalaisten aluepääkonttoreiden uudelleen sijoittaminen on yleistä. 
Aluepääkonttorimandaatin menettämisen syinä ovat useimmiten monikansallisen yrityksen sisäinen 
uudelleen organisointi, regionalismi, markkinoiden kasvu sekä yrityskaupat. Päätös 
aluepääkonttoriaseman lopettamisesta tehdään useimmiten pääkonttorissa, mutta myös suomalainen 
aluepääkonttori voi osallistua päätöksentekoon, joka johtaa oman aluepääkonttoriaseman 
loppumiseen. Tutkimuksessa argumentoidaan, että aluepääkonttoriaseman loppuminen ei usein 
merkitse organisaatioyksikön epäonnistumista, vaan kysymyksessä on ajoittainen vapaaehtoinen 
aluepääkonttoriaseman luovutus. Aluepääkonttoriaseman päättyminen johtuu usein dynaamisesta 
organisaation evoluutiosta, jossa ulkomailla sijaitsevat aluepääkonttorivastuun alla olevat 
organisaation yksiköt kasvavat itsenäisiksi toimijoiksi.  
Avainsanat  aluepääkonttorit, pääkonttorit, monikansalliset yritykset, aluepääkonttoriaseman 
lopettaminen, aluepääkonttorin siirto ulkomaille 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
This study focuses on regional headquarters (RHQ) that foreign multinational 
companies have established in Finland over time. The research is a sub-study of a larger 
research project carried out at Aalto University School of Business in 2009-2010. 
In Autumn 2009 a joint research project was initiated by Professor Rebecca Piekkari 
and Perttu Kähäri from Aalto University School of Business and Professor Wilhelm 
Barner-Rasmussen from Hanken School of Economics to examine the dynamics of 
regional headquarters within multinational corporations. Three researchers were 
selected for the team, Iiris Saittakari (formerly Hilvo), Taina Heimo and an author of 
the thesis. The research project was building on the results of a previous Gateway-
project study making the current study longitudinal.  
 
The Gateway-project study was organised under the FIBO (Finland’s International 
Business Operations) programme and was conducted by Professor Reijo Luostarinen in 
1998-1999 at the Helsinki School of Economics. His research group examined the 
Finnish gateway position in relation to the Baltics states, Russia, and the Central and 
Eastern Europe and concentrated on subsidiaries of foreign companies in Finland that 
had a regional headquarters’ position. In 1999, the study identified a total of 1144 
foreign–owned subsidiaries in Finland of which 375 had at some point in time been 
recognized with a regional headquarters’ status. In 1999, there existed 325 RHQs in 
Finland and 50 companies had lost the RHQ-position. (Ratia 2000, 31) 
 
The purpose of the study in hand was to find out how many of these RHQs identified in 
1999 still continued operations in 2010 in Finland, i.e., whether the RHQ mandate 
existed. The study sought to find out if some of the subsidiaries had lost the RHQ 
mandate, discontinued the operations or relocated the RHQ out of Finland. 
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Also, the study analysed the ways in which the RHQ mandate can be lost and possible 
reasons and motives behind the decision for the subsidiary to lose its RHQ mandate or 
relocate out of Finland. The decision making level of the organisation hierarchy when 
making the decision for the subsidiary to lose the RHQ mandate or relocate were also 
discussed. In addition, lifespans of RHQ and the relocation target countries were 
examined.   
 
1.2 Research gap 
 
According to Arregle et al. (2009), how MNCs cope with the opposing pressures of 
globalization and localization is a central issue in IB research. Recently there has been a 
debate about the existence and nature of regionalization process or semi-globalisation 
(Ghemawat, 2003; Rugman & Verbeke, 2007). The regionalisation of MNC activities 
have increased the demand for control and co-ordination functions that have been 
previously carried out by the corporate HQs. Many MNCs have established RHQs to 
penetrate into markets, which may be geographically too distant to be co-ordinated and 
managed by the HQ. If the MNC must efficiently manage many subsidiaries in the 
region, the RHQ often becomes established. (Piekkari et al. 2010; Yeung et al. 2001)   
The studies show that the number of RHQs has increased and RHQs have become a 
more important way of managing global business (Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010, 60). 
The existing research suggests that RHQs are widely used by MNEs, however, large 
scale studies on RHQs are still infrequent (Alfoldi 2012, 278). Piekkari et al. (2010) 
find that the RHQ related literature is rather managerial and descriptive, and the 
classification of the functions performed by RHQs is incomplete and under-theorised. 
Enright (2005b) sees that the existing work on the RHQs is more impressionistic than 
analytical and relies on a small sample of large firms. He finds that there is a need for 
studies with large samples and evidence of a clear research gap on the evolution of 
RHQs. The longitudinal approach in IB research has only recently become more 
articulate, but it has been found to be particularly suitable in research fields that involve 
evolutionary developments (Blazejewski 2011). Kähäri (2014) says that the role and 
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location issues have been discussed in the RHQ literature but the geographic scope has 
received less attention. He adds that since most research on RHQ is cross-sectional, 
little is known of what happens to RHQs during their life cycle or how RHQs develop.  
1.3 Research questions 
 
The overall purpose of this study is to gain a greater understanding of regional 
headquarters. In the empirical part, the study aims to find out how the RHQs situation in 
Finland, identified in 1998-1999, has evolved in ten years and how the change in RHQ 
population can be explained? 
 
The research questions in this study are as follows: 
 
1. Are the RHQ that were identified in 1999 still present in Finland in 2010? 
2. Have some RHQ lost their mandate?  
3. Have some RHQ relocated out of Finland?   
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2 REGIONAL MANAGEMENT 
 
”Economic geography is now much less relevant for business strategy at country and 
global levels. It is at the intermediate level of regions that new thinking needs to take 
place about the interaction between MNEs and geographic space.” Rugman & Oh, 
(2013, 475) 
 
Recent literature presents growing evidence that regionally based management is 
occurring in organizational life (Rugman & Oh, 2013; Rugman & Verbeke 2004, 2007; 
Ghemawat 2003; Arregle et al. 2009). The world is becoming more global, but a 
parallel process is regionalisation or semi-globalisation (Yeung et al. 2001; Ghemawat, 
2003). MNCs need regional strategies and government structures to deal with different 
main market areas. Also, the importance of regional headquarters (RHQ) as a strategic 
option to manage global business has grown.  
 
Rugman & Verbeke (2004, 3) argue that globalization is a poorly understood 
phenomenon and partially a myth. According to data on the activities of the 500 largest 
MNCs reveals that very few are successful globally. A geographic sales data shows that 
most large MNEs have an average of 80% of total sales in their home region of triad. In 
other words, many of the worlds largest companies are regionally based. Rugman & 
Verbeke (2004) argue that these results have significant implications on how MNCs 
should design their strategies and governance structures. They say there is a need for 
regional strategies to complement global strategies and a regional component in the 
MNCs governance structure to deal appropriately with the different characteristics of 
each region of the triad. (Rugman & Verbeke 2004; see also Collinson & Rugman 
2008) 
 
Rugman’s analysis is in line with Ghemawat (2003, 138) who sees regionalization as an 
expression of semi-globalization. He means that markets are neither completely isolated 
nor integrated across borders, but instead the markets fall somewhere in between these 
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two extremes. Limited cross-border integration of markets means that location and 
regional specificity matters. (Ghemawat 2003; Arregle et al. 2009)  
 
Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 60) say that the number of European RHQ have 
increased by 76 % during the last decade which suggests that RHQs are becoming a 
more important way for managing global business. According to the researchers, this 
trend has two implications. First, the world is becoming more regional instead of global 
when firms increasingly structure around key regions. Second, this shows that RHQs 
have become an important structural solution to deal with the global-local dilemma.  
 
2.1 A history of increasing regional management 
 
Regionally based management is not a new phenomenon. In the 1960s, Williams (1967, 
87) already reported that “an impressive group of U.S. firms with excellent records in 
international operations are moving in the direction of geographically based 
management.”  
 
Heenan & Perlmutter also observed a trend in MNCs towards regional integration in the 
1960s. They suggested that regiocentrism should be added to ethnocentric, polycentric 
and geocentric orientations managing the operations of MNCs. Corporations with 
regiocentric orientation were characterised as “organisations highly independent on a 
regional basis, where authority and decision-making were concentrated within a 
regional headquarters and collaborating subsidiaries.” (Schütte 1997b, 4) 
  
During the 1980s it was assumed that regional management was in decline due to the 
increased globalization of markets and competition. Many MNCs moved to a global 
approach in managing their operations. Some companies ended up eliminating their 
existing RHQs and switched to manage the business globally from HQs. In contrast, at 
the same time some companies set up their first RHQs “in order to compensate for the 
distance between the global view of the centre and geographic reality.” (Lasserre 1996, 
30-36)  
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At the end of the 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in regional competitive pressures 
that came from various sources (e.g. formalization of trading blocs). Regionalization 
was viewed as a new way to compete globally (see also Ohmae 1989) - a compromise 
between the traditional strategies adopted by miniature replica subsidiaries and the 
global strategies. Regionalization suggested that all companies should move to exploit 
their strengths and formulate competitive strategies separately for each region. 
(Morrison, Ricks and Roth 1991, 23-26) 
 
2.2 Reasons for regional approach 
 
According to Yeung et al. (2001, 2) the driving force behind regionalisation has been 
the formation of relatively homogeneous markets, an outcome of economic integration 
on a regional scale (e.g. the EU, NAFTA). Since a truly global market does not yet exist 
in most industries, MNCs are formulating regional strategies that are in line with the 
relative market homogeneity at the regional scale (Yeung et al. 2001). They say 
managing from a distance is no longer suitable due to the competitive situation of the 
world and high demand for local responsiveness. Lehrer and Asakawa (1999, 268) see 
the regional level approach as a practical organizational compromise between global 
integration and local differentiation.  
 
Besides the intra-regional homogeneity of markets, the authors point out that the 
differences between the regions require MNCs to carry out certain activities at the 
regional level, instead of a global one (Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010, 72). Lehrer & 
Asakawa (1999) mention cross-regional differences of markets and employees, while 
Rugman (2005, 52) notes that regional business environments differ in terms of 
“information processing requirements, customer requirements, region-based cluster 
requirements and political requirements”. 
 
Arregle et al. (2009, 103) say that the regional perspective reflects an attempt to reduce 
the complexity of location decisions. They mean that instead of managing foreign 
subsidiaries in more than 100 countries, there will be less complexity with six or seven 
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regional zones. In Daniels’ (1987, 40-41) words, a large MNC must divide the 
management responsibility so that there are not 120 subsidiaries reporting to the same 
manager at HQ. Daniels (1987, 40-41) suggests that if a company has investments in 14 
countries but the amount of business done in each is small, the region could be 
combined: “The country units are pushed down one tier in the corporate structure, thus 
better approximating the importance to the overall corporation.” 
 
Dunning (1993, 218) suggests that MNC can better achieve global reach effectively if it 
decentralises some of the decision making functions to RHQ. Ho (1998, 180) agrees 
that as a company’s internationalization increases, a certain regionalization in its control 
functions must take place. He continues that as the importance of foreign operations 
increases, the need to monitor and control these functions rises. Ho (1998, 180) adds 
that regional hubs “prevent local subsidiaries in expanding resource environments from 
building too much autonomy and power and thus lose sight of global competitiveness.” 
Morrison et al. (1991, 25) note that by transferring operations and decision making to 
the region, the firm will have an insider’s advantage in the local management.  
 
Finally, the authors point out many efficiency-related reasons for the regional 
management approach: pooling of resources, production rationalization, size of 
reporting structures, day to day control, management development and unifications of 
external relations, limits to economies of scale, and the need to protect subsidiary 
competencies and initiatives from a narrow headquarters mentality (Daniels 1986, 29-
32; Lehrer & Asakawa 1999; Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2010, 72). According to Daniels 
(1987, 40-41) a regional management group in Europe “saves the time necessary to 
make connections across the Atlantic”, and overcomes the problem of jet lag and 
telephoning through different time zones. He sees that the RHQ is especially important 
for troubleshooting. Arregle et al. (2009, 89) say that a regional management centre 
“permits firms to achieve superior flexibility, to avoid exclusive commitment, to reduce 
transportation cost, to capture better information and to benefit from larger economies 
of scale and scope”. 
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Figure 1: Different Motives for Regional Management (applied from Ambos & Schlegelmilch 
2010) 
2.3 Regional strategies and their clarifications 
 
“A key parameter of succeeding in the host region is to think about strategy on a 
regional not a global level”. (Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010, 60) 
 
Many global firms have adopted a regional strategy which means that regions become 
the main focus of the MNC’s worldwide activities (Yeung et al. 2001). Under regional 
strategies companies extend their home-country loyalties to the whole region.  The 
competitive strategies - investment locations, product mix, competitive positioning, and 
performance evaluation - are formulated for the region. (Morrison et al. 1991, 23) 
Arregle et al. (2009, 87) say that MNCs develop regional strategy by integrating their 
foreign investment decisions among countries at the regional level: “A decision to 
create a new foreign subsidiary in a country depends on characteristics, or prior 
decisions, relative to the other countries in the same region, or a decision to close down 
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a subsidiary in a country could be linked to the decision to open a new one in another 
country in the same region.” 
 
According to Schütte (1997a, 437) the strategic importance of a region depends on the 
market size and potential, the competitive threat of competitors’ activities in the region 
and the availability of the resources. He says that the strategic importance of a region 
differs between MNCs and even between businesses of the same company. Schütte 
(1997a, 441) argues that there is no justification for a regional organisation without 
regional strategy. However, he points out that in some exceptional cases the regional 
organisation has been established with the primary task of developing a regional 
strategy. This is in contradiction to Chandler’s (1962) argument that structure follows 
strategy. Also Ghemawat (2005, 104) suggests that having the RHQ does not mean that 
the company actually has a regional strategy, and a company without RHQ can still use 
regions as building blocks of its overall strategy. While Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 
60) argue that regional strategy does not require a regional structure, evidence from 
their survey of European RHQs shows that regional strategy and structure often go 
together. 
 
Ghemawat (2005, 101) classifies regional strategies into five types: Home Base 
Strategy, The Portfolio Strategy, The Hub Strategy, The Platform Strategy and The 
Mandate Strategy. Home Base Strategy means that companies start their 
internationalization by serving close by foreign markets from the home base, wherein 
the R&D and manufacturing are located. In the Portfolio Strategy, the company sets up 
or acquires operations outside the home region that report to the home base. In the Hub 
Strategy a regional base is set up that provides resources and services to local 
operations. In the Platform Strategy interregional platforms spread fixed costs across 
regions. The Mandate Strategy focuses on economies of specialization and scale. Firms 
that apply this strategy permit certain regions broad mandates to supply particular 
products or perform specific roles for the whole organisation. (Ghemawat 2005, 101-
104) 
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2.4 What constitutes a region? 
 
Lasserre & Schütte (1999, 263) suggest that the first move towards regionalisation and 
establishing a regional management centre is to decide how many regions a MNC needs 
to manage global operations. The authors say that often a triadic structure (North 
America, Europe, Asia) is adopted and completed by a fourth region which covers the 
home market. Also Rugman & Verbeke (2007, 200) consider the triad of regions the 
most important because these regions are home to a large group of MNCs in the world 
and the geographic concentration of most business innovations. In addition, they say 
that these regions differ economically, are distant from each other and characterized by 
internal attempts to achieve greater regional unity.  However, Ambos & Schlegelmilch 
(2010, 66) argue that the typical practise to divide the world into three triad markets 
“does not do justice to the managerial problems at hand”. Whereas, Amann et al. (2014, 
882) argue that the triadic split of world markets seems out of date due to the 
development of emerging economies (e.g. BRIC). Delios & Beamish (2005, 22) 
researched Japanese MNCs and found that they divide the world into seven regions: 
Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, North America, Oceania and South America.  
 
Instead of thinking about one region as a whole, Dunning et al. (2007, 186) discuss a 
specific in-country or intra-regional effect meaning that MNCs can be attracted to 
particular sub-regions or countries in a region. Amann et al. (2014, 900) investigated 47 
French MNCs in 11 countries in Asia and found that nearly half (22/47) of the firms 
subdivide the Asia-Pacific region into two to five clusters of countries. The MNCs used 
the following criteria to cluster Asia into homogeneous regions: economic size and 
maturity of markets, geographic proximity, cultural differences and specific 
characteristics of MNCs (entry mode, presence of production facilities, historical ties 
with countries). The other half (25/47) of MNCs considered Asia as a whole, but these 
MNCs were smaller, had smaller sales, and managed fewer countries with subsidiaries 
in Asia.  
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The research by Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 66) regarding European MNCs reveals 
five factors for defining a region for RHQ: geographic proximity, market similarities, 
managerial consideration, political consideration, and cost efficiency. While Laudien et 
al. (2011, 117) suggest organizing regions based on geographical position of the 
markets, the future market-specific development of demand as well as cultural and 
political market characteristics. Typically, the boundaries of the region are defined 
differently from company to company. Usually MNCs adopt a pragmatic attitude in 
defining the boundaries of the region, for example, distances and transportation linkages 
could be more important than political linkages or cultural similarities. (Lasserre & 
Schütte 1999)  
 
Arregle et al. (2009, 88) define regions from economic, social, cultural, institutional or 
geographical perspectives. They say that in a geographical conceptualization of a 
region, physical continuity and closeness of the countries inside the group is 
emphasized. According to them, the region is usually greater in size geographically and 
more diverse than a country. Arregle et al. (2009, 88-89) see that “the region is made up 
of a limited number of countries that are geographically close and with lower economic 
and institutional distance than at the global level.” They say that firms try to exploit 
these similarities and advantages across countries.  
 
Ghemawat (2005) says that the world economy consists of many overlapping 
geographic layers. Ghemawat (2005, 107) suggests that companies should determine 
what is the right level for them - global, continental, subcontinental, national, 
intranational or local – by defining the region based on its profitability. Also, Ghemawat 
proposes to redefine distance and regions according to non-geographic dimensions: 
cultural, administrative and political and economic. Finally, he mentions that the 
definition of a region tends to change in a response to market conditions and to a 
company’s own strategic decisions. (Ghemawat 2005). Nell et al. (2011, 88) observed 
across their case study of MNCs that firms had difficulties to group countries optimally 
into regions. They observed constant reorganisations where case firms reallocated 
subsidiaries from one region to another. 
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2.5 Alternative approaches for regional management 
 
According to Heenan (1979, 410), at the end of the 1970s, two out of three MNCs 
already maintained RHQs to supervise operations in Europe, North America, Asia and 
other geographic blocs. Now, a question arises that if two out of three MNCs had set up 
RHQs what alternative strategies for regional management were the rest of the MNCs 
applying at that time. 
 
According to Lasserre (1996, 34) there have been at least three other organizational 
devices other than RHQs for regional management: corporate-headquarters based 
regional structure, local subsidiary mandate and regional networking. However, 
according to his study, an executive board or a specific department in HQ for regional 
management is no substitute for local regional structure but rather they complement 
each other. In addition, he says that some companies have mandated a local subsidiary 
with a broad coordination function across the region and country managers have been 
pushed to develop a regional view. Lasserre (1996) mentioned the difficulty of such 
arrangement due to the fact that managers in non-mandated subsidiaries feel that their 
problems are given a second priority. He said, some companies that do without RHQ 
have managed to succeed in building a regional culture through informal and formal 
networking. Lasserre (1996) says that regional meetings, the exchange of best practices 
and regionally oriented task forces have provided some companies with an alternative 
way to manage regionally.  
 
Lehrer & Asakawa (1999, 278) examined the regional operations of Japanese and 
American MNCs in Europe. They reported that regional management was considered 
important also by those companies that did not have a RHQ. 
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3 REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
 
In advanced stages of internationalization - as the number, geographical dispersal, age 
and size of foreign units increase -maintaining control becomes more difficult. The 
regional headquarters (RHQ) tend to be established if MNCs must efficiently manage 
many subsidiaries in the region (Piekkari et al. 2010). RHQs provide better control than 
corporate headquarters (CHQ) (Daniels 1987, 31).  
 
Laudien et al. (2011, 111) say RHQ are administrative units hierarchically located 
between the HQ and the local subsidiaries in each individual country (see Figure 2). 
According to them, the RHQ are governed by the firm’s HQ and the core function of the 
RHQ is to coordinate the subsidiaries in a region in a more specific manner that the 
corporate HQ is able to. Regional managers have to cope with a limited number of 
subsidiaries that share certain characteristics, which make it easier to understand the 
context at the level of the RHQ (Nell et al. 2011, 93). 
 
CHQ RHQ Sub
Sub
Sub
 
 
Figure 2: The organisational structure of MNC with the RHQ 
 
According to Mahnke et al. (2012, 299), it is typical that global HQ usually hands over 
significant headquarters’ functions to RHQ, making RHQ a subunit within MNC as 
well as a HQ in their own right. They say that the formal HQ mandate shifts the 
relationship between CHQ and RHQ from a parent–agent relationship to a complex 
parent–parent/agent structure. Nell et al. (2011, 97) say that the corporate HQ only 
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selectively intervenes in regional matters, and the regions are very independent quasi-
firms. Also they propose that the establishment of RHQs is an act of strengthening 
hierarchical control within the region through means of centralised decision-making, 
vertical information processing and formalisation. Schütte (1997, 441) sees RHQ’ role 
as a link between the region and the headquarters independently of its location. Egelhoff 
(1988) stresses the RHQs’ role as improving information flows between top 
management and the growing number of subsidiaries. In addition, Mahnke et al. (2012, 
293) point out the RHQ as an important source of knowledge and input, a bridge 
between local subsidiaries and CHQ. 
 
Sullivan (1992, 238) sees a mission for RHQ is “to manage the tension between 
headquarters’ call for global efficiency and local subsidiaries’ push for national 
effectiveness.” Paik & Sohn (2004) say that RHQ provide MNC with a halfway 
platform to reach the simultaneous goals of global standardization and local adaptation. 
According to Enright (2005a, b), RHQ control valuable resources and take part to the 
creation of the MNC’s competitive advantage in the region.    
 
3.1 Definitions of RHQs 
 
This section describes some problems related to the theoretical definition of RHQ. The 
period under review for RHQs starts from early studies in the 1970s and continues up to 
date. In order to understand what a RHQ can be, one must go through RHQ and 
regional office (RO) related literature. These two organisational forms are closely 
related and together they constitute an intermediate level in the corporate organisational 
structure – between headquarters and local subsidiaries lays the regional level 
organisation or regional management centre (Enright 2005b, 84; Piekkari et al. 2010). 
RHQ and regional office have both definitions on their own, however, those have not 
been well established and in practise the definitions might overlap or could mean more 
or less the same. There is a need to discuss the RO side by side with the RHQ to show 
the difference between the two and reveal a full picture of what a RHQ can be.  
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From the next review one can notice the evolution of the RHQ definition over the years. 
From the 1960s to 1970s, the definition is on a very general level, but it starts to 
develop from the 1980s onwards. In the course of time the definition of RHQ becomes 
more precise, detailed and exclusionary when it comes to the ROs.  In the 2010s, the 
one and only exact definition for RHQ is still missing which can be noticed by 
comparing definitions given by different authors. However, some common 
characteristics have been formed and can be found between the definitions given by 
several different authors. 
 
We start by contemplating Williams (1967) classic study of US corporations’ regionally 
based management overseas, which has been the earliest cited reference among RHQ 
related literature. The term RHQ is not being used yet in this study, however, the study 
reflects the early years of regionalization, and can show us the starting point – what 
terms were used at that time when Williams (1967) discussed U.S. based MNCs’ 
geographically based management in Europe. The following terms were used in the 
study interchangeably without giving explicit definitions: “regional management 
organization; regional management unit; regional management group and regional 
office”. This easily gave the reader an impression that all the terms meant more or less 
the same. According to Williams (1967, 87), “a regional management unit is normally 
responsible for coordinating product, geographical, and functional activities in a major 
area of the world”.  
 
Williams (1967) was early to say that a regional management unit coordinates activities 
in the region, whereas Heenan (1979) noted that RHQ supervises operations in the 
region. Also, the earliest definition for RHQ that could be found from published journal 
articles is by Heenan (1979). He examined RHQs’ site selection criteria in large MNCs 
and collected data in 60 American and 47 Japanese corporations. According to Heenan 
(1979, 410), “MNCs set up regional headquarters to supervise multiple operations in 
Europe, North America, Asia, or other geographic blocs”. When it comes to the 
definition of RHQ, it is noteworthy that Heenan used the term regional headquarters 
throughout his study and did not use other synonyms, however, he did not give a precise 
definition for the RHQ. For example, all the MNCs that he researched had “some form 
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of regional headquarters”. The expression clearly indicates that there existed variation 
in the forms of RHQs between the studied 107 corporations.  It was probably difficult to 
frame a definition that would be suitable for a variety of corporations, thus he ended up 
giving the definition on a very general level.    
 
Grosse (1981) and Daniels (1986) both made a distinction between RHQ and RO. 
According to them, RO typically handles one or more functional responsibility for the 
region, while RHQ has management responsibility for the subsidiaries. Grosse (1981) 
studied regional offices and RHQs in US-based MNCs coordinating Latin American 
operations from Florida.  All regional offices had some degree of responsibility for 
subsidiaries in Latin America, ranging from functional (e.g. control of marketing) to 
management responsibilities. Grosse (1981, 51) stressed that real regional headquarters 
had management responsibility for the subsidiaries and according to him this case 
existed in only about 20 of the nearly 80 regional offices in industrial businesses.  
 
Daniels (1986, 35) researched U.S. MNCs in Europe, and like Grosse (1981), 
categorized ROs to those that had management responsibility over the subsidiaries 
operating within the area, and those that handled one or more functions for the region. 
Daniels classified regional headquarters as having multifunctional line responsibility 
over operations and they were accountable for overall profits in the area. Usually RHQs 
provided staff support as well. 
 
Next, some authors discussed the variety of establishments that may function as RHQs. 
Avenell (1996, 1) defined RHQs as performing coordination, control and business 
planning functions. Avenell (1996, 1) said, “the tasks performed can extend to any 
combination of finance and treasury operations, data management, telecommunications, 
research and development, accounting, logistics and marketing.” He also says that any 
of these RHQ functions must occur together at one location. In a report by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2000, 2), a study carried out by Enright and Scott of 
RHQs in Asia Pacific showed that corporations carefully assess the optimum location 
for the management of individual units or functions. They said that it is common today 
to find firms with several distributed RHQs coordinating marketing and finance in one 
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location, logistics in another, and production elsewhere – and all these units report back 
to the main RHQ. 
 
Whereas Perry et al. (1998, 240) discussed the establishments that may function as 
ROs: “At one end of the spectrum, the regional office may have a regional product 
mandate giving it control of the timing and direction of product development, 
investment decisions relating to production facilities, marketing and distribution and the 
technological thrusts that will sustain development.” Here Perry et al. (1998) refer to the 
possible responsibilities that RHQs could also carry out in the region. Perry et al. (1998, 
240) continue: “At the other end of the spectrum, regional offices without strategic 
influence or administrative authority may be established to provide service support to 
affiliates or to produce information or materials for the HQ”. RHQs might provide 
information and materials for HQ and offer service support for the subsidiaries, 
however, there is typically strategic influence and administrative authority otherwise the 
entity could not be called a RHQ. However, Avenell (1996, 1) has pointed out that the 
term RHQ has been used as “a convenient catch-all tag” which has covered “a very 
wide range of business services, some of which may have very little to do with 
headquarters.” As an example of confusing definitions of that time period, Ho (1998, 
181) said that the RO is a copy of CHQ at a regional scale.  
 
In line with the RHQ definition given by Grosse (1981) and Daniels (1996), is decade 
later Schütte (1996): RHQ is a unit established to control, coordinate and integrate 
activities of one or more subsidiaries in a specific geographical region. This is a 
classical definition that has been widely cited in many studies, among others Yeung, 
Poon & Perry (2001) used the same definition. However, there still exist some variation 
in the definitions, for example, interestingly Enright (2005a; 2005b) uses the very same 
expression for defining RHQ and RO but stresses the difference between those two by 
the degree of independence in the decision-making: RHQ “does not need to make 
frequent referrals to the overseas parent HQs” (see also Poon and Thomson 2003, 201; 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2000, 3) - eventually the RO needs to consult the parent 
before decision-making. Also Amann et al. (2014, 884) say that RO has less autonomy 
than RHQ, but is responsible for general business activities in the region. 
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Earlier Schütte (1997, 441) said the RHQ has authority “to solve problems in the region, 
which cannot be handled by the national units, and otherwise would have to be dealt 
with and acted upon headquarters.” While Ho (2000, 2343) said that RHQ is a regional 
version of a CHQ i.e. the office is exclusively tasked with the coordination between the 
CHQ and the subsidiaries in the region.  
 
From the 2000s on, the authors generally start to stress more RHQs’ independence, 
decision-making power and role in strategy development. Mori (2002) carried out an 
interview survey of European regional organisations of Japanese MNCs, examined the 
existence of RHQs and suggested a minimum requirement for RHQs. Mori (2002, 3) 
says that “a RHQ is a kind of headquarters” - meaning that it cannot be a liaison office, 
a RO, a sales headquarters, a financial subsidiary or a holding company. Mori discusses 
that a HQ is a core place in the organization where strategic decisions are made. He 
continues that the RHQ is a place where strategic decisions are made for the region. 
According to him, if RHQ carry out HQ functions they must have strong decision-
making power in the region, meaning that the CEO of the RHQ must be a member of 
the board at the CHQ. Also, he says that the CEO of the RHQ must work in the RHQ.  
(Mori 2002, 3)  
 
The definition by Paik & Sohn (2004, 351) is in line with the previous authors: RHQ 
generally develops long-term strategies for the regional operations, controls and 
coordinates local subsidiaries and evaluates their operational and managerial 
performances. 
 
As an exception, a text book definition for RHQs is given by Dicken (2007, 141): 
“Regional headquarters constitutes an intermediate level in the corporate organisational 
structure, having a geographical sphere of influence encompassing several countries.”  
 
As discussed earlier, Perry et al. (1998, 240) described ROs’ responsibilities as a 
spectrum, ranging from one end such as service support to a regional product mandate. 
This analogy, a spectrum of regional responsibilities, can be extended and applied for 
RHQs as well. Piekkari et al. (2010) and Enright (2005a; 2005b) recognize the functions 
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of regional units to vary ranging from regional coordination centres with limited but 
specific regional responsibilities to fully blown regional headquarters. Enright (2005a, 
79; 2005b) analysed survey responses of 1,100 Western and Japanese MNCs active in 
Asia Pacific and showed that there is not a single type of a regional management centre 
but instead four different types. In addition to the traditional, full-fledged RHQ there 
exist several regional centres: regional coordination and support centres, peripheral 
centres, and marketing and customer centres. 
 
When discussing HQ roles carried out regionally, it is important to separate the 
dedicated RHQ and local subsidiary with regional responsibilities. However, this has 
not been carried out yet in many studies (except Alfoldi et al. 2012; Kähäri, 2014; 
Lasserre, 1996; Piekkari et al. 2010; Schütte, 1997). In large MNCs HQ roles may be 
distributed to subsidiaries, instead of being being performed by the dedicated RHQ 
only. Alfoldi et al. (2012, 277) have examined a phenomenon that they term as a 
regional management mandate (RMM) which differs conceptually from the dedicated 
RHQ. According to them, CHQ gives the RMM to a profit-oriented local subsidiary that 
dedicates some of its time and resources to carrying out RHQ roles. 
 
Laudien & Freiling (2011, 112) define RHQ as an organisational unit that is 
hierarchically situated between the HQ and local subsidiaries - “Endowed with 
managerial discretion and responsibility confined to a certain region, they execute a 
managerial function towards the hierarchically subordinated local subsidiaries.” 
According to them, the primary purpose of the RHQ is to carry out a coordinative and 
administrative function, as well as, fulfil a market function. This is very much in line 
with the previous definitions of RHQs. 
 
Laamanen et al. (2011, 5) define RHQ as headquarters that administer a firm’s regional 
activities across multiple countries and consolidate the results before reporting them to 
the CHQ. They see a firm’s regional headquarters can be considered to represent the 
hub of a regional, spatially distributed system of activities. Before Laamanen et al. 
(2011), Piekkari et al. (2010, 3) used a similar kind of an expression as they first 
conceptualized regional management as a system of differentiated centers. From the 
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definition of Laamanen et al. (2011) the RHQs’ role stands out in consolidating the 
results and reporting them onwards to HQ – this is new approach to stress this aspect in 
RHQ definitions. However, they researched the relocation of HQs in Europe and tax 
benefits played a great part for explaining the relocation phenomenon of RHQs so it is 
natural that financial perspective shows off in their definition.  
 
The following authors offer us simple, classical type of definitions for RHQs on a 
general level. Nell et al. (2011, 91) say that the RHQ is an organisational unit that 
integrates and coordinates activities and provides a link between the region and the HQ. 
While Alfoldi et al. (2012, 277) define the RHQ as an administrative unit that dedicates 
its time and resources to performing regional HQ functions. Kähäri (2014) points out 
that approximately half of the publications of RHQ do not offer any definition at all. He 
says, instead many researchers rely on an implicit understanding of the RHQ concept or 
could allude to a definition with role descriptions. Kähäri (2014) says that it is difficult 
to define RHQ in an easy and simple way. When authors define RHQ briefly, the 
definition tends to be on a very general level.  
 
Kähäri’s (2014) recent RHQ definition is an exception, comes from a new perspective 
and is clearly more theoretically developed as a result of an in-depth analysis of RHQs 
lifespan research work in his doctoral dissertation. This is first instance when time and 
dynamic change has actually been taken into account in the RHQ definition. Kähäri 
(2014) defines RHQ as an intermediate organizational unit within MNC hierarchy with 
a mandated role, geographic scope and location. According to him, RHQ is triple 
embedded, terminable and change-sensitive. By being triple embedded he means the 
RHQ being simultaneously embedded internally and externally in both its own 
environment and its subsidiaries’ environments. Also, he stresses the interdependence 
of the three attributes, i.e. they are all related to each other. 
 
Kähäri (2014) noted that no generally accepted definition for RHQ has emerged yet. 
However, as he points out some attention should be paid to the fact that the language of 
the corporate world differs from that of academic world, i.e., the terms used for RHQs 
in practice differ for various reasons. The diversity of MNCs concerning their structure, 
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geographic reality, a company’s organizational politics, corporate language, spoken 
language (a native language) and even external reasons (statutory or tax position of 
RHQ in a particular country) could all lead to the use of a certain term for RHQ (Kähäri 
2014, 26). Also Amann et al. (2014, 898-99) recognized the great diversity of 
terminology concerning regional management structures in their study of 47 French 
MNCs in Asia by their respondents. They explain that phenomenon may indicate either 
the regional management structures being disparate or reflecting the specific corporate 
vocabularies being adopted by each MNC. In their study 15 MNC had set up RHQs in 
the Asia-Pacific and according to them, only eight respondents from 15 MNCs 
described their regional management structure with the term RHQ. In the study, six 
respondents incorrectly noted the RHQ as ‘a regional office’, whereas one interviewee 
mentioned the ‘Business Unit Asia’ instead of RHQ.  
 
According to Kähäri’s analysis of the RHQ definitions, certain shared attributes emerge. 
One can agree with his view about the common denominators shared by most of the 
RHQ definitions. Kähäri (2014, 28) says that most authors note RHQ’s intermediary 
nature between HQ and subsidiary and often refer to its management responsibility - “In 
terms of the object of such responsibility, the references to local subsidiaries or region 
are more vague and versatile while still present in most of the definitions. Even more 
ambiguity prevails over the tasks that RHQ performs, ranging between solving 
problems, control, and integration and coordination”. Kähäri (2014) recognizes that so 
far none of the definitions appears as an evident choice to be used in (all) the future 
literature on RHQ. As we have seen the beauty of the development of RHQ definition in 
the course of time, one could say that the current situation of the definition is simply the 
best forecast for the future. Lately the definitions by different authors have come closer 
and are mostly in line with each other. Also, the different research perspectives seem to 
show off naturally in the definitions. However, one could say that the future research 
possibilities in the RHQ field indicate some further development for the definition.  For 
example, at the moment new concepts such as ‘sub-regional headquarters, springboard 
subsidiary, extra-regional headquarters and regional management mandate’ have 
emerged related to the topic (Pla-Barber & Camps; Alfoldi et al. 2012)  
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Based on the analysis of previous RHQ definitions, I would summarize RHQ for the 
time being as an intermediary organizational unit that is hierarchically situated between 
headquarters and subsidiaries. HQ has given a certain mandated role for RHQ with a 
high decision making autonomy (strategic, administrative, coordinative and market 
function) concerning the subsidiaries under its management in a definite geographical 
area. Over time, RHQs are change-sensitive concerning their mandated roles, 
geographic scopes and possibly terminable.  
 
3.2 Types of RHQs 
 
Schütte (1997a, 442) classifies RHQs into three main types, depending on the way it 
manages the local subsidiaries: vertical, horizontal and virtual RHQs. He says that in 
vertical regional headquarters, local subsidiaries report to the RHQs which in turn 
reports to HQs. Horizontal RHQ operates on a consensus basis and by this he means 
that the authority of the RHQ is dependent partly on the national units. The role of RHQ 
in relation to local subsidiaries is only supporting and consulting (Kähäri, 2014). In 
virtual arrangements, a RHQ as an organisational unit with an office and staff does not 
exist and the RHQ responsibilities and functions are distributed to local subsidiaries 
(Schütte 1997a). Alfoldi et al. (2012, 277) call this latter arrangement as a regional 
management mandate (RMM) and see the arrangement as suitable in new, peripheral or 
transitional markets. According to them, another virtual arrangement option is to 
delegate the responsibilities of RHQ upwards in the corporate hierarchy.  
 
Lasserre & Schütte (1999, 252-56) categorize RHQs according to their organisational 
structure: global, transnational and multi-domestic RHQ. These RHQ types differ in 
their connection with HQ and how they enhance local responsiveness in the region. The 
global RHQ is an extension of the corporate headquarters and its purpose is to be easily 
reachable for the subsidiaries in the region. RHQ coordinates functional activities and 
represents HQ in board meetings of subsidiaries. However, it is relatively weak 
representing regional concerns at HQ. Transnational RHQ operates at the regional level 
and is a prototype of an organisation exposed to tensions arising from dual pressures for 
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integration and responsiveness. Its organisation structure is a matrix wherein sub-
regions or countries represent geographical concerns and product divisions business 
concerns. Ideally the transnational RHQ is a powerful organisation where decisions for 
the region are made without consultation with HQ. The multi-domestic RHQ typically 
operates in an environment that is different from other parts of the world. Its main 
purpose is to represent the subunits in the region and their concerns towards HQ. In this 
mission it relies heavily on consensus between local subsidiaries and their support. 
(Lasserre & Schütte 1999) 
 
3.3 Roles of RHQs   
 
Studies over the last 30 years have discussed various roles for RHQs in theory, but few 
studies have discussed what functions the RHQs carry out in practice (e.g. Lasserre 
1996; Daniels 1986; Lehrer & Asakawa 1999; Mori 2002, Kähäri 2014).  
 
Early studies already showed that companies were following a variety of approaches in 
terms of the functions that the RHQs carried out (Daniels 1986, 27). Williams (1967, 
89) pointed out that it is normal for the functions of a regional management to vary with 
the characteristics of the particular company, its operations, and its management. Perry 
et al. (1998, 240) mentioned the implementation of ambitious globalization strategies by 
MNCs as one influence driving the heterogeneity of regional headquarters. Ho (1998, 
180) saw the RHQs structure and activity as strategic and responsive to the resource 
environment: “RHQs add and shed functions as the market and production 
considerations change.” Whereas, Lasserre noted that the roles RHQs play depends on 
several factors: company’s experience in the region, corporate regional impetus, the 
global structure of MNC, corporate product diversity and the status and seniority of 
executives in the RHQs. Naturally, the roles of RHQs vary between organizations due 
to the different objectives MNCs’ try to achieve. For example, Daniels (1986; 1987) 
examined the European regional management centre experience by 16 large U.S. firms 
in terms of the types of responsibilities they handled and found that the purpose of the 
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offices varies substantially from company to another and no two companies had the 
same combination of objectives.  
 
According to a textbook definition by Dicken (2007, 141), RHQs’ primary role is “to 
integrate the parent company’s activities with in a region, i.e. to coordinate and control 
the activities of the firm’s affiliates (manufacturing units, sales offices etc.) and to act as 
the intermediary between the corporate headquarters and its affiliates within its 
particular region. RHQs are both coordinating mechanisms within the MNC and also an 
important part of the MNC’s ‘intelligence-gathering’ system.“ (Dicken 2007, 141).  
The literature shows that there can be found plenty of typical and more specific roles 
that RHQ play. Many authors divide the RHQ roles for the start for two main roles and 
then continue dividing these into more specific important functions or roles. First, we 
take a look at the two main roles named by different authors. Schütte (1997) divides the 
roles of RHQs between those more directed towards HQs and others more involved 
with regional operations. Lasserre (1996, 31) and Alfoldi et al. (2012, 278) 
conceptualise the main roles for RHQs as entrepreneurial and integrative. According to 
Mahnke et al. (2012, 295) RHQ perform unique parental activities, which they refer to 
as entrepreneurial or administrative. 
 
Two things must be noted when talking about RHQ’s roles and their definitions. First, 
generally speaking, many authors talk about the same kind of RHQ roles, but 
sometimes do so with different names i.e. role definitions may differ between the 
authors. Second, when Alfoldi et al (2012, 278) listed the possible RHQ roles they 
found in their study, they stressed that it must be noted that due to the complexity of the 
RHQ roles there may possible overlaps at the level of functions and roles. This idea of 
possible overlaps should be expanded to concern the variety of possible RHQ roles 
named by different authors due to the complexity of the roles and differing definitions. 
Next we will look at the variety of specific roles or functions in more into detail.  
 
According to Schütte (1997, 441), the first set of RHQ roles are directed towards HQs 
and concern “strategy development and implementation in a sense of budgeting and 
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control, strategic stimulation, intelligence gathering, new business development and the 
bundling of otherwise fragmented demands from dispersed operations for resource or 
simply more attention from HQs in competition with other regions.” Schütte’s (1997, 
441) second set of roles are involved with regional operations and consist of “raising 
efficiency and effectiveness through the pooling of resources, benchmarking and the 
spread of best practise, and the co-ordination of activities across borders and business 
divisions.”  
Based on empirical data obtained through a survey and informal interviews at RHQs of 
western MNC in Asia Pacific, Lasserre (1996, 31) identified five important roles for 
RHQs. Three of these roles enhance entrepreneurial development - that is, scouting, 
strategic stimulation and signalling commitment - while two of the roles are integrative: 
coordination and pooling resources. These roles named by Lasserre are nicely defined in 
his work and we will look at these more later on. His study represents classical RHQ 
research that has been repeatedly referred by many authors. Therefore, we will look at 
the Lasserre’s RHQ roles as a basic set for RHQ – seems that many authors have build 
their definitions on Lasserre’s – and compare them to other definitions later on and add 
some new ones. 
 
Alfoldi et al. (2012, 278) conceptualise the same entrepreneurial and integrative roles 
for RHQs as Lasserre. However, their definitions for these roles differ. Alfoldi et al. 
(2012) define the entrepreneurial role as value-adding or `creating something new’ and 
they further divide the role into five functions as follows: strategic leadership, planning 
and direction; resource development, acquisition and deployment; seeking and 
exploiting new opportunities; driving organisational adaptation; and attention and 
signalling. Alfoldi et al. (2012) define the integrative role as `managing something 
existing´ or as loss-preventing which they further divide into five functions: monitoring, 
control and governance; resource and knowledge management; representation and 
mediation and coordination and harmonisation; and integration and facilitation of inter-
unit linkages.  
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Mahnke et al. (2012, 295) say that RHQ's administrative charter consists of the 
coordination of regional activities, the exploitation of headquarters' knowledge, and the 
achievement of synergies by pooling resources and centralizing value-added activities. 
According to them, RHQ’s entrepreneurial charter, in contrast, provides a RHQ with a 
mandate to scout out and explore new business opportunities, to initiate new ventures, 
and to stimulate and assist in understanding the changes in the business environment. 
 
Lasserre (1996) used a term scouting when referring to the RHQs as a base from which 
to search out opportunities and initiate new ventures in the region. Perry et al. (1998, 
240) labelled this role as a bridgehead. The RHQs’ role for developing new business in 
the region was mentioned in many studies (Lasserre 1996; Schütte 1997; Perry et al. 
1998; Mahnke et al. 2012; Alfoldi et al. 2012). Regardless, when Mori (2002, 13) 
surveyed the role and functions of European RHQ in Japanese MNCs, he did not find 
such a role for the companies. According to him, RHQs are normally established to 
manage existing subsidiaries efficiently, therefore the development of new business is 
not a main purpose of RHQs. In addition, he said that RHQ is usually not a business 
unit and it is logistically difficult for it to develop new business. However, Mori (2002) 
believes if the RHQ has the mission to create value in the region, it will play the role of 
developing new business.  
 
By strategic stimulation Lasserre (1996, 31) means RHQs’ role in assisting businesses 
in understanding the changes in the regional environment and helping them to integrate 
these changes into their business strategies (see also Schütte, 1997; Enright 2005b; 
Mahnke et al. 2012; Alfoldi et al. 2012). Kriger & Rich (1987, 45) see RHQs as 
‘strategic windows’ that try to understand changes in the local host county environment 
and learn about those changes quickly. Also Laudien et al (2011, 113) stress RHQ’s role 
as an observer. According to them, RHQ monitor market developments, record the 
information on changes, evaluate the importance of each observation and bring together 
the observations on a regional level and transfer the result of this process to the HQ.   
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According to Lasserre (1996), another central tasks of RHQs is to signal commitment to 
the region internally and externally to local governments, the general public, 
shareholders and the financial community (see also Daniels 1987; Alfoldi et al. 2012).  
Most of the studies mentioned that RHQs should have the role as a coordinator (e.g. 
Lasserre 1996, Schütte 1997; Perry et al. 1998, Lasserre & Schütte 1999; Mori 2002; 
Enright 2005b; Alfoldi et al. 2012; Mahnke et al. 2012). This function could be further 
divided into two: coordination between global integration and local responsiveness (e.g. 
Morrison & Roth 1992; Lehrer & Asakawa 1999) and coordination of business units 
within the region. According to Lehrer & Asakawa (1999, 272), “where strong 
pressures exist for both regional responsiveness and for regional integration, the 
regional office can be expected to exercise an important administrative, headquarters-
like function”. Mori (2002, 4) sees the coordination between global integration and 
local responsiveness as important due to possible differences in market sensitivity and 
intent between HQ and RHQs. Lasserre (1996, 31) stated that co-ordination consists of 
“ensuring that the businesses exploit synergies and follow consistent policies across the 
region.” He distinguished between strategic and operational coordination. Whereas, 
Perry et al. (1998, 240) said the RHQ is being responsible for disseminating policies 
and decisions from CHQs, monitoring the performance of subsidiaries and providing 
periodic reporting to the CHQ.  
 
Several studies mentioned pooling of resources as one of the main roles of RHQs 
(Lasserre 1996; Schütte 1997; Mori 2002; Perry et al. 1998; Daniels 1986; Mahnke et 
al. 2012). “The management of certain key functional activities across the region may 
be undertaken by the RHQ for a greater efficiency and effectiveness” (Lasserre 1996, 
31). According to Daniels (1986, 29), by pooling of resources it is possible to add 
services that would otherwise not be available to the country level management. For 
example, regional staff monitors region-wide economic conditions and regulatory 
developments, prepares and supplies information and forecasts in order to prevent 
costly duplication among subsidiaries within the various countries (Daniels 1997). Also, 
Daniels (1986, 31) suggests the management development as one of the RHQs 
objectives (see also Morrison 1991). Nell et al. (2011, 101) say RHQs are in a very 
good position to manage economies of scale and scope within the region through means 
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of centralisation, formalisation and socialisation. Mori (2002, 4) expects RHQs to 
provide staff services (e.g. information systems, personnel function, and legal services). 
Also Perry et al. (1998, 241) mentioned RHQs as providing services to the HQ and 
subsidiaries such as search for investment opportunities, site selection, public relations 
and liaison with host governments and other regional and international organisations.  
 
The role of transferring knowledge was seen as one of the main roles of RHQs 
according to the literature. According to Asakawa & Lehrer (2003, 32), RHQs are in a 
key role in the identification and mobilization of knowledge in the MNC. Lunnan & 
Youzhen (2014) say RHQ may have important roles in the knowledge creation, 
adaptation, integration and transfer of knowledge within MNEs as they may be centers 
of HQ expertise in region. According to them, RHQs potentially create knowledge and 
provide lines of transfer for local knowledge initiatives into the regional and global 
network. Perry et al. (1998, 241) said RHQs directs information both upwards and 
downwards in the MNC. Mori (2002, 5) expects RHQs to transfer knowledge from 
local operations and markets to CHQ and other subsidiaries in MNCs. Kriger & Rich 
(1987, 45) call RHQs as ’windows of influence’, meaning that RHQ “serves as two-way 
conduits of influence” between various stakeholder groups in the host region and key 
decision-makers in HQs at home. Daniels (1986, 31) mentions the role of RHQs in 
transfer successful practices from one of the countries to others. Also, “by the RHQs 
transferring information, there is a growing ability to predict success or failure for a 
group of countries on the basis of their experience in one of them” (Daniels 1987, 34).  
 
Laudien et al. (2011, 109) see that RHQ has a role as a facilitator since it exerts 
considerable influence on the information flow between local subsidiaries and the HQ. 
They say, it is necessary for MNCs “to gather relevant and detailed information both on 
a global and local scale since they have to identify local prospects and local risks to 
ensure or improve their performance and to make sure their long-term survival”. 
Laudien et al. (2011, 109) see RHQ as an essential coordination mode for MNC which 
can be used “to ensure the availability of a sufficient quality and quantity of required 
information considering the costs of information search, the costs of ensuring 
information quality” and the significant costs caused by incorrect or missing 
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information. Nell et al. (2011, 93) found across their case study examples of MNCs 
where “introduction of RHQs had the effect of closing information asymmetries 
between the HQ and the subsidiaries in the regions.”  
 
Amann et al. (2014, 899) investigated regional management structures of 47 French 
MNCs in the Asia-Pacific and found that 15 of them had set up RHQs with the 
following roles and functions: investment choices, financing, business development, 
management of subsidiaries, executive HRM and intra-Asian short-term assignments. 
While Enright (2005b, p. 100) analysed the roles of regional management centers of 
North American, European and Japanese MNCs active in the Asia-Pacific his findings 
for the roles of RHQs are very much in line with Amann et al. (2014): coordination, 
monitoring, reporting and supporting of regional activities; regional strategy 
formulation; senior HRM; competitor intelligence; business development; finance and 
investment; accounting; marketing and IT management.  
 
3.4 Life cycle of RHQ 
 
The evolution of RHQs has attracted limited scholarly attention. There are a few 
exceptions, such as: Lasserre 1996; Lehrer & Asakawa 1999; Enright 2005a, 2005b; 
and Piekkari et al. 2010; Kähäri 2014; Kähäri & Piekkari 2015). Based on the literature 
review, we know that RHQs are change sensitive with possibly limited lifetime. 
However, a longitudinal research perspective in RHQ studies is missing (except 
Piekkari et al. 2010; Kähäri 2014; Kähäri & Piekkari 2015) and without empirical 
studies we cannot say for sure what happens to RHQs during their life-cycle or how and 
why RHQs develop.  
 
First, we will look at the birth of a RHQ. According to Kähäri (2014, 74), there are two 
ways for a RHQ to be born. In both cases corporate HQ grants a new RHQ mandate, 
either to an existing subsidiary or sets up a green-field operation. Schütte (1997a, 441) 
says that companies can potentially set up RHQ when the benefits of regional 
integration are higher than the costs of an RHQ as an additional organisational unit and 
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an extra hierarchical level. Laudien & Freiling (2011, 109) say the implementation of 
RHQ means that fixed operation costs rise but in contrast costs caused by collecting 
local market information potentially decline and the quality of information may improve 
due to the RHQ’s locational advantage in comparison to HQ.  Therefore, they say that 
potentially MNC’s overall costs of operation decline. Kähäri (2014, 77) says RHQs live 
because they add value to their parents and subsidiaries at a lower agency cost than 
other alternatives, and because they are flexible structures. 
 
Among many studies Nell et al. (2011, 102) have recognized that the RHQ solution is 
not clear to MNCs since many of them struggle with the implementation. As Parks 
(1969, 79) have said it, RHQ represents an extra layer of management and “few 
companies have effectively sorted out the respective roles of these three tiers”. Nell et 
al. (2011) have noticed that MNCs “constantly increase and decrease the power of their 
RHQs, reallocate individual markets from HQ to RHQ responsibility and back again, 
regroup countries to form regional entities, establish sub-regional offices and dissolve 
them again.” Nell et al. (2011, 100) studied nine large MNCs from different industries 
originating from US, Germany and Japan and interviewed the decision makers at all the 
three hierarchy levels of the MNC. Based on the interviews they reported that regional 
managers complained about their need to fight constantly for their mandate (see also 
Piekkari et al., 2010).  In line with Nell et al. (2011) is one finding of the study of RHQs 
in Asia-Pacific by Enright and Scott: A large number of companies, consisting of North 
American, European and Japanese firms, had reorganised their regional activities at 
least once in the last three years, and quite a few expected further reassessment in the 
near future. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2000, 3).  
 
Parks (1969, 79) reported that during the 1960s many US MNCs set up European HQ 
with great expectations, however, in many cases the offices were later cut back in scope 
or closed down. The author found six reasons for the failure: profit failures, limitation 
of regional management, personnel changes, communication, poor execution and 
organisational philosophy. In contrast, Piekkari et al. (2010) suggest that the frequently 
reported failure of RHQs is associated with the immense task complexity requiring 
local, regional, product and functional knowledge. Schütte (1997a) worries that costs 
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and benefits of RHQs are difficult to measure. Lasserre & Schütte (1999, 250) see this 
as one possible explanation why RHQs of Western MNCs in Asia have such “a 
chequered track record and are a largely unstable organisational phenomenon”. Also 
they have recognized lack of planning among the reasons why so many RHQs of 
Western MNCs in Asia have failed or been closed, or have been restructured. Also 
Parks (1969) has recognized that many U.S. based RHQs in Europe have suffered from 
too rapid build up and have never quite recovered from the mistake. However, Parks 
(1969) points out that the withdrawal of RHQ does not necessarily mean that it has 
failed. Instead, it may simply indicate “the mission of launching ventures has been 
accomplished” and the need for a HQ in the area has ended. Anyway, seems that Parks 
(1969, 84) wanted to save some of the US RHQs in Europe from closing down: “While 
the European headquarters is oftentimes sick, let us cure the patient, not eliminate him”. 
 
One important theoretical contribution in the field is by Lasserre (1996, 36) who 
introduced a life cycle model for RHQ in Asia based on a survey and informal 
interviews with managers at RHQ of Western MNCs. The life cycle of RHQ mirrors the 
tasks that are carried out at different stages in the evolution of the RHQs. Depending on 
the relative emphasis given to the entrepreneurial or integrative role of RHQ during its 
life cycle, he suggested four profiles for RHQs: initiator, facilitator, coordinator and 
administrator.  
 
Lasserre (1996, 36) says that in the entry stage, the RHQ takes the role of an initiator 
and concentrates “on the stimulation and strategic coordination needed to support local 
operations in their development”.  In the development stage, the company has become 
more established in the region, the RHQ will augment the facilitator profile and take a 
more integrative role in the region. When regional operations have reached the 
consolidation stage, local subsidiaries are sufficiently mature to develop their own 
business opportunities. Then, the RHQ takes the role of the coordinator by playing a 
strong integrative role and by exploiting synergies between the businesses. However, 
none of the companies Lasserre (1996) interviewed represented this stage in the life 
cycle. In the final administrative stage, as a natural evolution the full tasks of the RHQs 
will be taken over by local subsidiaries. The RHQ is left with the role of the 
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administrator covering only functions such as: financial management, training, taxation, 
treasury and legal support. Lasserre (1996, 36) calls this as “a prelude to the RHQ being 
wound down and finally withering away completely”. Yeung et al. (2001, 8) pointed out 
that the scope for deviation of individual organisations is so wide that it is unlikely that 
most RHQs will evolve in the same sequence as Lasserre presents. Ambos & 
Schlgelmilch (2010) point out that some caution should be warranted when transferring 
Lasserre’s model into the European context since the model was developed for RHQ in 
Asia. Schütte (1997, 132) said that setting up a RHQ in Asia was linked to a certain 
phase in MNCs development called ‘strategic investor’ and this action was designed to 
signal strong commitment to the region and high visibility of the project both internally 
and externally. Lasserre (1996) describes that MNCs entered Asian market typically 
through a regional bridgehead that had a mandate to enter the region, develop business, 
and become redundant as the subsidiaries become mature enough to take over the tasks 
from RHQs. Ambos & Schlgelmilch (2010) say that the starting point for many 
European operations they investigated is different. According to them, the RHQs for 
Europe are usually not the first unit to be established in the market but much later after 
the subsidiaries are already running. They argue that RHQs in Europe are not a 
temporary structure but help firms to manage the international operations in the long 
term. Even if Lasserre’s role categorization has been criticized, the model has still been 
quoted by many. However, Enright (2005a) suggested that Lasserre (1996) should prove 
large-sample tests to determine the generalizability of the concept. Also Kähäri (2014, 
111) notes that Lasserre’s role categorization has never been empirically tested in 
published literature.  
 
Edgington & Hayter (2013, 662) made a case study analysis of RHQs and interviewed 
managers of seventeen Japanese electronics MNCs in Japan and in ASEAN. Their study 
indicates that Japanese electronic MNCs have established more autonomous RHQs in 
Europe and the United States in comparison to those set up in Singapore or ASEAN. 
RHQs are at different stages of development. Edgington & Hayter (2013, 665) note “the 
evolution of RHQs should not be taken for granted but understood in terms of nuanced 
reciprocating relations between corporate structure and corporate strategy and how 
these relations change over space and time. “ 
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Li et al. (2010) examined the changing role of RHQs in five American and one 
European MNCs based on interviews of managers in Taiwanese subsidiaries. All MNCs 
had set up sub-regional headquarters (e.g. Greater China) under RHQ in Asia in 2000. 
According to the authors, findings of the study suggest just the opposite to Lasserre’s 
(1996) argument that the last step of RHQs is diminishing. In their study, the sub-
regional headquarters replaced RHQ to manage the subsidiaries in a sub-region, while 
RHQ became a resource distributor. It managed the operations of the sub-regional 
headquarters, distributed resources to them and engaged more in planning activities. 
According to the study, all RHQs ended up existing. (Li et al. 2010, 28-29) 
 
In comparison, Paik & Sohn (2004) carried out a case study of large Japanese MNCs 
that redesigned their organizational structure, including the roles of RHQs. They say 
that in their case the organizational restructuring led to a ‘double-tiered’ RHQ structure. 
Also, they found that the role of RHQ at the group corporate level became smaller as 
their main responsibility was to provide supporting activities (e.g. legal and financial 
services).  
 
Lehrer & Asakawa (1999) studied the European operations of 19 American and 
Japanese MNC and found that here the roles of RHQ became also less important over 
time. They say the MNCs were unbundling their European operations in order to 
improving their flexibility but they did so in different ways and to a different extent. 
The American MNCs tended to delegate regional tasks to local subsidiaries, while the 
coordination task was assured by periodic formal or informal European management 
councils. Japanese MNCs hesitated to grant any real authority to RHQs which therefore 
ended up exercising a largely nominal function.  
 
Piekkari et al. (2010) carried out a longitudinal case study concerning RHQ evolution in 
a Finnish MNC. The study included three regional management centers in Northern 
Europe and five in Asia-Pacific: two RHQ, one sub-regional headquarters and five 
regional coordination centres. Piekkari et al. (2010, 3) suggested that regional 
management could be conceptualized as a system of differentiated centers that adapt 
over time to internal and external contingencies. In the study, an analysis period was 
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exceptionally long at 40 years and throughout the span the MNC had a regional 
structure in place, but the resources and status of RHQs shifted over time. For example, 
at a certain point in time RHQs were organized almost virtually and one of the RHQ did 
not survive the entire period. According to Piekkari et al. (2010), some of the regional 
management centres were dismantled or merged with existing ones and their regional 
responsibilities were divided between other centres in the region. Piekkari et al. (2010, 
14) argue that regional centres tend to disappear when they become inefficient.  In other 
words, when the realized information processing capacity of an individual centre 
became smaller than their cost, adjustments were made to the regional management 
system. Also, Enright (2005a, 63) argued that regional management centres exist and 
survive only as long as they create value for the corporation. In his doctoral thesis 
Kähäri (2014, 77) lists three possible reasons why RHQs will die: if RHQs stop adding 
value, if it loses its parent’s (HQ) trust, or if something unexpected happens in the 
corporate or external environment that affects RHQ position within the organizational 
structure of the MNC. Also Parks (1969) reports that changes at US corporate HQ often 
have an immediate impact on subsidiaries in Europe and sometimes the actions and 
decisions made in the US corporate HQ have hurt the RHQs in Europe.  
 
So according to Kähäri RHQs can simply die and their termination incurs low cost. He 
explains (2014, 13): “RHQ may disappear entirely and be replaced with alternative 
organisational structures.“ Kähäri (2014) sees terminability of RHQ as an innate 
attribute of an intermediate organizational level. According to him, RHQ can be 
eliminated and the surrounding organizational structure can continue to exist, albeit 
with changed roles. Kähäri’s (2014) longitudinal study shows that while RHQ possibly 
evolve through a life cycle, most likely RHQs lose their mandate due to a disruptive 
change in the MNC or to external development. He says that these reasons account for 
two thirds of the RHQ mandate losses in his data, while natural death remains a clear 
minority. 
 
Pla-Barber & Camps (2012, 531) studied European MNCs and the role of the Spanish 
subsidiary as a springboard into Latin America. As RHQ, the springboard subsidiary is 
situated between the parent company and local subsidiary and it may have similar 
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functions as RHQ. However, the opposite of RHQs, the springboard subsidiary is not 
located in the foreign region but outside. The authors describe that springboard 
subsidiary´s roles may change over time. According to Pla-Barber & Camps (2012, 
532-33), in the initial phase when activities are developing in the region, “the 
springboard subsidiary may have an entrepreneurial role that involves searching the 
opportunities across the region and signalling commitment”. In the final stage, after the 
MNC has increased its presence in the region the springboard subsidiary potentially 
plays an integrative/administrative role as an extra-regional head quarters (ERHQs). 
They say, it coordinates the different units in the region, exploits synergies and pools 
resources to manage the key functional activities regionally. They continue, when the 
springboard subsidiary gains experience it acquires more autonomy to formulate and 
implement strategic decisions in the target region/country. In the end of the life-cycle, 
they expect the springboard subsidiary to disappear due to its own success. When the 
springboard subsidiary has successfully developed the strategy in the region, it loses the 
reason to exist. Now, the parent company has two options: either establish RHQ or give 
more autonomy to the local subsidiaries in the region. (Pla-Barber & Camps 2012, 533) 
 
To sum up, we already know several features about RHQs life-cycle. The RHQs are 
being born when a CHQ grants a new RHQ mandate to an existing subsidiary or sets up 
a green-field operation. RHQs are born with flexible structures and they live because 
they add value to their parents and subsidiaries (Kähäri 2014). Theoretically we have a 
classical RHQs life-cycle model (Lasserre 1996) guiding RHQs potential development, 
however, the model has not been empirically tested. Anyway, we know from the 
literature that RHQs are at different stages of development, change sensitive and their 
evolution should not be taken for granted, but understood that RHQs adapt over time to 
internal and external events (Piekkari et al. 2010). Also, we know that the RHQ solution 
as an extra layer of management is not clear to MNCs and many of them struggle with 
the implementation. Typically, MNCs often increase and decrease the power of their 
RHQs, reallocate individual markets from HQ to RHQ responsibility and back again, 
regroup countries to form regional entities, establish sub-regional offices and dissolve 
them again (Nell et al. 2011; Piekkari et al. 2010). In practice many RHQs strive to keep 
their mandate. Also it is not uncommon that RHQs fail and we know several possible 
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reasons for this such as: lack of planning, poor execution, tremendous task complexity, 
cost and benefits of RHQs are often difficult to measure. 
 
Some studies indicate that the role of RHQs possibly becomes less important over time. 
In other words, RHQ could adopt more administrative role, or responsibility to provide 
more supporting than originally managing activities to subsidiaries. Respectively, the 
role of subsidiaries under RHQ’ management typically grow larger and more 
independent with time. RHQ live only as long as they add value to MNC and have the 
trust of a parent. The latest research on RHQs with large RHQ population with 
longitudinal perspective shows that RHQs possibly evolve through a life-cycle, but it is 
likely that RHQs lose their mandate due to a disruptive change in the MNC or to 
external development. Natural death of RHQ is also an option, but a minority one 
(Kähäri 2014).  
 
The problem in the field and concerning RHQs’ life-cycle is clearly that the longitudinal 
studies of RHQs are few. We can recognize that RHQs evolve with time and are at the 
different stages of development but without empirical studies we cannot say for sure 
what stages RHQs meet while going through a life cycle or how and why RHQs 
develop in the long run. The research perspective is relatively short in the current 
studies. What we see in few years of RHQ development is possibly different kind of 
evolution compared to the analysis period being 10 or even 40 years (Kähäri 2014; 
Piekkari 2010). As mentioned in the recent literature an empirical test of Lasserre’s 
(1996) life-cycle model would be an interesting addition to the discussion since the 
model was build based on analysing RHQs of Western MNCs in Asia. Empirical life-
cycle study based on his work of European RHQs population could possibly give 
differing RHQ profiles.  
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4 RHQ LOCATION 
 
According to Zaheer & Nachum (2011, 96) firms locate and relocate in order to get 
access into location resources. The authors classify location resources into physical 
resources (e.g. natural resources, weather, sources of energy) and relational resources 
(e.g. labour, supplier networks, connections to institutions and consumers). Also they 
divide location resources into tangible (e.g. labour, natural resources) and intangible 
(e.g. identity or reputation for quality of particular location). They say that locations do 
not have the same value for all MNEs, and a firm’s ability to extract value from location 
is an outcome of its sense of place, i.e., the recognition of the potential of a location. 
Zaheer & Nachum (2011, 96) point out that value of a location that might be 
disadvantageous for one firm could deliver unique value to another.  
 
Kähäri (2014, 115) says that only 20% of the RHQ papers have location as the main 
focus, even the topic is widely noticed and attracts general attention. The academic 
focus has been so far on the criteria for selecting a location for RHQs and on the 
relocation phenomenon. These will be covered next in the following chapters. Next we 
will look at the criteria that MNCs have used in selecting the location for their RHQs.   
 
4.1 RHQ location criteria  
 
There does not exist specifically articulated theory of RHQ location choice (Holt et al. 
2006, 6). However, previous studies list number of attributes that possibly affect the 
decision where to locate the RHQs.  
We start from internal factors that may affect the choice of a RHQs’ site. Williams 
(1967, 89-90) compared five cities in Europe and introduced several factors that could 
play a part when choosing the place for the RHQ: location of largest subsidiaries, 
proximity to customers, nationality of executives and their personal preferences, 
availability of office and staff. Then Dunning (1988, 279) suggests several factors that 
could affect the location choice: office rents, availability of support staff, housing and 
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residential costs, attitudes towards foreigners, taxation, market growth, the 
telecommunications and personal preferences of executives. These factors mentioned 
seem natural and logical determinants and can be found commonly among the literature, 
but the weight of the decision factors varies between the studies. For example, the 
personal preference of executives has been found to have some weight in the process of 
choosing location for RHQs.  
 
According to Laamanen et al. (2011, 10), companies favour headquarters locations that 
are central to their operations and can regard some countries as more peripherally 
located than others. Ho (1998) said that coordination and the need for regular contact at 
dispersed local subsidiaries requires a geographically central accessible site, especially 
in terms of flight times and frequency. According to Lasserre & Schütte (1999, 266), the 
central location is one of four main criteria that influence the decision where to locate 
the RHQs. The other criteria according to them are: convenience and infrastructure, cost 
factors including taxation and proximity to business. These factors are common location 
criteria and have been widely recognized in the literature. Lasserre & Schütte (1999, 
266) add that RHQs may be located either where the main market opportunities lie, or 
where the business is small, vulnerable and needs support.  
 
Heenan (1979) examined the decision making process of executives in 60 US and 47 
Japanese MNCs for selecting site for RHQs. He found different preferences between the 
US and Japanese corporations. For US executives, the most important criteria in the 
RHQs’ location selection were a political stability of the city (see also a report by 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2000, 3), when the Japanese appreciated the most the 
economic importance of local market to the region.  Both US and Japanese firms 
considered the supporting infrastructure as a second most important criteria. The other 
important factors for the US MNCs included the cost of maintaining expatriate staff, air 
transportation, communications and proximity to major countries’ markets and support 
services. In comparison, for Japanese MNCs the other important factors were 
government attitudes towards HQ companies, political stability, educational and 
medical facilities, as well as, international and multicultural orientation of the location. 
(Heenan 1979, 413) 
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Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 78) studied European RHQs and found three different 
motivations concerning the location choice: power leverage of individual managers, 
personal preferences of senior managers and historical accidents. For most of the MNCs 
they studied, the location choice for the RHQ was not to select a greenfield site but to 
choose one subsidiary within the region to win the RHQ mandate. Williams (1967, 89-
90) suggested that the decision of site location could be best approached by process of 
elimination. Anyway, Ambos & Schlegelmilch found that soft factors or pure personal 
preferences of the top management were second most common driver. Also Parks 
(1974, 8) noticed that the European RHQ location has been influenced by the personal 
preferences of the European chief executives. However, the managers in the study of 
Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 78) often revealed that the initial location decision was 
usually a historical accident (see also Mori 2002).  
 
Ho (1998) suggested that the following factors shape the location of RHQs in Asia 
Pacific: proximity to company affiliates, market access, distribution and information 
services. He also discussed the pull of places affecting location choice of RHQs: 
presence of large budget customers, other RHQs, skilled labour and local service sector. 
Ho saw that only a few cities in Asia could provide the attractive environment to RHQs, 
and stressed the importance of the base since once it is established inter-industry 
linkages provide the additional incentive for new firms seeking site for RHQs. (Ho 
1998, 182-87; see also Ho 2000, 2351-53).  
 
Ho (2000, 2354) also compared the site characteristics of three competing centres for 
RHQs in Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia. He found that there is a match 
between functions and sites, in other words, for some functions of RHQs (e.g. 
manufacturing, and sales and marketing) proximity and distance matters. He said that 
there is a clear geographical division of labor between Hong Kong and Singapore, since 
Hong Kong handles the East Asian region, while Singapore coordinates the South-East 
Asia. However, according to Ho (2000, 2354) Australia sells the concept of ‘passive 
RHQ’, where the workers do not travel frequently within the region. Ho suggested that 
for some particular functions of RHQs (e.g. customer support, training and data 
processing) the computers and telecommunications possibly overcome the hurdle of 
  40 
distance. Zaheer & Nachum (2011, 105) agree that companies have increasingly the 
ability to access location resources remotely through technology.  
 
According to a report by Economist Intelligence Unit (2000, 3), Enright and Scott 
surveyed over 8000 North American, European and Japanese companies’ key RHQ 
decision criteria and locations of their RHQs in the Asia Pacific. The results of the study 
showed that political stability and consistency of government policy were the most 
important factors affecting the location decision. In comparison, Ho did not mention 
these factors in his study concerning the location choice of RHQs in Asia Pacific. 
However, market factors (proximity to existing and potential customers) proved to be 
important in both of these studies. Communications and transportation infrastructure, 
especially air transportation (see also Ho 1998) and dense route network were 
considered important, following factors such as: transparent law and regulation 
environment, absence of corruption, and availability of skilled managers. In 
comparison, as mentioned above, Heenan (1979) found similar determinants in his 
study. However, in contrary to study by Lasserre & Schütte (1999, 266) in the Asia-
Pacific, Enright and Scott did not found taxation, cost issues or quality-of-life among 
the most relevant factors when choosing location for RHQs in Asia Pacific. Parks 
(1969, 82) supports Enright and Scott by saying that tax issues should not be an over-
riding criterion for RHQ’s location. Instead, Parks (1969) suggests that the living 
conditions for the staff and a favourable environment for operations should be 
considered as the most important location criteria which is in line with Lasserre & 
Schütte (1999).  
 
A research by Yeung et al. (2001, 14) made of 130 RHQ in Singapore showed that three 
factors played a significant role in strategic decisions by MNCs to establish RHQs in 
Singapore: geographic distance, strategic necessity and business services. Since control 
decreases with distance, MNCs from outside Asian region (e.g. European and US) tend 
to be more likely to set up RHQs in Singapore to coordinate and manage their 
operations in Asia. Yeung et al. (2001) pointed out that there is a contrast in their study 
to Heenan (1979) who found that geographical proximity to CHQs was of least concern 
to US multinational corporations. The contrast in the results of the two studies could be 
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explained by the fact that in Heenan’s (1979) study American MNCs had a higher 
preference for satisfactory air transportation and easy access to international airports in 
comparison to Japanese MNCs. Ho (1998; 2000) and a report by Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2000, 3) both agree that distance matters while setting up a RHQ in Asia. Third 
reason to choose Singapore as a location for RHQs, according to Yeung at al. (2001), is 
its business services capabilities (see also Ho 1998). Yeung et al. (2001) see this as an 
important finding since many Asian mega-cities are trying to copy the success of Hong 
Kong and Singapore in attracting the RHQs, but they fail to understand that total 
business environment of the host city matters most to RHQs. Yeung et al. (2001) argued 
that interurban competition for the location of RHQs through incentives (e.g. tax 
holidays) is unlikely to be highly effective among those cities with very different 
endowments of infrastructure and service qualities. As we see, the tax issue as a 
decision factor has been mentioned by many authors but the importance of its role 
clearly varies between the studies.  
As we know, the strategic necessity of RHQs is important in their establishment and 
RHQs are part of the wider regionalisation strategy for MNCs (Yeung et al. 2001). Mori 
(2002) researched Japanese MNCs with RHQs in Europe and on a basis of the survey he 
discovered that there were no well-defined strategic reasons for RHQ location site. In 
Mori’s study, for most of the companies the location of RHQ was originally the site of a 
sales subsidiary, or a logistics subsidiary. As already mentioned, Ambos & 
Schlegelmilch (2010, 78) studied European RHQs and found that the initial location 
decision was often a historical accident. In Mori’s study, only one Japanese MNC out of 
eleven had located the RHQ on the basis of prospects for the future. The author said that 
too often companies locate RHQs as a management or service organisation. Instead, 
Mori (2002, 20) suggested that Japanese MNCs should reconsider the RHQs locations 
on the basis of knowledge flow. Laudien & Freiling (2011, 116) actually suggest that 
MNCs make the decisions about locating the RHQs based on the information costs and 
information quality. They say that the location of the RHQ defines the costs stemming 
from collecting and transmitting information. According to them, it is preferable to 
locate RHQ close to their areas of responsibility to ensure high information quality and 
to enhance the reaction time revealed to environmental influences.  
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Holt et al. (2006) studied the decision factors influencing MNCs’ regional headquarters 
location selection strategies. They analysed 57 RHQs in Europe and the Asia-Pacific 
and found that RHQs established in order to be responsive to regional markets tend to 
use different selection criteria compared to the RHQs that facilitate global coordination. 
Also Zaheer & Nachum (2011, 102) argued that MNEs’s ability to recognize 
opportunities in a location, its sense of place, varies across MNEs pursuing 
multidomestic and global strategies.  
 
According to Holt et al. (2006) the location decisions of RHQs pursuing regional 
responsiveness strategies are based mainly around concerns of operational costs. The 
factors that were taken into consideration were as follows: economical IT infrastructure, 
a location must fit with the firm’s prior experience, low operating costs and favourable 
government incentives. In contrast, they found that RHQs pursuing a global 
coordination strategy, the primary concern in making location choices were the type of 
employment relations that environment presents, a supportive business environment, the 
cost of living, a favourable financial environment and efficient access to regional links. 
(ibid. 17-18)  
 
Holt et al. (2006) also found that US-based MNCs use significantly different selection 
criteria compared to Asian-based MNCs when making location decisions. Also Heenan 
(1979) found differences in the preferences between the US and Japanese corporations 
when selecting a place for RHQs. Holt et al. (2006) found that the RHQ location 
decisions of US firms were driven primarily by business efficiency and incentive 
concerns. Their factors in location selection of the top priority were, in descending order 
of importance: compatibility with home base, economical IT infrastructure, effective 
regional links, government incentives and low cost of living.  These results were 
partially in contrast with Heenan’s study (1979) – for example, the political stability of 
the city was the most important decision factor in locating a RHQ for US MNC. 
Nevertheless, Heenan discovered a similar type, but not the same, business efficiency 
factors and incentives affecting the location choice in a different order of importance.   
In contrast, the location decision priorities of European-based firms were low operating 
costs, supportive business environment, favourable employment relations and effective 
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regional links. In contrast, Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 78) who studied European 
RHQs, did not find these specific motivations concerning the location choice (see 
above). According to the study by Holt et al., the location decision priorities of Asian-
based firms were different and almost only driven by government incentives, and to a 
lesser extent cost concerns. (Ibid. 19-20) As mentioned earlier, Heenan (1979, 413) 
found that government attitudes towards headquarters companies were an important 
criteria for Japanese MNC in the RHQ’s location selection. 
 
Holt et al. (2006) also found that location decision priorities vary between industry 
sectors. The service sector firms’ prefer a favourable financial environment and a 
familiar operational environment, whereas manufacturing sector firms’ are driven by 
cost effectiveness. Ho (2000, 2354) found that for manufacturing function of RHQs 
proximity and distance matters in Asia. In comparison, Holt et al. found that technology 
firms’ location decisions are driven by broad concerns for a supportive environment, 
spread across business and government and familiar operational culture.  (Ibid. 21-22) 
 
Holt et al. (2006) identified a total of 39 specific variables associated with influencing 
location decisions of RHQs. Their study revealed that the infrastructure related 
variables were ranked the highest in affecting the location choice of RHQs.   Reliable 
communications infrastructure was the most important variable, followed by the 
availability of highly skilled and English speaking staff, an English-speaking 
environment, and efficient international flights (see also Ho 1998). Also, Lasserre & 
Schütte (1999, p. 266) found infrastructure as one of four main criteria that influence 
the decision where to locate the RHQs. The results by Holt et al. (2006), being very 
much more detailed and specific, still seem to be quite in line with the previous authors. 
 
In the study by Holt et al. (2006), the market-related location variables were ranked as 
the second most important group of variables affecting the location choice of RHQs: 
economic stability, accessible geographic location, market growth potential, presence of 
key technology suppliers, commercial compatibility with home base, and reliable 
suppliers. The importance of market related variables as location criteria for RHQs have 
been widely noticed in other studies. 
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In the study by Holt et al. (2006), the third group of variables centre around the median 
score of importance and they are as follows: strong cultural links with the region, 
cultural compatibility, taxation regulations, stable exchange rates, regional 
telecommunications hub and low priced telecommunication circuitry. The variables 
below median importance were dominated by three groups of variables: input costs 
(rents, operating costs, price of labour,) government incentives and cost of living (ibid. 
12-13). All these specific variables mentioned and associated with influencing location 
decisions of RHQs have all been noticed in some of the earlier studies.  
 
Dicken (2007, 141-42) says that CHQ and RHQ both need a strategic location on the 
global transportation and communications network, an access to high-quality external 
services and particular range of labour market skills (e.g. information processing). Also 
he says that headquarters activity involves interaction with the head offices of other 
organisations, so there are strong agglomerative forces involved. A close geographical 
proximity also enables face-to-face contacts with executives of other organizations. 
(Dicken 2007, 141-42) 
 
Zaheer & Nachum (2011, 104) say that the managerial task in MNCs varies from the 
location choice to the development of the MNC’s location capability, and the 
deployment of this capability to create firm-specific locational capital and benefit from 
location resources. According to them, the MNCs’ administrative heritage, its 
experience at home and in other countries, and the global exposure of its senior 
management all influence its location capability. Zaheer & Nachum (2011) say that by 
developing such capability, firms can turn locations into a differentiate factor and 
potential source of competitive advantage.  
 
The review of literature identified dozens of factors that have been either found or 
suggested to have an influence in the process of choosing a location for RHQs. 
However, based on the current literature these location determinants cannot be easily set 
into an order of importance as such. First, the results of the various studies seem to be 
situation and location specific. Second, the results of the studies vary, i.e. the order of 
importance concerning the specific determinants vary significantly between studies. 
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However, based on the current literature we know that several factors can be found 
commonly among various studies and some determinants seem to have more weight 
than others in the process of choosing a site.  
 
Each location choice process for the RHQ is a unique case where MNC’s internal 
factors, such as the location of the largest subsidiaries, proximity to customers, 
nationality of executives and their personal preferences all affect the location choice. 
Therefore, locations do not have the same value for all companies and a location that 
might be disadvantageous for one company could provide exceptional value to another.  
 
Based on the literature, we know that the home country of MNC might affect the 
location criteria of RHQ, for example US based firms tend to stress different factors 
when choosing a site compared to Asian-based companies. Also, regional differences 
affect to the location criteria i.e. when setting up a RHQ in Europe, the location criteria 
seem to differ in order of importance compared to the area of Asia Pacific. Location 
decision priorities seem to vary also between industry sectors. There is some indication 
that service sector, manufacturing sector and technology firms’ locational needs differ. 
Also, RHQs established in order to be responsive to regional markets tend to use 
different selection criteria compared to the RHQs that facilitate global coordination. 
 
Literature shows that the location of RHQ is preferred to be strategic, geographically 
central, accessible and in close proximity to the largest subsidiaries and customers. 
Central location seems to be clearly one of the main criteria when choosing a site for 
RHQ. The results of two studies show that political stability is the most important factor 
by respondents affecting the location decision choice, but other studies do not indicate 
similar importance – possibly for the reason that political stability has been a current 
state for long periods in some regions, and is type of basic assumption that does not 
show in study results.  
 
As we know, RHQs require high-quality business services, particularly a range of 
labour market skills and reliable communications infrastructure. Overall, infrastructure 
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related variables have been ranked very high in the literature and seem to be clearly one 
of the main criteria that affect the location choice of RHQs.  
 
According to the literature, other important location criteria seem to be market related 
variables, costs, overall business efficiency and convenience. The importance of 
personal preferences of executives has been noticed in some of the studies to weigh in 
the process of choosing a location for RHQ. Taxation, as location criteria, has been 
noticed widely, but the weight of its importance varies between the studies. 
 
As suggested earlier, the decision of site location can be best approached by an 
elimination process. Even though the studies introduce plenty of important variables, it 
is probably still the internal factors of MNCs and the overall business environment of 
the host city that matters most to RHQs.  
 
4.2 Relocation of RHQs    
 
There is an established literature on the relocation of CHQ, while very few studies 
purely concern the relocation of RHQs – instead the focus of prior research has been 
primarily at the business unit or division level of analysis (Forsgren et al. 1995; Euro, 
2001; Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2007). Even if the locational 
requirements of corporate headquarters and RHQs are partially similar (Dicken 2007), 
the motives to relocate these entities possibly differ, although, there is not enough 
empirical evidence to show this. However, the drivers of HQ relocation have been 
found to be different in the business unit and corporate settings (Birkinshaw et al. 2006, 
697). In this work, studies concerning corporate headquarters relocation will not be 
referred to. Instead, the studies available of the relocation of business/divisional HQs 
will be used, since these units are more closely related to RHQ - all of them present a 
layer directly below corporate headquarters in the organisation hierarchy. 
 
There has been a debate about the mobility of RHQs, but according to the literature the 
relocation of RHQ is not an unusual event (Perry et al. 1998, Ambos & Schlegelmilch 
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2010, Edgington & Hayter 2013, Kähäri 2014). Laamanen et al.  (2011) have analysed 
52 cross-border headquarters relocations (both corporate and regional headquarters) in 
Europe during 1996-2006 and have found an increasing trend towards relocation. Ho 
(2000) says that on a medium term (5-8 year period) perspective, we see a fair degree of 
mobility concerning RHQs. Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007, 261) discuss that 
relocations are becoming more common and find it surprising that the issue has not 
received more academic attention. Birkinshaw et al. (2006, 682) say that a firm’s 
competitiveness depends of its geographical location so any decision to relocate RHQs 
is potentially very important to the future success of the MNC. 
 
Birkinshaw et al. (2006, 684) define headquarters as having two essential elements: a 
top management group in an official location and a number of HQ functions with an 
identifiable physical location. These elements have traditionally been co-located, but 
now we see some growing separation. Today, it is relatively common for the firm to 
move one or more corporate functions away from the traditional centre. The HQ 
location can be conceptualized as a continuum, from entirely based in the home country 
through to entirely relocated overseas. (Birkinshaw et al., 2006) 
 
Laamanen et al. (2011, 5) define international headquarters relocation as the legal 
transfer of a firm’s corporate or regional headquarters from one country to another. In 
order to be considered as headquarters relocation, they do not require the top 
management team to move to the new HQs location, but they observe this to be the case 
in most relocations. Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007, 261) say that relocation of a HQ 
unit of MNC involves reorganising critical activities and moving key decision makers 
of the firm to a new location.  
 
According to Strauss-Kahn & Vives (2005, 2-3) the relocation of headquarters is a three 
level logic structure. First, a firm considers whether to relocate HQ, then classifies the 
potential locations by characteristics and chooses a nest, and finally chooses a location 
within the nest.  
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According to Ho (1998, 190), MNCs review periodically the site of their regional 
functions and seek new central points amid changing markets, production sites, 
regulatory and pricing environments. Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 80) say that as an 
organization matures, firms often reconsider the original location of the RHQ and the 
decision where to locate a RHQ seems to be driven by many unpredictable and often 
firm-specific factors. Laamanen et al. (2011) find that the decision to relocate the RHQs 
is likely to be driven by rational optimization. Also, they say that finding reasons for the 
existence of a large number of HQs in a certain country is equivalent to analysing why 
companies choose to relocate their headquarters there. 
 
Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010, 80) have researched European RHQs and found that a 
large proportion of the RHQs changed their original location during the course of 
operation. In their study, the firms followed one of three trajectories over time: 1) The 
HQ stayed in its original location 2) The HQ relocated into a lead market 3) The HQ 
relocated to mirror structural changes. According to the authors, soft factors and internal 
resource and power considerations have more impact on the relocation decision than 
economic factors like tax benefits. In contrast, the study results by Laamanen et al. 
(2011, 3) show that high corporate taxation or employment rates play an important role 
in increasing the likelihood of HQs relocation decisions. They found that the mean tax 
rate, an increase in corporate taxes by one percentage point will increase the likelihood 
of any given company leaving the country by 6.8%. Also, their data shows that 
companies tend to move their HQs to countries with lower taxes and to locations close 
to capitals. Laamanen et al. (2011) also say that RHQs tend to be diverse in their 
functions and scale. As these functions are usually more limited than those of the global 
headquarters, they assume that the costs associated with the relocation of RHQs are 
lower and therefore RHQs are easier to move. Results of their study show that the 
RHQs of foreign companies are more mobile than the global headquarters of European 
companies. They say that being a RHQ rather than global headquarters increases the 
chances of relocation over fourfold. In addition, the authors have considered the 
possibility that HQs’ relocation decisions are driven by the tendency for firms to imitate 
each other.  
 
  49 
As we know, MNCs possibly review the relocation options periodically but some of 
them decide to stay in the original location. What are the possible reasons for this 
according to the literature that may explain the immobility of RHQs? If the MNC is 
satisfied with the current geographical location of RHQ, sunk costs (e.g. investments in 
information systems and physical infrastructure) and the cost of relocation can add to 
the barriers of RHQs mobility. Also, companies could stay if they enjoy the benefits of 
continued infrastructure investment by governments and the advantages experienced by 
companies because of the critical mass created by co-locating businesses. In addition, 
the following reasons have been mentioned that may constrain RHQs mobility: the 
organizational context of RHQ within matrix organization structures, alternative roles of 
RHQs such as new business development and management of regional resources, 
coordination of networks of business partners and the absence of a pool of prospective 
regional managers. (Ho 2000, Perry et al. 1998) 
 
Perry et al. (1998) examined the relocation of RHQs between Singapore and the Hong 
Kong. These two cities accommodate the major concentrations of RHQs located across 
the Asian Pacific rim and there is flexibility within organizations to use either Singapore 
or Hong Kong as the main RHQs location for East Asia. The findings of the study 
indicated a low level of mobility amongst RHQs. Also, little willingness to consider any 
other location was discovered. The range of feasible headquarters locations for foreign 
organizations is limited as Hong Kong and Singapore are both specialized in the 
geographical sub-regions to which they are most suited. (Perry et al. 1998, 137-39) 
 
The study by Perry et al. (1998) argued that the relocation of RHQ occurs only in the 
context of multiple influences. According to them, the location considerations tend to be 
subject to market cycles that can change the relative attractiveness of locations. They 
continue, the growth and redistribution of foreign investment can affect the geography 
of regional control, thus affecting to the location choice of RHQs. For example, Hong 
Kong’s attractiveness to RHQs has strengthened from the changing geography of 
foreign direct investment in favour of China to the loss of South-East Asia (Perry 1998). 
Third, according to Perry et al. (1998), fiscal incentives are less important in attracting 
RHQs than firm strategies and other structural forces. Ho (2000) sees that in the 
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medium term perspective (5-8 years) RHQs could move as a response to rising costs, 
the pull of new markets and productions sites, and the investment promotion efforts of 
new contenders. 
 
Forsgren et al. (1995) examined 19 large Swedish MNCs and reported that 22 of a total 
of 104 divisions HQs had moved abroad. They explained that the location of division 
HQ is a consequence of power relations associated with the internationalisation of the 
corporation. In other words, the different interests associated with division HQ, foreign 
subsidiaries and corporate HQ have an impact on the location of division HQ. 
Internationalization changes power relations between the three different actors and leads 
to a power struggle - wherein foreign subsidiaries present an attractive force and 
corporate HQ as a resisting force in the relocation of division HQ abroad.  The results of 
the study indicate that the more internationalized the operations of a division, the more 
likely that the division HQ will be located outside the CHQ country. The most dominant 
subsidiary presents an attraction force which has a positive effect in locating division 
HQ abroad. (Forsgren et a. 1995, 475-86) 
 
Previous research has taken a view that the HQ relocation is a step in a firm’s 
internationalisation process (Forsgren et al., 1995). Usually, internationalisation starts 
from the transfer of sales and marketing units abroad, with production and R&D units 
following later. Forsgren et al. (1995) have labelled this the first degree of 
internationalisation. According to them, in the second degree of internationalisation, 
subsidiaries may develop into strategic centres or centres of excellence with 
responsibilities beyond their local undertakings. Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007, 263) 
build on the work of Forsgren et al. (1995) by labelling the relocation of HQ units as the 
third degree of internationalisation. 
 
According to Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007, 263), several different types of relocation 
have been identified. Firms may relocate a HQ unit directly or a firm may decentralise 
its functions to other units which then are relocated – this would be called an indirect 
relocation or a hidden relocation, which according to them may be difficult to detect. 
They say that relocation can be full, partial or virtual. Full relocation takes place when 
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the entire top management group and all HQ functions move. When only selected 
members of the top management group and functions are transferred, the question is 
about partial HQ relocation. In virtual relocation, HQ management responsibilities are 
being handled by frequent travelling and with modern IT support systems. Barner-
Rasmussen et al. (2007) argue that the patterns are not mutually exclusive, but often 
simultaneously present due to the intertwining of the functions and staff of corporate 
and business units. (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007, 263; 270) 
 
However, Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007, 269) discovered that the relocation of HQs in 
some Finnish MNCs was practically “de-internationalisation”. In their research, in two 
of the case companies they examined, the HQ returned to the firm’s home country of 
origin after having been abroad for some ten years. However, they note that the 
relocation abroad should not be interpreted as being erroneous or the return to the 
home-base as being a step backwards. They say, instead the relocations helped the 
executives to gain valuable experience that contributed to a more global mind set. Their 
study discusses that under particular circumstances HQ may be highly mobile and that a 
strategic decision to relocate a HQ unit abroad is not necessarily a one-off event, but 
may be repeated or take a virtual form. Therefore, according to them no relocation 
should be considered permanent. (Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2007, 269) 
 
Strauss-Kahn & Vives (2005) have examined the relocation phenomenon of HQs and 
management centres in the US between 1996-2001. They used a database of about 
30,000 management centres and found the rate of relocation to be 5% a year. Their 
study shows that larger firms (in terms of sales) and younger HQs tend to relocate more 
often, as well as larger (in terms of the number of management centres) and foreign 
firms, and firms that are the outcome of a merger. Typically, HQs relocate to 
metropolitan area with good air traffic connections, low corporate taxes, low average 
wages, high levels of business services, and concentration of HQ in the same sector of 
activity (Strauss-Kahn & Vives 2005, 3).  
 
A study by Birkinshaw et al. (2006) examined the decision by the Fortune 500 list of 
global companies to locate their corporate or business unit headquarters overseas. They 
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used data on 125 business unit HQs and 35 corporate HQs and found out that around 23 
of them had shifted their entire HQ overseas. More than half of the 23 cases occurred in 
the last five years.  
 
Birkinshaw et al. (2006, 685) suggested that there are three reasons why business units 
might move overseas: efficiency gains, strategic benefits and symbolic value. By 
moving management closer to the centre of the business, there are likely to be efficiency 
gains in communication and more efficient interaction between different activities will 
enhance the firm-specific advantages. Second, strategic benefits may emerge in the 
form of knowledge spillovers and access to resources in shifting to a new location. 
Third, there is symbolic value in relocating the business unit HQ abroad since it 
demonstrates to employees and outside stakeholders, that the business is global in its 
outlook.    
 
Birkinshaw et al. (2006, 697) showed that the business unit HQs relocate overseas when 
they already have a large percentage of their sales and manufacturing activities 
overseas, and they move to more attractive locations than the host country, in terms of 
industrial clustering and a favourable business climate. Birkinshaw et al. (2006) argue 
that the extent to which corporate and business unit HQs move overseas is constrained 
by the concentration of the share ownership of the MNC and to some extent by the 
interdependence between the two levels of HQ. 
 
Birkinshaw et al. (2006, 698) expect that in the future there will be more relocations of 
HQs from small European countries (e.g. Finland) to larger European countries; from 
Canada to the United States; and from smaller developed economies in other regions to 
major financial and commercial centres.  
 
Barner-Rasmussen et al., (2007, 267) studied the relocation cases of large Finnish 
MNCs (including division HQs and business group HQs) and based on their findings 
they explained and conceptualised HQ relocation as an outcome of six key drivers in 
two dimensions. The key drivers may be internal or external to the case company and 
the two dimensions are pragmatic or symbolic. The key drivers of HQ relocation are: 
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control and integration of subsidiaries, inducing HR-related change, responding to 
owners and other stakeholders, physical presence in relevant area, costs and spatial 
structure of management, and the quality of life. Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007) argued 
that factors associated with HQ relocation are prioritised differently in different firms, 
and even within the same firm, their relative importance varies across time as business 
conditions and goals change. According to them, the same key drivers can operate into 
two directions: at one time, they may push the HQ to relocate to another host country 
and at another time, they may attract it to return to its original location. The interaction 
of key drivers and two dimensions results in different patterns of HQ relocation under 
particular circumstances in highly mobile HQ units: full, partial, virtual, hidden or direct 
relocation.    
 
Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007, 269) found that HQ relocation is often motivated by a 
quest for resources, such as global managerial talent perceived to be low in the location 
of departure and plentiful in the target location (see also Euro 2001). Closeness to key 
customers and competitors was also mentioned. The availability of skilled employees 
and knowledge spillovers from customers, suppliers and competitors also apply to HQ 
relocations. In addition, they discovered that financial performance seemed not to be a 
direct driver of the relocation, instead the expected economic benefits were seen as 
longer-term and indirect, derived from smoother and better integrated operations or 
more competent employees that the firm was able to attract in the new location. Barner-
Rasmussen et al. (2007) did not find strong evidence that individual income taxation 
alone would determine the HQ location. However, they say that in combination with 
other factors, a country with high levels of personal income taxation constitute a barrier 
to the recruitment of foreign nationals to that country and over time may contribute to 
MNCs locating their HQ somewhere else. (Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2007, 269) 
 
Benito et al. (2011) conducted a longitudinal study concerning the relocation of 
divisional HQ abroad in about 30 of the largest publicly listed Norwegian companies 
between the years 2000 and 2006.  In 2000, the 30 companies were divided into a total 
of 106 divisions while in 2006 the number of divisions had increased to 132. The 
number of division HQs located outside Norway increased from 31 in 2000 to 56 in 
  54 
2006, which represents an increase of 80 percent and a massive outward movement of 
divisional HQs out of Norway.  
 
Benito et al. (2011) suggested that HQ relocation is influenced by efficiency factors, 
relating to company size and internationalization as well as drivers by legitimacy, 
particularly by ownership factors, such as the identity of owners (private versus state, 
national versus foreign) and ownership concentration. To be precise, their study showed 
that the higher the number of divisions in a company, the more likely that it has located 
some of its HQs abroad. According to them, one explanation is that companies increase 
the number of divisions when expanding abroad through acquisitions. In contrast to the 
studies of Forsgren et al. (1995) and Birkinshaw et al. (2006), Benito et al. (2011) found 
that the degree of internationalization does not itself lead to relocation of divisional 
HQs. According to their results, conglomerates are less prone to locate division HQs 
abroad. However, Benito et al. (2011) said it is possible that large conglomerates have 
more layers of HQ functions (other than division HQs), and their study may have 
missed foreign headquarters activities at lower levels. Also, their data showed that 
companies operating in service sectors are more prone to locate division HQ abroad 
than manufacturing companies. They said that service MNCs must pay more attention 
to local institutes and competition conditions, as well as, develop strategies for local 
subsidiaries, therefore division HQs must be located close to subsidiaries abroad.      
 
Benito et al. (2011) observed that foreign ownership does not itself increase the 
tendency to relocate. However, they found that state ownership and ownership 
concentration prevents headquarters relocation abroad. Results of the study of Benito et 
al. (2011) support the findings of Birkinshaw et al. (2006) concerning ownership 
concentration.   
 
In summary, HQ unit relocations are becoming more common and it is not unusual that 
the RHQ changes the original location during the course of its operation. International 
RHQ relocation is defined as the transfer of a firm’s RHQ from one country to another. 
However, several different types of relocation have been identified. HQ unit can be 
relocated directly or indirectly. Also, relocation of HQ can be full, partial or virtual. It is 
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possible to conceptualize the HQ location as a continuum, from entirely based in the 
home country through to entirely relocated overseas. The relocation event should not be 
considered as permanent.  
 
The decision where to locate a RHQ unit is likely to be driven by rational optimization, 
but often it is driven by many unpredictable and firm-specific factors. The relocation of 
a RHQ unit usually occurs in the context of multiple influences. Also, it is possible that 
factors associated with RHQ relocation are prioritised differently in different firms, and 
even within the same firm their relative importance could vary over time.  
 
Several factors affecting the relocation decision of a HQ unit have been found in the 
literature: control and integration of subsidiaries, inducing HR-related change, 
responding to owners and other stakeholders, physical presence in relevant area, costs 
and spatial structure of management, and the quality of life. HQ relocation is often 
motivated by efficiency gains, strategic benefits and symbolic value. HQs relocate to 
more attractive locations than the host country, close to capitals with good air traffic 
connections, low corporate taxes, low average wages, high levels of business services, a 
favourable business climate and concentration of headquarters in the same sector of 
activity. HQs’ relocation decisions could be driven by the tendency for firms to imitate 
each other. 
 
There is some evidence that larger firms (in terms of sales) and younger HQs tend to 
relocate more often, as well as larger (in terms of the number of management centres) 
and foreign firms, and firms that are the outcome of a merger. The costs associated with 
the relocation of RHQs are lower than global headquarters, and therefore RHQs are 
easier to move. The RHQs of foreign companies are more mobile than the global 
headquarters of European companies.  
 
RHQs have been found to relocate into lead markets and to mirror structural changes. In 
the medium term perspective (5-8 years) RHQs could move as a response to rising 
costs, the pull of new markets and productions sites, and investment promotion efforts, 
and regulatory and pricing environments. Soft factors and internal resource and power 
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considerations possibly have more impact on the relocation decision of RHQ than 
economic factors like tax benefits.  
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5 METHODOLOGY 
First, this chapter discusses the background of the study and structured survey interview 
as a study method. Second, it will describe the method of analysing data. Third, it will 
reflect on the reliability and validity of the research, as well as limitations of the study. 
5.1 Background  
 
The empirical part focuses on regional headquarters (RHQ) that foreign multinational 
companies have established in Finland over time. This research is a sub-study of a 
larger research project carried out in Aalto University School of Business in 2009-2010 
and findings of this study have been reported before (Kähäri 2014; Kähäri & Piekkari 
2015). The research project builds on the results of a previous Gateway-project study  
carried out by another team of researchers in 1998-1999 in the Helsinki School of 
Economics (Luostarinen 2000).  
 
The Gateway study identified a total of 1144 foreign–owned subsidiaries in Finland and 
out of them 375 had at some point in time been recognized with a regional 
headquarters’ status. In 1999, there existed 325 RHQs in Finland and 50 companies had 
lost the RHQ mandate. (Ratia 2000, 31) 
 
In the study of 1989-1999, the RHQ was defined as a unit which fulfils two key criteria: 
1) it should be mandated by the higher levels of the MNC organisation (before or after 
the initiation of the activity) and 2) it should have explicit decision-making power over 
its mandated region (Kähäri 2014). Due to the longitudinal nature of this study, the 
same RHQ definition has been applied in the research of 2010.  
 
The purpose of the study in hand was to find out how many of these regional 
headquarters identified in 1999 still existed in 2010. The feasible way to reach this goal 
was to carry out a census, i.e. the complete population was researched. It should be 
noted that this study did not seek to find new RHQ but to follow up the original 
population that existed in 1999.  
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For the start, the population was determined and a sampling frame was formed. This 
stage in research process is often problematic in practice, because “it is difficult to get a 
complete and fully correct list”, which was also the case in this study (Kajalo 2010). 
5.2 Sample, researching the original database 
 
First, the original extensive Gateway-database had to be researched and organized. The 
material was not in any kind of order or listed after being stored in several locations for 
over a decade. In practice, part of the database was searched from a messy warehouse, 
which was filled mostly with irrelevant material, but among relevant piles of papers, 
albums filled with old written questionnaires (with most part missing), and floppy disks. 
The most valuable part of the database had been saved from computer hard disks and it 
consisted of several files from different periods of the prior research process. The 
researcher was left with a great amount of disorganized files that had to be listed and 
researched in order to understand the content and meaning of the files. The written 
material concerning the Gateway research and results could be found from the school 
library and also from some of the old files in Word-format that were a great help in 
understanding the prior research process and meaning of data. The prior research 
consisted of three major parts (corresponding to three Thesis’: Ratia 2000; Santalainen 
2000; Kautovaara 2000) and two separate sub-studies and a summary report of five 
different studies by professor Reijo Luostarinen (2000).  
As the results of the Gateway study were produced by five different sub-studies, the 
master files (in Excel-format) had been built by pooling the information from separate 
studies. The researcher examined both the individual files and master files in order to 
understand the different sub-studies relative to the reported results as a whole. Also, 
comparisons between the files were carried out and some minuscule differences could 
be found between the reported findings of the study and the Gateway Excel-files. After 
reviewing the whole prior research material, some lack of clarity was found to exist 
concerning the 50 companies that had lost the RHQ-position before 1999. Excel-files 
showed around 30 companies from whom RHQ was withdrawn, while the reported 
results showed almost 50 companies. In other words, at this stage of the research, some 
names of the companies were missing that had lost the RHQ status. To solve this 
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problem, it was justifiable to include all 375 companies in the sampling frame, which is 
a total number of RHQs established through time in Finland up to 1999. 
5.3 Choosing the data collection method: structured interviews 
 
Due to the longitudinal nature of this research, the study method of the former 
FIBO/Gateway research conducted in 1998-1999 will first be discussed. In the previous 
study, the method was a mail questionnaire, however, the problems encountered with 
this method led to a change of method in the middle of the research process. Santalainen 
(2000, 39) explains: 
“The questionnaire was mailed to 228 Baltic RHQs. Due to the limited number of valid 
responses after the first mailing round, a second round was undertaken in August 1999. 
However, after two mailings only 48 answers were received and therefore it was 
decided to carry on the data gathering by telephone interviews.” 
The difficulties encountered in the former research and low response rate convinced the 
author of the thesis that the study method should be other than traditional mail survey. 
The research team collectively shared the view that an electronic mail survey would 
probably not provide better results than the traditional mail survey, and the response 
rate was expected to be low. Some disadvantages can be attributed to the mail surveys: 
the time taken, a low response rate, and some of the questionnaires when returned are 
not fully complete (Kajalo 2010).  
The purpose of this study was to contact the whole population and find out how the 
RHQ position in each of the 375 companies had developed in over a decade. The 
research team was aiming for a high response rate, which would clearly have an effect 
to the reliability of the study. The survey interview over the phone was chosen as a 
suitable method due to the large number of respondents and the nature of research 
questions. The study would be longitudinal, employing both qualitative and quantitative 
research (Pettigrew 1990). According to Pettigrew (1990), longitudinal research design 
can be conducted using different data collection methods such as interviews. According 
to Daniels & Cannice (2004, 190), a methodology should be picked based on the quality 
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of information that the methodology is likely to yield. The information we needed was 
of a special kind, highly contextual and could only be obtained from company 
representatives at executive level i.e. the desired sample consisted of respondents in a 
very specific target population.  As researchers we needed to understand the 
phenomenon more deeply and considered direct discussions with company 
representatives necessary. According to Daniels & Cannice (2004, 186): “Interview-
based research studies are particularly well suited for exploratory and theory building 
studies; that is, when researchers study an issue with little or no pre-existing theoretical 
bias.” They say that the interview method has several strengths, including the possibility  
that interviews may allow researchers to establish a deeper rapport with informants than 
is possible through written questionnaires. Daniels & Cannice (2004, 186) continue: 
“This may be necessary to gain honest and accurate responses and to add insights that 
lay the groundwork for larger or follow-up studies.” Also, the researcher becomes 
confident that no other than the target informant supplies the information. A telephone 
interview was chosen, seeing that it is relatively cost efficient and fast in the sense that 
the results of the survey are available right away (Kajalo 2010). However, 
disadvantages of this method include that it can be very time-consuming, which 
typically constrains the use of interviews for large samples. Interviews are also more 
demanding since they require certain interpersonal skills, researchers must have the 
ability to interact with high-level executives. (Daniels & Cannice 2004).   
Structured interview was chosen as the type of interview, meaning that interviewer uses 
a pre-planned script and there is little flexibility in the wording or order of questions. A 
structured interview is qualitative if the responses given by participants are open ended. 
It is considered as an efficient study method when collecting information about ‘facts’ 
(e.g. what happened, when and how). Also, the structured interview was suitable 
because there were three interviewers involved and it was necessary to reduce 
variability caused by it. Structured interview is convenient when interviewers are less 
knowledgeable, and when it is important to be able to compare the information provided 
by the participants systematically. (Eriksson Päivi & Kovalainen Anne, 2008)  
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5.3.1 Preparing for data collection 
 
Before the interviews, the existence of the original population of 375 RHQ companies 
had to be verified. A contact information update was carried out for the companies due 
to changes in company name, mergers and acquisitions as well as shut downs that had 
occurred since the first survey was administered in 1998. This was carried out based on 
the official registries (Yritys- ja yhteisötietojärjestelmä YTJ, www.ytj.fi), company 
contact information databases (Fonecta, http://profinderb2b.fonecta.com) and company 
websites. In addition, business news, company updates, business articles published in 
internet/web in general provided some useful hints. These were used as a supporting 
source of information in order to find out what had happened to some of the companies 
in a period of over ten years. In some case it appeared during the phone interview that it 
was no longer relevant (e.g. the company had moved to Finnish ownership). 
Old questionnaire forms could still be found from the FIBO database concerning some 
of the researched companies with the prior address of the company and the name of the 
executive who answered the survey over 10 years ago. In practice, there were some 
cases were several phone calls had to be made in order to find out what had happened to 
the company/business operations under survey in 1999, or until the appropriate contact 
person could be found.  
There existed certain challenges related to the data collection in general. How to get 
access to interviewees? How to get the number of suitable respondents and reach them? 
It was expected that the large target population would be busy and unreachable at times. 
Even so, the research team believed that the telephone would be the most appropriate 
way to find out who is the right representative of the target company to answer to the 
survey and to obtain the telephone number of the person.  
It was clear that the role of the interviewer would have an effect on who would respond 
to the survey and what kind of information the researchers would obtain from the 
interview. Golden (1992) says that the incentives and disincentives for participating in a 
research project must be recognized in the design of a study. Miller et al. (1997, 201) 
say that researchers should motivate the managers to participate in the study, as well as 
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provide accurate information. Miller et al. (1997, 201) add: “To motivate informants, 
confidentiality should be ensured, the duration and inconvenience of data collection 
should be minimised, and rich explanations of the usefulness should be given.”  
The phone interview cannot last long (e.g. more than 15 minutes) therefore the 
questionnaire could not be very complicated. We created a short marketing pitch 
concerning the value of our research and stressed that the company had responded in the 
first round of data collection over ten years ago. We promised confidentiality and to 
preserve the anonymity of respondents so as to put the responder more at ease (Daniels 
& Cannice 2004).   
5.3.2 Formulation and piloting of structured interview questionnaire                                             
The data gathering from the RHQs was carried out by structured survey questions over 
the telephone. We designed a new open-ended telephone questionnaire (see Appendix 
1) based on the original questionnaires from 1998 and 1999. Some research questions 
(e.g. related to background information) remained as they were in 1998-1999. The old 
study was only partially replicated and was extended for certain new aspects. We added 
new questions about the development of RHQs and its changing role. Interview 
questions centred around: basic company and group data; data on Finnish subsidiary’s 
current RHQ position and responsibilities; data on lost RHQ position and possible 
relocation of RHQs; and factors that affected the change in RHQ position in each of the 
situations.    
First, the questionnaire was pretested with an arranged telephone interview and adjusted 
based on the feedback.  The questionnaire was further tested and developed while the 
telephone interviews were carried on with the pilot group of companies. We considered 
the pilot interviews necessary seeing as it helped us to understand the phenomenon. 
Discussions with company representatives provided not just data, but ideas on how to 
continue the survey and the results guided to the direction of questions to be used in the 
final questionnaire. In the pilot stage, few target respondents answered that they are too 
busy for the interview and asked us to send the interview questions in written form by e-
mail. However, we noticed almost immediately that the procedure was not working. 
Either the respondent never took the survey or had not understood some of the research 
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questions, so we needed to call back to ask further questions and ended up doing the 
interview over the phone eventually. This was a valuable learning experience after 
which a conscious decision was made not to send the interview questions by e-mail and 
to conduct the interviews only over the phone. 
5.3.3   Respondent                                                                                                                
The contact person in the companies was either the executive secretary or CEO for 
smaller companies. Researchers found it useful to send an e-mail to the secretary 1-2 
days before the telephone interview. The mail contained short introduction to the 
research topic, a definition of RHQs and some examples of upcoming research 
questions. The person who received the mail therefore had some time to prepare the 
answers for the interview, or could pass the mail to someone in more suitable position 
to answer the questionnaire. It was common that two company representatives answered 
the questionnaire. Typically, assistants provided answers to basic research questions, 
and determined who would be another appropriate company representative to continue 
the interview. Later on staff, communication or marketing managers, country managers, 
controllers or CEOs continued answering the more specific questions about RHQs and 
organisational change. 
5.4 Data Collection 
 
Table 1: Phases of longitudinal data collection 1998-1999 
Phase Data set Number of 
subsidiaries 
Phone 
Interview 
Information 
over the 
phone 
No contact / 
decision not to 
contact 
Questionnaire Collection 
completed 
1 Pilot 28 18 5 5 1 December, 2009 
2 Main group 1 37 34 1 2 1 January, 2010 
3 Main group 2 310 172 57 81 2 April, 2010 
  Total 375 224 63 88     
 
The phases of the data collection are summarized in Table 1 above. The data collection 
started in November 2009 with telephone calls and gathering of 10 companies that were 
considered as the pilot group of the study - these were chosen from the group of 375 
companies. A total of five companies in the pilot group did not exist in 2009, therefore 
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new companies needed to be chosen from the list of 375. Finally, the pilot group was 
extended to a total of 28 companies. At this stage, final adjustments were made to the 
questionnaire and the 4th version of the questionnaire (1) was in use while we continued 
the interview with “the main group” of companies. Between December 2009 and 
January 2010, data concerning the pilot and main group (1) of companies were restored 
to the FIBO database using Excel-format.  
 
Each interview was conducted in the Finnish language and took about 15 minutes. Since 
the original survey questions were in the Finnish language the follow-up survey was 
also conducted in Finnish, that being the native tongue of the majority of the 
respondents and the researchers (a small number were native speakers of Swedish or 
other languages). While conducting the structured interviews over the phone, 
researchers wrote answers directly in the questionnaire. The interviews were also 
recorded. Summaries of interviews were typed up to the database and distributed to 
other team members (google.doc).  
The third phase of data collection started in February, 2010. A final version of the 
questionnaire suitable for the large number of interviews was designed. Also, a 
conscious decision was made that the telephone interview procedures had to be 
simplified and therefore several measures were taken to improve the efficiency. First, 
we stopped sending e-mails concerning the upcoming telephone interviews to the 
companies and later the study results showed that this measure had no effect on the 
response rate. Second, a decision was made to carry out the large number of interviews 
with the help of a computer (computer assisted telephone interviewing, CATI). A new 
web-based questionnaire (2) was created to the Webropol environment (www. 
webropol.com) only for the use of researchers (see Appendix 2). Now, during the 
structured interviews, researchers would feed the collected data directly to the database.  
Data collection lasted until the end of April in 2010, while we covered the entire 
remaining population. We performed 287 phone calls all together and a total of 224 
structured interviews were conducted (see Table 1).  
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5.5.    Data Analysis 
5.5.1   Preparing  
Before the data analysis we undertook several measures to improve the data quality. A 
period of one month was dedicated for cleaning of the collected data. The data collected 
in phase one (the pilot group) and phase two (the main group, part 1) needed to be 
converted in order to make it comparable with the information collected in phase three 
(the main group of companies, part 2). We recorded the open-ended questions from 
phase one and two into Excel format corresponding to the form of the final 
questionnaire (phase three). A great amount of time and effort was invested in this 
procedure and all three researchers were involved in this phase. The work was divided 
as follows: the two researchers that originally collected the data in phase one and two 
(from pilot and main group of companies) fed the information into a clean Excel sheet 
in the form equating to the Webropol-survey questionnaire, while the third researcher 
fed the same information to another clean sheet. Later, the two sheets were compared 
and if any deviation existed, even minor details, the researchers discussed each case and 
made a collective decision about the final form of presenting the data. The collective 
view was copied to into the original form of sheet used in the survey. This work was 
time consuming, however, the researchers shared a common opinion that the procedure 
was necessary and agreed that the end results were satisfying. Second, due to the fact 
that we had three individuals performing phone interviews, we reviewed all interview 
questions in detail and ensured that similar answers were coded in the same way.   
Skippari (2010) points out that in longitudinal statistical data, changes in measures and 
data classifications and categorizations over time are a major challenge possibly leading 
to problems in consistency. The classifications of different factors were defined in 
accordance with the previous Gateway-study 1998-1999 whenever possible, enabling 
comparisons between the two studies. This was a basic requirement with longitudinal 
data that concerns more than one point of time and repeated observations on units 
observed over time (Skippari 2009). 
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5.5.2   Analysis 
The purpose of this study was to reveal the development of the RHQ situation in 
Finland between 1999 and 2010. The thesis builds on the research results of another 
research group and continues their work. The analysis methods applied in the earlier 
research process and choices made in reporting the results have offered some guidance 
on how to continue the work. The main purpose from the data is to recognize possible 
changes over the long-term and show trends, therefore straight statistical distributions 
provided by Excel have been considered appropriate by providing simple and clear 
results. The simple way to report survey results is by using charts and different figures 
(Kajalo 2010).  
Due to the large sample size, structured interviews produced hundreds of observations 
that needed to be summarized in a simple way, in order to make the data manageable. 
Even though a large amount of data refers to a quantitative research, the best approach 
to the research problem concerning the RHQ dynamics has been qualitative due to the 
large amount of qualitative data generated in the telephone interviews. Descriptive 
statistics were chosen to summarize the sample and describe the multiple discrete events 
of the data. The analysis method was classification of the variables. Classifications are 
often tabulated and presented with tables, figures and graphs that enable one to 
understand the data distribution. (http://www.uiah.fi/projekti/metodi/170.htm) 
The research data was analysed by producing summary data with numerous tables, cross 
tabulations, figures and graphs that were formulated in order to make the data “visible”. 
Frequencies and relative frequencies were calculated for different variables regarding 
time and different background variables. These summaries were then used for particular 
investigation in order to produce a description of the RHQ phenomenon under research 
and explain the change that took place in the RHQ population during the research 
period. (http://www.uiah.fi/projekti/metodi/170.htm) 
5.6     Reliability and validity 
According to Pettigrew (1990), longitudinal methods may be the only way to uncover 
processes of changes. Retrospective reports are a popular tool for studying the past, but 
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their use poses a series of challenges (Golden 1992). The main problem is that the 
interviewees may not be able to accurately remember the past (Miller et al. 1997, 189). 
According to Golden (1992), inaccurate recall in retrospective reporting can result from 
rationalizations, simplifications, attribution, self-presentation, and simple lapses of 
memory. He argues that retrospective errors appear to occur systematically, and 
demands plenty of scepticism in the study design stage and in the interpretation of 
retrospective data. Miller et al. (1997, 200) say that “retrospective reports should only 
be used when reasonable efforts to demonstrate reliability and validity can be reported”. 
Golden (1992; 1997) and Miller et al. (1997) suggest strategies for reducing errors in 
retrospective accounts. Golden (1992, 855) says researchers should ask about simple 
facts or concrete events rather than past opinions or beliefs. A focus on facts and 
concrete events is likely to be less subject to cognitive biases and impression 
management (Miller et al. 1997). Miller et al. (1997, 201) say researchers should not 
ask informants to recall facts or events from the distant past. He adds that researchers 
should motivate their informants to provide accurate information. Golden (1992) 
suggests that researchers should acknowledge respondents’ possible emotional 
attachment to pet projects or their interest in portraying a particular view of the 
organisation. He continues that the respondent’s organizational role may also influence 
to her interpretation of the past, therefore, a researcher should possibly rely on multiple 
respondents in an organisation. Miller et al. (1997, 201) agrees that the information 
provided by any one informant should be checked against the information provided by 
other informants. However, as Golden said, the strategic awareness is usually positively 
related to hierarchical level, therefore, the benefit of using multiple respondents must be 
balanced against the possibility of introducing greater systematic error into the 
measurement of certain phenomena. Also, researchers should seek multiple forms of 
data, including retrospective, archival and longitudinal data – Triangulation may both 
allow for the validation of each data source and also enrich the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data. (Golden 1992, 855-56) 
Golden (1992) argues that there is a disadvantage in asking open-ended questions about 
recent changes: Informants may selectively neglect some events that are important or 
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focus on trends that are actually unimportant but temporarily on display to the 
informant.  
In the course of study, it turned out that some of the interviewees had limited 
knowledge and memories related to the questions asked. According to Daniels & 
Cannice (2004, 196): “The people with current responsibility for an area may have little 
first hand knowledge about events that occurred even recently. A researcher can usually 
determine that in a short phone call and be redirected, if necessary, to the right person.” 
It was common that two company representatives answered to the questionnaire, which 
enabled us to check the internal consistency of respondents from that company and to 
take into account each respondents’ responsibilities and level in the organisation. 
(Daniels & Cannice 2004) 
The executive secretaries provided answers to basic research questions concerning the 
background information of the Finnish subsidiary and group. It was common that they 
checked the information from official company documents (annual reports, financial 
statements). In addition, researchers used official registries to verify their answers (e.g. 
net revenue, staff size) that increased the reliability of the answers. However, sometimes 
assistants possessed limited knowledge and memories related to the specific questions 
about RHQs and organisational change. Therefore, the respondents from managerial 
level continued answering the questionnaire and their role was crucial in improving the 
reliability of responses. 
However, we considered the role of executive secretaries and the conversation with 
them important and agreed with the following line. “A favourably impressed executive 
assistant will tentatively put the researcher into the boss’s schedule, after which the boss 
will almost certainly participate in an interview” (Daniels & Cannice 2004, 195). 
Second, we got an impression that when one respondent from the company had already 
given her/his time and participated to the survey this seemed to put the second 
responder from executive level under an obligation to continue the survey and provide 
information to the open questions. Also the longitudinal perspective of the study and the 
fact that a respondent from executive level of the firm had participated to the survey in 
1999 impressed the respondents. The high response rate of the survey could also be 
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interpreted as partly reflecting this phenomenon. In addition, the conversation with the 
secretary was often very useful in order to get the general impression of the company’s 
RHQ situation that helped to continue the survey with managerial level respondents. 
First, we could seek verification from multiple informants. Second, researchers were 
more prepared for the conversations with executives and CEOs since they already had a 
preliminary understanding of the company’s current situation, which sometimes could 
be very complicated. Researchers should clarify responses by asking additional 
questions and paraphrasing what has been said (Daniels & Cannice 2004, 200). This 
procedure was instrumental in performing the interviews, and especially useful with 
discussions with several respondents from the same company.  
One must notice the interviewees represented the Finnish subsidiaries and their answers 
reflect the situation from their point of view, based on their knowledge, memories and 
impressions on what had happened and why. We must take into account the fact that 
some of the answers may be biased or inaccurate due to the interviewee’s limited 
knowledge and memories related to the questions asked. For explaining RHQ change 
over time, one needs a longitudinal perspective. However, one must realistically 
consider how long in the past can a human being remember. So researchers must be 
careful, interview many people and compare their answers (Skippari 2009). In this study 
the reliability of answers was increased by researchers providing the basic facts so 
respondents did not need to remember company’s RHQ situation from the distant past. 
The main research question was: Does your company still have the RHQ responsibility 
in this country as you had in 1999 (according to the results of the previous study 1999) 
or do you have currently a new RHQ position that was not mentioned in 1999? 
Executive secretaries and executive level managers gave very similar answers 
concerning the company’s current RHQ position.    
If the RHQ position was lost, respondents were asked to remember the exact timing of 
event – When Finnish subsidiary lost the RHQ position concerning a particular country 
or when the RHQ was relocated out of Finland? Typically, the executive secretaries 
checked the exact year of organizational change from either company’s internal 
documents or passed the survey to someone else in a more suitable position, typically to 
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a manager level. More specifically, in practice this question divided the respondents 
into three categories. One group of the respondents checked the exact timing from 
company’s internal documents or from someone else in the organisation e.g. CEO. 
Second group of respondent gave an exact yeat from their memory (e.g. CEO or 
financial manager). The third group of respondents gave an estimate: “It was five years 
ago either 2004 or 2005”. For the third group, answers were treated by researchers as 
follows. In the data collection phase we recorded the exact given answer (e.g. 2004-
2005) by the responder, however, in the data cleaning stage we commonly agreed to use 
systematically always the first given year in the data analysis (e.g. 2004). We must 
acknowledge that some of the answers concerning the exact timing when the RHQ 
position was lost might be biased or inaccurate due to the interviewee’s limited 
memories. It is realistic to expect the exact timing of RHQ changes that took place 
recently to be more reliable than the exact timing of event that took place ten years ago. 
The data concerning how long the Finnish subsidiary’s RHQ position existed is 
realistically expected to be an estimate rather than en exact fact in some of the answers 
given by respondents.    
Among the large sample, there existed a few cases where the company’s current RHQ 
position was open to interpretation - if the company had a RHQ responsibility or not.  
Research team discussed each case separately in order to find a shared opinion about the 
specific case and a common line throughout the study. 
According to Malhotra & Birks (2007, 281), a recording error can arise due to the errors 
in hearing, interpreting and recording the answers given by the respondent. Due to the 
longitudinal nature of the study one must acknowledge possible recording errors in 
different stages of the studies. A possible error made in the study of 1999 could affect 
the single result of researched company in 2010 (e.g. the basic RHQ situation and the 
length of RHQ responsibility of Finnish subsidiary).  However, it can be expected that 
possible single recording errors could not skew the results of the study, since single 
errors would be compensated for in a large sample. 
Some discrepancies were found to exist between the study results of 1999 and the 
answers given by a few respondents concerning the Finnish subsidiary’s prior RHQ 
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responsibility on a single country level. There were few cases where the interviewee 
disagreed with the prior study results that their company had a certain RHQ 
responsibility concerning a particular country in 1999 – and clearly indicated that there 
must be an error in the old data. We can only speculate about the source of an error or 
the reason for this deviation between the results of the two studies. Besides possible 
recording errors, the deviation can arise due to the fact that the interviewee from the 
company is different now than ten years ago, and the current responder might possess 
limited knowledge or memories related to the questions. It was typical for the responder 
to withdraw his remarks after considering the RHQ situation of 1999 for a while. She 
could say on second thought: “We actually might have had some operations in a certain 
CIS country, however, it was nothing significant”. In some of the cases the people who 
had answered the questionnaire ten years ago had left the company or retired, and there 
was no one left that could know the exact facts (e.g. the year when the RHQ position 
was lost and the reason for RHQ change), therefore these questions were skipped and 
the interview did not continue.  Miller et al. (1997, 200) suggests that one method for 
improving the validity of retrospective reports is to use free reports rather than forced 
reports. They say that under the forced report option an informant is encouraged to 
answer the question and no option to skip the question is given. Miller et al. (1997) add, 
although loss of data from the free report approach reduces the number of organisations 
available for analysis, it raises the accuracy of responses used in the analysis.  
The data collection method in the survey was structured phone interviews performed by 
three individuals, therefore it is important to discuss an interviewer bias (see Malhotra 
& Birks 2007, 281). Interviewer bias could not be eliminated, however, since there were 
three researchers performing the interviews of which the number was high, each 
individuals’ own way to conduct the interview starting from the way to pose interview 
questions stabilized as well as the way of using the questionnaire. It can be expected 
that three individual styles compensated each other in the large number of interviews 
conducted.  
 
In this study, respondent selection error was minimized. The Gateway database 
provided us with a list of target companies, a census study was made, and the target 
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companies determined the representatives from their side for the survey interview. In 
other words, researchers did not select the respondents.   
The response rate in the study was extremely high. The researchers were able to follow 
up the current status of 362 RHQ from the original population of 375 RHQ, which 
represents a completion rate of 97 %. The interviews were carried out with and research 
questionnaire thus completed for 222 RHQ units. 153 companies did not complete the 
questionnaire. Out these, 13 respondents could not be contacted or the person was 
unwilling to answer. For 140 companies the information does not exist anymore. 
5.7    Limitations of the study 
 
The starting point for this longitudinal investigation was the total population of RHQ in 
Finland in 1999. To ensure comparability and consistency over time, it was not possible 
to include new RHQ in this study that had possibly been established between 1999-
2010. This could be considered a limitation.  
The study concentrates on the Finnish subsidiaries of MNC and the interviewees 
represent the RHQ situation from their point of view, based on their knowledge, 
memories and impressions of what had happened and why. The HQ of foreign MNCs 
have not been interviewed in this study. Considering the RHQ position of the Finnish 
subsidiary and parent’s view about the possible RHQ related change over the longer 
term could provide us with different results. This can be considered as a limitation. 
In this longitudinal study, the period of analysis concerning the case companies under 
survey is 1999-2010. The temporal research perspective is that the research group 
collected both real time data and retrospective data. This means that the research 
process took place simultaneously, both while the events of interests were still going on 
and about the past events that had already come to a conclusion and were reported and 
interpreted from the point of view of the present (Blazejewski 2011). As we know, the 
retrospective data is associated with a number of limitations such as difficulties in 
determining cause and effect and lack of recall (Golden 1992). However, in real-time 
studies the involvement of interviewees in ongoing events might lead to emotional 
  73 
biases, misattribution, distortion or actual concealment of important facts (Blazejewski 
2011). Real-time and retrospective perspectives produce potentially different time-
bound truths (Blazejewski 2011). The variation in temporal research perspective can be 
considered as a limitation of the study. The research time, meaning the time spent in the 
field gathering survey interview data, lasted from November 2009 to April 2010. 
During the last 16 months, from January 2009 to April 2010, RHQ responsibility 
concerning certain countries was terminated in 11 companies and during the last four 
months of the research two companies encountered a loss of RHQ position concerning a 
certain country responsibility. It is possible that the RHQ position of some of the 
companies rapidly changed after the interview during the research time of five months – 
the phenomenon was also recognized in the Gateway study in 1999 (Ratia 2000).  
Ratia (2000, 30) discusses the limitations concerning the previous Gateway project 
study:  
“Even though the gateway project is aimed at charting the entire population of 
subsidiaries with regional headquarter positions, there will be some distortions in the 
gathered data. There are several reasons for this. One is the fact that not every single 
foreign subsidiary in Finland was reached in phase one of the project. False 
information, lack of exhaustive list of subsidiaries and refusals to answer the interviews 
were some causes of this. Secondly, the data is only a snapshot of the current situation. 
In reality the positions of the subsidiaries can change rapidly, especially those involved 
with operations in Russia. This can already be seen when comparing the results of 
phase two to those of phase one.” 
These earlier reported limitations also concern the current study both directly and 
indirectly.  
In addition, the analysis of this study did not concentrate to the subsidiaries that had lost 
part of their RHQ responsibilities (e.g. regional responsibility of Russia, but still 
continued possessing the RHQ position towards the Baltic countries). Only those 
Finnish subsidiaries that had lost all RHQs responsibilities or that had relocated their 
RHQ out of Finland were included to this study. However, the group as such can be 
considered as a representative group of companies, since it represents nearly the total 
number of companies that were identified as having RHQ position in Finland in 1999.  
Those companies that had RHQ position in 1998-1999 but have been merged later on 
could not be researched as a separate unit and were therefore not included to the 
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research. In addition, companies that were transferred to the Finnish ownership were not 
studied, since they did not belong to the study’s target group (i.e. foreign MNC’s 
Finnish subsidiary as having RHQ position) anymore.   
The structured survey interview questionnaire might pose some limitations. In the case 
that the respondent misunderstands some of the questions or the definition of RHQ, this 
can produce biased interpretation. Also, there exists a disadvantage in asking open-
ended questions about change in the RHQ position and factors that affected that change, 
since interviewee may selectively neglect some events that are important and focus on 
unimportant trends (Golden 1992). 
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6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This chapter introduces the empirical findings based on the survey interviews. For the 
beginning, the status of the sample is presented. The first part of the chapter gives a 
general description of the 222 companies that lost and retained the RHQ mandate during 
the research period 1999-2010. These two categories of subsidiaries will be compared 
and we will examine if they differ from each other. The second part of the chapter, 
focuses on the RHQs that have lost the mandate and we will discuss the three different 
ways in which the RHQ mandate was lost in the data. Third part of the chapter 
concentrates on the companies that relocated the RHQ out of Finland 
 
Status of the sample   
 
As the Table 2 shows, we were able to follow up the current status of 362 RHQ from 
the original population (a completion rate of 97%). The structured interviews were 
conducted for 222 RHQ (59% of total population), which revealed that 131 (35%) units 
had retained their RHQ status between 1999-2010, and 91 (24%) units had lost it during 
the period.  
 
Table 2: Status of the original sample in 2010  
Status RHQs % 
Structured research questionnaire completed 222 59 % 
       RHQ status retained 131 35 % 
       RHQ status lost 91 24 % 
RHQ status lost already before 1999 30 8 % 
Not possible to study separately due to ownership changes 36 10 % 
Operations ended in Finland 52 14 % 
Moved to Finnish ownership 22 6 % 
Unclear RHQ situation (non-respondent or person not reached) 13 3 % 
Total  375 100 % 
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Out of the original population of 375 RHQ units, 153 companies were no longer 
relevant for further investigation. 52 companies had ended their operations in Finland. 
Out of these, 16 were contacted and the information was received over the phone. The 
situation in the remainder of the 36 companies was researched based on the official 
registries, company contact information databases and company websites. 22 companies 
had moved to Finnish ownership, i.e., were no longer operating as a subsidiary of a 
foreign MNC in Finland. In 36 companies, there had been a change in the ownership, 
making them unsuitable for studying further (in 27 cases the company was interviewed 
and in 9 cases the information was found through official registries). 30 companies had 
lost the RHQ status already before 1999.  
 
Unclear situation (about the current RHQ position) remained with 13 companies. There 
were five company representatives unwilling to answer the survey. The non-respondents 
explained that they were either too busy or indicated that the company’ business 
situation in the Baltics was extremely difficult or company policy discouraged 
participation. In six cases, the contact person or the company could not be reached in 
the given time limits. In two cases, the company name was missing from the original 
list of 375 companies and could not be contacted.  
 
Beyond the results above, there was one interesting finding based on our research 
experience as a team of close to five months conducting structured survey interviews 
over the telephone concerning the RHQ related change and possible relocations. In the 
Gateway project study in 1989-1999, Kautovaara (2000) discussed that managers don’t 
see it as important to discuss operations that have been relocated or discontinued and 
relates this as comparable to the problems in obtaining data on divestments. However, 
he said that the telephone interviews were very successful and described the atmosphere 
during the interviews as very positive, the interviewees helpful and patient in explaining 
the situation of their company. Based on my experience, it is easy to agree with 
Kautovaara (2000). Managers had a positive attitude towards this study and seemed to 
understand the value of the longitudinal perspective. They were helpful and patient in 
explaining the company situation and provided the information we needed. Unofficial 
information was also revealed on occasion. In some cases, the phone interview time was 
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reserved beforehand and managers were prepared to provide the answers despite the 
time pressure.  
6.1 RHQ lost versus RHQ retained: Are they different? 
 
Next, a general description will be given about the 222 Finnish subsidiaries of foreign 
MNCs by comparing the lost RHQs (41%) with the retained RHQs (59%). To follow, 
we will look at the industries that RHQs lost and retained represent. Then there will be 
comparisons made of the functions that the Finnish subsidiaries carry out, their 
functional responsibilities, turnover, staff size, strategic position of the Finnish 
subsidiary in the group hierarchy, and the parent and group company home countries.  
6.1.1 Industry distribution 
Table 3: The industry classifications (NACE) of RHQs lost and retained in 1999- 2010 
Industry classifications RHQ lost % 
RHQ 
retained % 
Wholesale and retail trade  55 60 % 71 54 % 
Manufacturing 14 15 % 38 29 % 
Professional, scientific and technical 8 9 % 7 5 % 
Transportation and storage 3 3 % 2 2 % 
Information and communication 3 3 % 4 3 % 
Administrative or support service activities 3 3 % 3 2 % 
Construction 1 1 % 4 3 % 
Financial and insurance activities 1 1 % 0 0 % 
Other service activities 1 1 % 2 2 % 
Missing 2 2 % 0 0 % 
Total 91 100 % 131 100 % 
 
Table 3 presents the industry classifications of the 222 companies that have lost or 
retained the RHQ mandate. All the industries are represented quite evenly in both of the 
groups, RHQ lost and RHQ retained. There is at least one observation in each of the 
categories in both groups with only one minor exception. There is clearly a large 
concentration of the subsidiaries in wholesale and retail trade in both of the groups, 
meaning that the Finnish subsidiaries are mainly sales units and their most important 
RHQ responsibility is to export to the Baltics, Russia or in some cases to Scandinavian 
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countries as well.  The RHQ retained group clearly includes more companies that have 
manufacturing, which could explain some of the RHQ responsibilities remaining in 
Finland due to the factory linked to the exporting of the goods to the subunits abroad.  
6.1.2 Functions of the Finnish subsidiaries 
Table 4 below shows the operations of the Finnish subsidiaries that lost or retained the 
RHQ mandate between the years 1999-2010. It is possible that the subsidiary has 
several functions (e.g. all of them).  
 
Table 4: The functions of the Finnish subsidiaries in 1999-2010 
Functions RHQ lost  % RHQ retained % 
Sales 83 91 % 130 99 % 
Production  31 34 % 57 44 % 
Warehousing 20 22 % 63 48 % 
Service 17 19 % 47 36 % 
R&D 17 19 % 31 24 % 
Other 17 19 % 29 22 % 
Total 91 
 
131 
  
In both of the RHQ categories, the subsidiaries’ main function is clearly sales. Also, 
production and warehousing have an important role, especially for the subsidiaries that 
have retained the RHQ mandate. The table shows that every functional category is more 
presented in the group of subsidiaries that have retained the RHQ mandate. The Finnish 
subsidiaries that have retained the RHQ mandate have clearly more manufacturing, 
warehousing, service, R&D and other operations (e.g. design, training, quality control) 
established in Finland. This could also mean that they are larger units in general and are 
more capable of carrying out RHQ responsibilities. It is easier to take away the RHQ 
mandate from the Finnish subsidiary active in sales and transfer the responsibility to the 
MNC’s global sales unit than from a subsidiary that has production, warehousing and 
service serving the Baltic and Russian market geographically nearby.  
 
In contrast, there is one case where a Danish MNC in a food industry had sales, 
production, warehousing, service and R&D in Finland and the subsidiary was RHQ for 
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the subunits in Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Ukraine 
and Hungary. However, due to the reorganisation of the company’s sales organisation 
that became a global one, the Finnish subsidiary lost the RHQ mandate but continued 
with the food production in Finland.  
 
Another case is about a Swedish factory automation and data communication MNC that 
has manufacturing, sales, and marketing and warehousing in the Finnish subsidiary with 
the RHQ mandate for exports to Estonia and Latvia. However, the RHQ mandate was 
lost after the company opened the sales units in Estonia and Latvia and these started to 
report to the HQ in Sweden. The warehouse was closed in Finland as well and the 
goods were delivered to Estonia and Latvia directly from Sweden.  
6.1.3 Functional responsibilities 
Next, we will look at the functional responsibilities that the Finnish RHQ carries out on 
behalf of its the subunits. A large share of the RHQs export to countries under its 
mandate, while the other group of RHQs have wider responsibilities concerning the 
subunits abroad, such as business, administrative, reporting or functional responsibility. 
If RHQ has a business responsibility of the subunit, it means that the RHQ manages the 
unit and is accountable for its profit and loss. Administrative responsibility means 
administrative tasks and juridical responsibility of the subunit. When the Finnish RHQ 
has the reporting responsibility of the subunits, it means that the Finnish subsidiary 
reports on behalf of the subunit to the HQ. Functional responsibility could mean that the 
Finnish subsidiary carries out functions on behalf of its subunits such as marketing, 
financial or legal services. 
 
Table 5 shows the functional responsibilities of the both groups of the Finnish 
subsidiaries during the research period. The subsidiaries that have retained the RHQ 
mandate carry out different functional responsibilities more often than the ones that 
have lost the mandate. The RHQ retained group of companies have more 
administrative, business and reporting responsibilities for their subunits and their 
overall role seems to be more entrepreneurial. 
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Table 5: The functional responsibilities of the Finnish subsidiaries for the subunits in 1999-
2010 
Functional responsibilities RHQ lost* % RHQ retained* % 
Export 22 24 % 56 43 % 
Administrative 13 14 % 26 20 % 
Business 11 12 % 29 22 % 
Reporting 10 11 % 21 16 % 
Functional 1 1 % 2 2 % 
Other  12 13 % 17 13 % 
Missing 31 34 % 33 25 % 
Total 91 
 
131 
 *One RHQ may get multiple values 
 
There was a case regarding French MNC, specialized in providing technology solutions 
for the textile industry. The Finnish subsidiary had a RHQ mandate with business, 
administrative and reporting responsibility of the Baltic countries and Russia. However, 
parent MNC’s restructuring, economical rationalisation and regional specialization lead 
to the relocation of RHQ out of Finland to the HQ in Benelux countries. The subsidiary 
lost the RHQ mandate but continues the production, sales and marketing in Finland. 
 
6.1.4 Turnover  
 
Table 6 shows the turnover of the Finnish subsidiaries. The RHQ lost group of 
subsidiaries has an average turnover of 41,1 M€, while RHQ retained have 97 M€. 
There were 13 micro sized companies among the group of RHQ lost, while the same 
figure for the RHQ retained group was seven. These figures and the table below 
together show that the subsidiaries that have lost the RHQ mandate tend to be smaller 
by turnover than the ones that have retained the RHQ mandate. The largest share of 
subsidiaries (39%) belong to the category turnover ≤ 5 M€ for the RHQ lost, while most 
of the subsidiaries (51%) that retained the mandate have turnover between 5-50 M€. 
Also, the RHQ retained had a larger percentage of companies with turnover over 200 
M€. 
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Table 6: Distribution of the Finnish subsidiary and the group company by turnover in 2010 
		
Turnover 
M € RHQ lost % 
RHQ 
retained % 
  0-5  29 39 % 24 20 % 
  5-50  26 35 % 63 51 % 
The Finnish subsidiary 50-100  11 15 % 15 12 % 
  100-200 5 7 % 8 7 % 
  200- 3 4 % 13 11 % 
  Total 74 100 % 123 100 % 
		 0-500 11 18 % 29 31 % 
  500-1000 8 13 % 11 12 % 
 The group company 1000-5000 19 31 % 18 19 % 
  5000-10000 6 10 % 14 15 % 
  
10000-
50000 14 23 % 18 19 % 
  50000- 3 5 % 5 5 % 
  Total 61 100 % 95 100 % 
 
The group turnover ranges for the subsidiaries that lost the RHQ between 3,3 and 81 
588,3 M€, the average turnover of the group being 10 393 M€. For the subsidiaries that 
retained the RHQ the turnover ranges between 1,7 and 324 313 M€, the average 
turnover being 13 152 M€. According to the table there is clearly a larger group of 
smaller MNCs among the group of RHQ retained. 
6.1.5 Staff size  
The average number of personnel in the companies that lost the RHQ mandate is 111 
versus 178 for the group of RHQ retained. A median for the RHQ lost is 32 (persons) 
while for RHQ retained it is 43. These numbers show that the subsidiaries with RHQ 
retained are larger in staff size. Given this wide range in the staff size in general, it 
shows that the ability of the Finnish subsidiaries to carry out regional responsibilities 
could vary widely. The subsidiary with a small staff size is more likely to lose the RHQ 
mandate or it can be relocated to a larger central unit in the European organisation with 
more resources to carry out the RHQ responsibility of the subunits in the Baltic 
countries and Russia. Table 7 shows that there are more micro sized companies in the 
group of the RHQ lost than the RHQ retained. Also, there are more small and medium 
sized companies in the group of RHQ retained than RHQ lost. This size difference and 
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larger size of RHQ retained could indicate the subsidiary’s ability to carry out RHQ 
responsibilities better. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of the Finnish-based subsidiaries by personnel in 2010 
Personnel RHQ lost  % RHQ retained % 
1-9 (micro) 23 25 % 22 17 % 
10-99 (small) 40 44 % 64 49 % 
100-499 (medium) 14 15 % 33 25 % 
500- (large) 6 7 % 10 8 % 
Missing 8 9 % 2 2 % 
Total  91 100 % 131 100 % 
 
6.1.6 Strategic position of the Finnish subsidiary in the group 
Table 8: Strategic position of the Finnish subsidiary in the group 
Strategic position of the Finnish subsidiary  RHQ lost  % RHQ retained % 
Under the CHQ 29 32 % 58 44 % 
Under European unit 18 20 % 21 16 % 
Under Scandinavian unit 29 32 % 30 23 % 
Some other option 11 12 % 21 16 % 
Missing 4 4 % 1 1 % 
Total 91 100 % 131 100 % 
 
As the table 8 shows, the strategic position of the Finnish subsidiary lies more often 
directly under the parent company in the case of RHQ retained than RHQ lost. Also, in 
the case of RHQ lost the strategic position of the Finnish subsidiary is situated under 
Scandinavian and European unit more often than in the RHQ retained. It could be 
interpreted that the Finnish subsidiaries may have kept their RHQ mandate more often 
due to the MNCs organisation structure and because the Finnish subsidiary is in a 
stronger role towards the parent company and the subunits strategically, i.e. there are no 
other hierarchy levels in between the parent and the Finnish subsidiary.  
 
It is noteworthy that 14% of the interviewees (32 companies) had some other regional 
organisation structure than presented in the Table. Findings of the study show that there 
exist various possible regional organisation structures for the foreign MNCs in Europe. 
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The size, geographical proximity and distances between their regions can vary much 
between the MNCs. There were no signs of a triadic structure (North America, Europe, 
Asia) as such, but signs of large regional structures such as EMEA (Europe, Middle-
East and Asia; or Europe, Middle-East and Africa) or EMEA + South-America. 
However, the focus was on the Finnish subsidiary and the RHQ responsibility of the 
subunits so the regional structure of the whole MNC was not discussed. Still, many 
MNCs seem to divide Europe to smaller regions or sub-regions, such as: North-West 
Europe; North and East Europe; Nordic and Central Europe; North Europe; or a sub-
region of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg. Finland often belong to the 
Scandinavian region (with or without the Baltic countries) or to the region East, e.g., 
Finland, the Baltics and Russia (+ CIS-countries) or to the region North-Europe (e.g. 
The Nordics, the Baltics, Russia, Poland, etc.).  
6.1.7 Group home country 
Table 9 shows the group home countries of the Finnish subsidiaries between 1999 and 
2010 and that most of them (57%) had the group home country in Europe, while 29% 
had it outside Europe. The largest number of subsidiaries had the group home country in 
the United States (23%), followed by Sweden (16%) and Germany (14%). When 
comparing the figures between the categories RHQ lost and retained, nearly the same 
amount of Swedish subsidiaries lost the mandate as retained it. More subsidiaries with 
the group home country in the US continued with the RHQ mandate (58%) than had 
lost it (42%). However, most of the subsidiaries with the German group home country 
(78%) retained the RHQ mandate.  
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Table 9: Group home country of the Finnish subsidiary in 2010 
Group home country RHQ lost  %	 RHQ retained %	
United States 21 23 % 29 22 % 
Sweden 17 19 % 18 14 % 
Germany 7 8 % 25 19 % 
France 6 7 % 7 5 % 
Switzerland 6 7 % 4 3 % 
United Kingdom 5 5 % 4 3 % 
Denmark 3 3 % 7 5 % 
Japan 3 3 % 7 5 % 
Netherlands  2 2 % 2 2 % 
Norway  1 1 % 4 3 % 
Italy 1 1 % 1 1 % 
Other countries 5 5 % 7 5 % 
Missing 14 15 % 16 12 % 
N 91 100 % 131 100 % 
 
6.2. Lost RHQs operations in Finland 
 
Next, the focus will be on those 91 subsidiaries that lost the RHQ mandate during 1999-
2010 and we will take a closer look at the ways in which the mandate was lost, what 
were the motives behind the decision and where the decision was made in the 
organisation hierarchy of the MNC.  
 
Table 10: Status of the units that have lost the RHQ in 2010 
RHQ status lost RHQ % 
RHQ responsibility ended, subunits report directly to the HQ 25 28 % 
RHQ terminated  14 15 % 
RHQ relocated 38 42 % 
Missing data 14 15 % 
Total  91 100 % 
 
As Table 10 shows, out of 91 cases where the RHQ responsibility of the Finnish based 
subsidiary of foreign MNC had ended in Finland, there were 25 cases (28%) where the 
RHQ responsibility had been transferred to the parent company, i.e., today the units 
  85 
report directly to the headquarters. One interviewee described the situation as follows: 
“After the sales offices were opened in Estonia and Latvia, these countries started to 
report directly to headquarters in Sweden” and the Finnish subsidiary was left out from 
the middle. Another interviewee explained: “Today, [the units in] Baltic countries, 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are independent and these countries manage themselves”. 
The Finnish subsidiary has lost the RHQ responsibility, and the reporting is done to HQ.  
  
In 14 cases (15%), the RHQ had been terminated without transfer of the responsibility 
to the parent company or relocation. For example, one Finnish industrial company (part 
of a German group) had a RHQ responsibility concerning Baltic countries, but the 
company’s operations had ended entirely in the Baltics and the Finnish RHQ had been 
shut down. Another case was that the Finnish subsidiary of Danish MNC had RHQ 
status concerning sales to Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Ukraine and Hungary. However, the Finnish RHQ was shut down since the 
new global sales organisation started to take care of these countries directly.  
 
There were 38 cases where the RHQ mandate concerning the subunits overseas was 
relocated out of Finland. This was the most popular way in which the RHQ mandate 
was lost in Finland during 1999-2010. 42% of the 91 subsidiaries lost the RHQ mandate 
due to the RHQ relocation. The last part of the chapter focus more on the RHQs that 
were relocated, but first we continue to compare the three different ways in which the 
RHQ mandate was lost. 
6.2.1 Reason for the lost RHQ mandate 
 
There were five main motives categories behind the RHQ mandate loss in the study. 
These categories were given in the interview for the respondent. As Table 11 shows, 
parent MNC reorganisation has been the most common motive for RHQ mandate loss, 
following the parent MNC regionalization. 17% of the respondents mentioned growth 
of markets, while 15% of the RHQ mandates were lost due to acquisitions.  
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Table 11: Motives behind the RHQs mandate loss in 1999-2010 
Motives 91 RHQ* lost % 
25 RHQ* 
% 
14 RHQ* 
terminated % 
38 RHQ* 
relocated % ->parent 
Parent MNC reorganization  23 24 % 8 27 % 3 18 % 12 25 % 
Parent MNC regionalization  20 21 % 3 10 % 3 18 % 14 29 % 
Growth of markets:  16 17 % 8 27 % 0 0 % 8 16 % 
Acquisition 14 15 % 5 17 % 4 24 % 5 10 % 
Diminishing of market 4 4 % 1 3 % 3 18 % 0 0 % 
Other or unknown 19 20 % 5 17 % 4 24 % 10 20 % 
Total 96 100 % 30 100 % 17 100 % 49 100 % 
*One RHQ may get multiple values 
 
Next we will examine the motives behind the RHQ mandate loss in the case of 
responsibility transfer to the parent and the RHQ termination. The motives behind RHQ 
relocation will be examined in the last part of this chapter.  
 
Motives for the RHQ responsibility transfer to the parent company 
 
As already mentioned, there were 25 cases where the Finnish subsidiary lost the RHQ 
mandate and subunits started to report directly to CHQ. For those subsidiaries, the 
growth of markets was one of the most important motive that interviewees mentioned 
why the RHQ was terminated. An interviewee explained why the RHQ was terminated: 
“[It was due to] the growth of the companies [subunits abroad] while getting 
independent and naturally letting go of Finland. Now they are working independently”. 
There seems to be a link between growth of markets, subunits growing into 
independence and diminishing role of the tutor and later on there happens a natural shift 
in responsibilities between the three parties. The subunit takes the responsibility of itself 
and there happens RHQ responsibility transfer from the RHQ to the HQ. The Finnish 
subsidiary is left out from the middle, because the large subsidiary is strong enough to 
report to the HQ on its own. On the opposite side, only one interviewee mentioned a 
shrinking market as the reason for closing the RHQ and explained that “in a heavy 
competitive situation you can not compete with a small organisation structure”. This 
shows that sometimes the subunit might need support and resources from a stronger 
organisational unit, like the group HQ, in a case of too small organisation size and lack 
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of resources to handle the difficult market situation abroad. In the case, the Finnish 
subsidiary had the RHQ mandate of exporting to Estonia and Russia and when the 
market situation got difficult the Swedish CHQ transferred the RHQ responsibility of 
the markets for herself. 
 
Parent MNC reorganization/restructuring represents 27% of the motives mentioned for 
ending the RHQ in Finland. For example, one interviewee explained the restructuring 
situation of their company that Russian operations were transferred right under the HQ 
in Denmark. Often the interviewees explained that Russia became independent (from 
Finland) and reports directly to HQ today. It occurred several times in the data that there 
was parent MNC restructuring linked to the Finnish subsidiary losing the RHQ mandate 
of Russian subunit after its growth of independence and after that the reporting structure 
was changed to CHQs (or relocated out of Finland to somewhere else in the 
organisation).   
 
In 17 % of the cases (five) when the RHQ was shut down and responsibility was 
transferred to the parent company an acquisition had played a part. There were several 
different acquisition cases on the different organisation levels that all lead to the closing 
the Finnish RHQ unit. In one case, the acquisition concerned the group and due to this 
the subunits (under the Finnish RHQ responsibility) in the Baltic states were transferred 
directly under the responsibility of the new parent company. In another case, the Finnish 
subsidiary was sold and the new owner, well established in the Russian market, had a 
large sales unit over there. Thus, there was no point to continue the previous direct 
exports from Finland in the current situation that led to the closing of the Finnish RHQ.  
 
Parent MNC regionalization was mentioned in 10 % of the answers as a reason to close 
the Finnish RHQ. In one case the parent company restructured its sales organisation to a 
global one that lead to the closing the Finnish RHQ concerning the subunits in Latvia, 
Lithuania, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Ukraine.  
In 17% of the cases the motives were others than mentioned above or unknown. For 
example, one company representative explained that earlier there was a problem with 
customs in Russia and the goods had to be delivered through Finland. However, after 
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local people started to handle the operations in Russia, there was no role for Finland 
anymore and the RHQ was closed.  
 
Motives for the RHQ termination 
 
This part focuses on the 14 cases where the RHQ mandate was terminated and shows 
that the RHQ mandate is not necessarily transferred in the organisation to some other 
unit. 
 
As the table 11 shows, acquisitions represent the most common motive (24%). In one 
case, the parent company bought the subunit from Lithuania that was under the Finnish 
RHQ responsibility, leading to a termination of the RHQ mandate along with the 
acquisition. In another case, the Estonian subunit was sold out from the company and 
the Finnish RHQ position was lost.  
 
The parent MNC reorganization represents a motive in 18% of the cases. For example, 
the production was ended in Finland, and therefore the RHQ was closed down as part of 
wider restructuring. In 18% of the cases, the parent MNC regionalization affected the 
termination of the RHQ mandate. In the interview data there were signs of 
regionalization process in the Eastern European area. MNC’s have shifted their strategic 
focus more to the region and are building the regional organisation over there. One 
interviewee explained that the company’s strategy concentrates on the Eastern Europe 
and the RHQ responsibility of the area has been given to Poland.  
 
The growth of markets was not mentioned as a motive, however, the diminishing of the 
market/shrinking market as a reason represented 18% of the answers (three cases). The 
responders also described the situation as “uncertainty of markets” or “risks had grown 
(e.g., especially in credit financing) in the Baltics”. The termination of the mandate can 
be a consequence of the difficult market situation in the subunit countries and it can be a 
conscious decision to get away from uncertain markets if there are too many risks 
involved. This kind of decision, leading to a RHQ mandate loss, can actually be a relief 
for the Finnish subsidiary. 
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In the case of RHQ termination, 29% of the motives are other than mentioned above or 
not known. For example, problems in pricing and with customs in Russia were 
mentioned as a reason to give up the Russian market (loss of RHQ mandate) and now 
Russians are handling the market themselves. Another respondent explained that the 
strategic focus of the company is in the Eastern Europe and therefore they ended up 
giving up the Russian market.  
6.2.2 Decision making level  
Next Table 12 presents findings concerning the decision making level in the 
organisation hierarchy when the RHQ mandate was lost. It is very common that the 
CHQ makes the decision and this was the case in 62% of the decisions. Contrary to 
expectations, a Finnish subsidiary was more involved in the decision making than 
European RHQ or Nordic RHQ. 
 
Table 12: Level of decision making in the MNCs when the RHQ mandate was lost 
Level 91 RHQs % RHQ ->parent % 
RHQ 
 terminated % 
RHQ 
relocated % 
Group HQ 56 62 % 21 84 % 9 64 % 26 68 % 
European RHQ 8 9 % 2 8 % 0 0 % 6 16 % 
Nordic RHQ 2 2 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 2 5 % 
Finnish 
subsidiary 10 11 % 1 4 % 5 36 % 4 11 % 
Missing  15 16 % 1 4 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 
Total  91 100 % 25 100 % 14 100 % 38 100 % 
 
In the case of RHQ responsibility transfer to the parent and when the RHQ was 
relocated, in both of these cases the decision was made more often in the European 
RHQ than in the Nordic RHQ. In the case of RHQ responsibility transfer to the parent 
and when the RHQ was terminated, there were no decisions made in the Nordic HQ. As 
Table 8 shows, this finding is interesting since the strategic position of the Finnish 
subsidiary in the organisation hierarchy lies more often under the Nordic unit (32%) 
than under the European unit (20%). If we look at the situation in those RHQs that 
relocated, in 21 companies that relocated the strategic position of the subsidiary was 
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under the Nordic unit (55%) and yet the unit was involved in the relocation decision 
only 5% of the cases.  
 
What is even more interesting is the involvement of the Finnish subsidiary in the 
decision making process when the RHQ mandate was lost. The Finnish subsidiary was 
involved most often in the decision making when its own RHQ mandate was 
terminated. When the RHQ was relocated out of Finland, the Finnish subsidiary was 
involved in the process and responsible for the decision in four cases. One interviewee 
said: “This kind of decisions do not just come from the parent [alone]”. Four of these 
decisions that led to the relocation of RHQ out of Finland concerned the Russian market 
and three of them related to Baltic countries. For example, in one case the Finnish 
subsidiary decided to give up the business in Russia due to the weak profitability and 
difficulty of getting payments from Russia. Since the Finnish subsidiary did not want to 
do business in Russia anymore, the RHQ responsibility for Russia was transferred 
elsewhere in the group. In another case, the Finnish subsidiary sold the business 
concerning all the three Baltic countries to the group company, and the RHQ position of 
Finland in relation to Baltic countries was shifted away.  
 
For comparison, Kautovaara (2000) looked at the level of decision making in relocating 
the RHQ in 1999 and found that the decision was made in the group HQ and European 
HQ equally often (39% of the cases each). Out of 18 relocations, the decision was made 
in the Nordic RHQ (11%) only twice. One time (6%) the parent of the Finnish based 
unit made the decision and one time it was made in the Finnish unit (6%). 
6.2.3 Lifespan of lost RHQs 
Next we will examine the lifespans of the RHQs that were lost. First, we will look at the 
years of establishment for all 91 RHQ, then the ending years of RHQ mandates and 
finally the lifespan for each of the RHQ lost category separately. 
 
Establishment of the RHQ mandates 
 
According to the Gateway project study database (1998-1999), the first RHQ mandates 
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for the RHQ lost population were established as early as in 1962, 1965 and 1976 for the 
subunits in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia. The first Finnish subsidiary that got 
the RHQ mandate was a sales unit of a Swedish industrial and garage door 
manufacturer in 1962. The second subsidiary with the RHQ mandate was a production 
unit of the fuel industry that also had a Swedish group company. Regiocentrism was 
noticed already in the 1960s when a large group of MNC were building regional 
organisations and setting up RHQs (Williams, 1967; Schütte, 1997b). In the 1980s the 
regional management was in decline and many MNCs moved towards a global 
approach in managing their operations (Lasserre, 1996). Since 1990 onwards the 
situation changed drastically, as the USSR fell apart in 1991 and new markets opened 
up. Finland was used as a gateway to go to the Baltic and Russian markets. Many 
MNCs used acquisition as an entry mode to the Finnish market and the acquired units 
often already had a long tradition doing business with the countries in the East from the 
era of the Soviet Union (Santalainen 2000).  
 
 
Figure 3: The year of establishment for the subsidiaries’ RHQ mandates for the subunits in 
the Baltics, Russia, the Nordics and other countries (data source Gateway project study, 1999). 
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As the Figure 3 shows, the 91 subsidiaries got new RHQ mandates every year between 
1987 and 1998. The number of RHQ mandates grew increasingly during the 1990s, up 
to 1996. The subsidiaries got the highest number of RHQ mandates for the Baltic 
countries starting in 1987, following mandates for other countries (Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kalingrad, 
Kazakstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) in 1988. The first RHQ mandate of Russia was 
started in 1990, and a new mandate was based every year up to 1998. A British and US 
MNCs gave their subsidiaries RHQ mandates for the Nordic countries (Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Iceland) the latest, starting in 1994.  
 
RHQ responsibility transfer to the parent 
 
Next Figure 4 shows the ending years for the RHQ mandates of 25 RHQs concerning 
58 different subunits. The RHQs were closed down and the responsibility was 
transferred to the parent company. The first RHQ mandates were closed in 1993 
concerning Estonia and Latvia. From 1998 onwards the Finnish subsidiaries lost RHQ 
mandates steadily until 2009. Year 2009 represents the highest figure on RHQ 
terminations with 7 events.    
 
 
Figure 4: The year when the Finnish RHQ ended for the subunits in the Baltics, Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine 
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The next 5 Figure shows the lifespan of the RHQ mandates. In this RHQ lost category, 
the shortest lifspan for the RHQ mandate was four years and this case was about the 
Finnish subsidiary of a German pumps manufacturer exporting to Estonia. The RHQ 
mandate was lost due to the problems with an agent in Estonia following a 
responsibility transfer of the Estonian market to the CHQ. The longest RHQ mandate 
lasted 36 years. As already mentioned, this case was about the Finnish subsidiary of 
Swedish industrial and garage doors manufacturer exporting to Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Russia. The CHQ decided to transfer the RHQ mandate to itself and 
exporting to these countries was changed to be handled directly from Malmö, Sweden.  
 
 
Figure 5: The lifespan of the RHQ mandate before responsibility transfer to the parent for the 
subunits in the Baltics, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (data source Gateway project study 1999). 
 
Altogether, there were eight subunits that had the Finnish RHQ for over 30 years. 64% 
of the subunits had the Finnish RHQ for over 10 years and 80% of the subunits of the 
Finnish RHQ had a lifespan over eight years.  The average length for the Finnish RHQ 
mandate concerning Estonia was 14 years (Md 10,5), for Latvia 13,1 years (Md 9), for 
Lithuania 15,1 years (Md 11), for Russia 14,5 years (Md 10,5) and for the other 
countries (Belarus & Ukraine) 11 years (Md 11). 
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Lifespan when the RHQ was terminated 
 
Next we will look at the ending years of those Finnish subsidiaries’ RHQ mandates that 
were terminated (14 companies and their 31 subunits). 
 
As the next Figure 6 shows, the highest number of RHQ terminations were in 2006 
when one company closed the RHQ concerning five subunits in Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine, two in the Baltics and one in Russia. Seven 
RHQ mandates concerning Russia ended between 2000-2007. The RHQ mandates for 
the 22 Baltic subunits ended between 1997-2008. Similarity can be noticed between the 
ending years for the RHQ mandates with the other RHQ lost categories, since the RHQ 
responsibility transfers happened during almost the same time period, between 1998 and 
2009. The requirement for the Finnish RHQ mandates for the Baltics and Russia for 
many MNCs had stopped during the same time.  
 
 
Figure 6: The year when the Finnish RHQ ended regarding the subunits in the Baltics, Russia, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine 
 
The next Figure 7 shows the lifespan of the Finnish RHQ mandate of 14 subsidiaries 
(concerning 30 subunits). The shortest RHQ lifespan was six years for the subunit of 
Russia. The longest RHQ mandate was for the Estonian subunit for 18 years. The 
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mandates for other countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Ukraine) were between 12 to 17 years. The average lengths for mandates were as 
follows: 11,3 years for Estonia (Md 10,5), 11,6 years for Latvia (Md 11), 11,2 years for 
Lithuania (Md 11), for Russia 9,7 years (Md 9) and for the other countries 15 years (Md 
15).  
 
 
Figure 7: The lifespan of the RHQ mandate in the case of RHQ termination for the subunits in 
the Baltics, Russia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine (data source 
Gateway project study 1999). 
 
If we compare the average lifespans between the RHQs with responsibility transfer to 
the parent and RHQs that were terminated, first it seems that the average lifespans are 
longer in the case of the responsibility transfer for the parent for all the Baltic countries 
and Russia. However, if we look at the median lifespan, it is the same for Estonia and 
Lithuania in both of the RHQ lost categories. For Latvia the median lifespan is actually 
two years longer for the RHQs terminated and one year shorter for the Russia than for 
the RHQs where there was the responsibility transfer. The lifespans seem to be close to 
each other in both of the RHQ lost categories which shows that large group of foreign 
MNCs have needed the Finnish RHQ about the same length of time, around 9-11 years.  
The lifespan of the RHQs that were relocated will be looked in the last part of the 
chapter.  
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6.3 Relocation of RHQs out of Finland 
 
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the relocated RHQs. First, we will examine 
how many RHQ mandates were transferred over time and what were the motives for the 
relocation. Then the lifespan of the RHQ mandates will be looked at. Last, the 
relocation target countries will be presented.  
 
Out of a full population of 375 units researched, in 10% of these Finnish subsidiaries 
the RHQ mandate was relocated out of Finland to some other country during the 
research period. 
6.3.1 Relocation per year 
In the original Gateway study in 1998-1999, Kautovaara (2000) detected 19 RHQ 
relocations in the original population during the research period. The relocations took 
place between 1994 and 1999. Kautovaara found 4 RHQ relocations in 1998 and one in 
1999 while this study found two more: the first one in 1998 and the other in 1999. By 
combining the results of these two studies, the longitudinal RHQ relocation situation is 
presented in Figure 8 which shows that 57 Finnish subsidiaries relocated the RHQ 
during the years 1994-2009.  
 
As the Figure 8 shows, there have been RHQ relocations steadily every year out of 
Finland during 15 years. The average RHQ relocation per year has been around 3,6 
mandates. The largest amount of RHQ relocations took place in 1997, with eight events 
(14%).  
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Figure 8: Number of RHQ that relocated out of Finland between 1994-2009  
 
The next Figure 9 shows that the Finnish subsidiaries have lost the RHQ mandates 
steadily and increasingly every year since 1997 until 2005 in each of the three 
categories. At least four mandates have been lost every year between 1999 and 2009. 
The three different ways in which the RHQ mandates were lost do not seem to follow a 
common pattern during the research period.  
 
 
Figure 9: The RHQs lost in 1997-2010 
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6.3.2 Motives for the RHQ relocation 
Largest amount of the Finnish subsidiaries (42%) lost the RHQ mandate due to the 
RHQ relocation. As the Table 11 shows, the following motives were mentioned by 
interviewees to explain the relocation of the RHQ out of Finland.  
 
According to the results, the most common reason mentioned for the relocation decision 
was the parent MNC regionalization that represents 29 % of the given answers. The 
RHQ relocation out of Finland seems to be often related to the regionalization of 
Eastern European countries inside the MNC organisation structure, and the 
responsibility of these markets is shifting from the Finnish subsidiary to Eastern Europe 
or Central Europe. For example, interviewees explained the situation as follows. When 
the RHQ responsibility of Estonia had been relocated out of Finland, the interviewee 
explained that Estonia is part of the Eastern European organisation these days and the 
RHQ mandate has been shifted to Lithuania inside the MNC. Another interviewee 
explained their situation with the new Central and Eastern European RHQ in Prague as 
follows: “Today we have this practice [inside the MNC] that many small countries 
report to the same place. This is a much better model than before, where small countries 
[Baltic countries] report to another small country (Finland).” An interviewee from a 
metal industry subsidiary of a Swedish MNC explained that, inside the MNC, Eastern 
Europe is as a strategic centre of focus and responsibility for the region has been 
transferred to Poland. Another interviewee, from a business assurance service 
subsidiary with the CHQ in Great Britain, explained about their company’s reporting 
structures that today Baltic countries report to the Central European organisation in 
Berlin while Finland reports to Copenhagen. Another interviewee from a Finnish 
express shipping subsidiary explained that the new reporting structures of their MNC 
(CHQ in Netherlands) were organised so that the Baltic countries and Russia report to 
Eastern Europe these days, and Finland reports to Nordic organisation.  
 
Parent MNC reorganization/restructuring was mentioned as the reason for relocating the 
RHQ out of Finland in 25% of the given answers. For example, an interviewee from an 
industrial painting subsidiary with the CHQ in the Netherlands explained their 
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company’s situation as follows: “The production ended in Finland, the subsidiaries were 
sold inside the group and therefore the business we used to have did not exist anymore” 
and therefore the previous RHQ responsibility that the (Finnish) subsidiary used to have 
concerning the Baltic countries, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other 
countries was relocated to Warsaw, Poland. The respondents mentioned also other 
reasons such as regional specialization and economic rationalization inside the 
organisation. For example, one interviewee explained how the Finnish organisation was 
restructured into a smaller unit and the Finnish financial administration, customer 
service and logistics were relocated to Stockholm inside the MNC, that lead to 
relocating the RHQ responsibility accordingly concerning the Baltic countries out of 
Finland as well. 
 
In ten cases (20%), the interviewees gave some other reasons to relocate the RHQ out of 
Finland than mentioned above or did not know the true logic behind the relocation 
decision. For example, two interviewees mentioned that the new RHQ had a better 
market knowledge concerning the countries under RHQ responsibility than the Finnish 
unit. In one case, the RHQ was relocated to Estonia because it has better market 
knowledge concerning the Baltic countries, Russia and Ukraine. Another interviewee 
mentioned that the RHQ was relocated because it is now located closer geographically 
and the business operations are easier to carry out in practice from the Baltic countries 
than from the Finnish unit. Kautovaara (2000) found similar statements in the 
interviews in his study concerning the motives behind the relocation decision.  
 
Growth of markets represents 16% of the motives mentioned to relocate the RHQ out of 
Finland. By growth of markets the respondents tend to mean that business in the Baltic 
countries and Russia got off to a good start during the years under the RHQ 
responsibility of the Finnish unit and were growing meanwhile the companies became  
more independent. The RHQ role of the Finnish subsidiary as a tutor was no longer 
needed since the operations grew and subunits were ready to take care of the business 
themselves in these countries. One interviewee explained that “operations in Russia 
have expanded after the Finnish unit had a RHQ role. New offices have been opened 
and the parent company probably wanted the responsibility of Russia for itself. Russian 
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operations are more independent now than previously under Finnish supervision”. This 
is in line with Kautovaara (2000) since he also found the positive development of the 
target operation and the resulting need and possibility for less control as one of the three 
main motives to relocate the RHQ. However, this was the third important motive for the 
RHQ relocation in his study. In his study, the most important reason was the need for 
local organisation (RHQ) in the target country. The second main motive was the 
accounting and regulatory differences between Finland and the target countries. The 
latter motive as such was not found in this study. But the need for a local organisation in 
the target country seems to be among the main motives also in this study. The main 
motives were regionalization and reorganisation of MNC regional structure linked to the 
growth of markets. 
 
In 10% of the cases mentioned, acquisition was the reason for the relocation. A British 
MNC in the tobacco industry had bought a Danish company and the North European 
HQ was relocated there and the Finnish unit lost the RHQ mandate for the Baltic 
countries and four Scandinavian countries. In another acquisition case, the companies in 
Finland, in the Baltic countries and Russia became part of a US company. In the new 
organisation structure, each of these countries reported directly to European RHQ and 
the previous RHQ responsibility of Finland was left out and relocated to Europe.  
 
6.3.3 Lifespan when the RHQ was relocated 
Next Figure 10 shows the year when the RHQ mandate of the Finnish subsidary was 
lost (relocated) for different areas under responsibility. The RHQ relocations of 38 
companies concerned 119 country units during the years 1998-2009. The Finnish 
subsidiaires lost the RHQ mandate due to the RHQ relocation every year between 1998-
2009 for the Baltic countries (except only Latvia in 2006). A RHQ mandate concering 
Russia was lost every year (at leat one) starting in 1999 to 2009, however, there were no 
mandates lost in 2006. Two companies had the RHQ resposibility of seven subunits all 
together in the Nordic countries that were all lost in 2008. The first subsidiary lost the 
mandate in an acquisition. The second case was due to the MNC’s internal 
reorganization where the Finnish subsidiary of a US mother lost the RHQ mandate 
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(business responsibility of Norwegian unit, sales in Sweden and Denmark, and 
reporting concerning the Sweden and Denmark) and the responsibilities were split and 
relocated to Great Britain and the Netherlands inside the European organisation 
structure.   
 
 
Figure 10: The year when the RHQ mandate of the Finnish subsidiary ended for the Baltic 
countries, Russia, Scandinavian and other countries  
The Finnish subsidiaries lost the RHQ mandate concerning other countries (12 units) 
mentioned above in 2002 and in 2007. In 2002, the production ended in the Finnish 
subsidiary and the subsidiary was sold inside the MNC (parent company in 
Netherlands), and the previous RHQ mandate was relocated to Poland. The other 
mandate loss happened in 2007 when the Swedish parent company reorganized its 
export department and relocated the RHQ mandate (exporting to Poland, Hungary and 
Czech Republic) of the Finnish subsidiary to Sweden.  
 
Next, the lifespan of each RHQ mandate is calculated based on the results of the two 
studies. The Figure 11 shows the time that the Finnish subsidiary functioned as RHQ 
for different areas before the relocation out of Finland. The Finnish subsidiaries have 
the longest RHQ mandates for the Baltic countries (information used in this figure 
concerns 73 units). The first mandates were started in 1987 and the last ones ended in 
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2009. The shortest lifespan for RHQ mandate, before the relocation happened, was four 
years (RHQ position concerning all three Baltic countries in one company). This case 
was about a US clothing company relocating its European HQ to Belgium. The Finnish 
subsidiary used to have the exporting mandate for the Baltic countries but the mandate 
was lost and relocated. The longest RHQ lifespans were 18 years (for the three Baltic 
countries) and 19 years (for the Lithuanian subunit). The longest RHQ mandate 
belonged to the Finnish subsidiary of the Swedish MNC specialized in wood finishing 
solutions that relocated the RHQ out of Finland after the subunits grew independent. 
The Finnish subsidiary had a business and administrative responsibility for the subunits 
in Estonia (14 years) and Lithuania (19 years).  
 
 
Figure 11: The Finnish subsidiary’s RHQ mandate for the subunits in different areas in case 
of RHQ relocation (data source Gateway project study 1999). 
The average lifespan for Estonia is 11 years (Md 11), for Lithuania 10 years (Md 10), 
for Latvia 10,2 years (Md 10,5), for Russia 8,5 years (Md 8,5), for Nordic countries 13 
years (Md 14) and for the other countries 13 years (Md 14). In comparison to the 
findings of other RHQ lost categories, these average lifespans are slightly longer (0,3-2 
years) than in the category responsibility transfer to the parent, and shorter (1,5-4,8 
years) than average lifespans of terminated RHQs (except for other countries). 
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However, the median shows very similar lifespans for all the RHQ lost categories for 
the Baltic countries and Russia, ranging from 9 to 11 years. 
For the comparison, in the study by Kautovaara (2000), the years that the Finnish 
subsidiary functioned as RHQ before the relocation were as follows. Out of 19 RHQ 
relocation cases, nine functioned as RHQ for only one to three years, six companies had 
the RHQ mandate for 3-5 years and four companies were in the RHQ position for 5 to 
10 years. The empirical data of this work in hand clearly shows longer average lifespans 
for RHQs.  
 
6.3.4 Relocation target country 
Out of 91 companies that had lost the RHQ status, there were 38 companies (42 cases) 
that relocated the RHQ in the empirical findings. The Table 12 shows the target country 
where the RHQs relocated. 
 
In 10 cases, the RHQ was relocated to the Baltic countries or Russia as follows: Estonia 
(4), Latvia (2), Lithuania (1), Russia (1). In two cases the interviewee did not know on a 
country level where the RHQ had been shifted after the Finnish unit lost the RHQ 
mandate, but he knew the new area: “It went to the Baltic states”. Therefore, the 
relocation phenomenon is presented here both on an area level and a country level. 
 
In 12 cases the RHQ responsibility was relocated to Scandinavia, and out of these seven 
went to Sweden, two went to Denmark and one to Norway. Also, there were two cases 
where the responsibility was shared in Scandinavia. When the RHQ was relocated to 
Scandinavia, the respondent knew the exact target country every time.   
 
For clarity, there were five companies altogether where the responsibilities of RHQs 
were shifted away from Finland and the relocation was split between two countries 
(e.g., Great Britain and Holland; Poland and Denmark; and Sweden and Germany). One 
interviewee of the Finnish subsidiary of a US parent company that lost the RHQ 
responsibility of Baltic countries explained: “Today Lithuania and Latvia report to 
Moscow and Estonia reports to Hamburg”. Another example about splitting the RHQ 
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responsibility concerns a U.S. manufacturer of microcontrollers and semiconductors and 
its European sales organisation.  The Finnish subsidiary used to have the RHQ mandate 
of exporting to Norway, to the Baltic countries and a functional responsibility of sales 
in Sweden and Denmark. The MNC reorganized its activities and decided to concentrate 
on the key customers globally instead of the regions, which changed the RHQ 
responsibilities and reporting structures, e.g. the sales responsibility that the Finnish unit 
used to have became divided partially between HQs in Great-Britain and the 
Netherlands. However, the Finnish sales unit is part of European sales organisation and 
reports to München, whereas the Finnish design centre is under the Scandinavian HQ 
and reports to Norway.  
 
There is another example regarding a US engineering software provider that 
restructured its European organisation and relocated the RHQ by splitting it into two. In 
this relocation case, the RHQ mandate concerning the main business area was relocated 
to Denmark, while the regional responsibilities of the Baltic countries were transferred 
to the RHQ in Poland.  
 
In 20 cases the RHQ responsibility of the Finnish subsidiary relocated to the Central or 
Eastern Europe, representing 49 % of the relocation cases. Poland was the most 
common target country in the area with five relocations, and the second most popular 
destination within all the target countries after Sweden (seven). The importance of 
Poland as a challenger for other countries as the RHQ target country was noticed 
already in the Gateway study in 2000. Santalainen (2000) reports that companies named 
Poland as the third most important alternative RHQ target country if the company had 
considered other countries besides Finland. During the previous research in the 1990s, 
Poland had successfully adopted the idea of capitalism and competition was already 
fierce in many sectors, but MNCs considered the Polish market still challenging but 
with a lot of potential (Santalainen 2000). However, the importance of the Polish market 
has grown significantly in 15 years and after aggressive market-oriented economic 
reforms its market today is dynamic, the sixth-largest economy in the EU and the largest 
market among the former Eastern bloc countries in Central Europe. The country has a 
central location geographically and shares a border with new EU and old EU-15 
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countries. According to one interviewee, Eastern Europe is increasingly managed from 
Poland these days and it is a natural RHQ location for the Baltic countries due to its 
centrality and cultural similarity with the Baltic countries.  
(www.export.gov/poland/doingbusinessinpoland/)  
 
Table 13: The new RHQ target country 
New RHQ target area/country Number of RHQs relocated Freq % 
Russia and Baltic countries 10 24 % 
Estonia 4  
Latvia 2  
Lithuania 1  
Russia 1  
Area Baltics/Russia 2  
Scandinavian countries 12 29 % 
Sweden 7  
Denmark 2  
Norway 1  
Shared responsibility  2  
Central and Eastern Europe   20 48 % 
Poland 5  
Benelux-countries 3  
Switzerland 2  
Germany 3  
Austria 1  
Czech Republic 1  
Shared responsibility 3  
Area Central/Eastern Europe  2  
Total 42 100 % 
 
Kautovaara (2000) found the new RHQ countries after the relocation in 1999 to be as 
follows: Sweden (4 cases), Germany (4), Italy (1), Great Britain (3), Austria (2), Estonia 
(2), Russia (2) and Poland (1). In both studies, Sweden has been the most popular 
destination to relocate the RHQ after Finland lost the position. All the countries where 
the RHQs relocated in the study of 1999 can still be found in the study of 2010. 
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
For a long there has been a need for empirical, longitudinal RHQ studies to open up the 
secret lives of RHQ. The purpose of this research has been to examine the development 
of the RHQ identified in 1998-1999 during the ten years of the research period. Besides 
answering to the research questions, the study has generated new information about the 
length of RHQ lifespan, the different ways in which the RHQ mandate can be lost, the 
motives behind the mandate loss and about the level of organisation hierarchy in the 
decision making when the RHQ mandate is lost. Next, the main findings of the research 
will be discussed. 
  
7.1 Research questions 1 and 2 
 
 Are there RHQ that were identified in 1999 still present in Finland in 2010? Have 
some RHQ lost their mandate?  
The study finds support that it is common for subsidiaries to lose the RHQ mandate. In 
the population, 91 subsidiaries out of 222 (41 %) lost the RHQ mandate during the 
research period (1999-2010). However, the larger part of RHQ in the population (131) 
continued to exist over the research period, i.e., 59% of the RHQs will have a lifespan 
longer than the research period of 11 years.  
Based on the RHQ literature, we know that RHQ are change sensitive and possibly exist 
for a limited lifetime. The current literature discusses RHQ as an extra layer of 
management in MNC, but notices some lack of clarity in its respective role since many 
companies seem to struggle with the implementation. RHQ are noticed to be largely 
unstable organisational phenomenon. MNCs often restructure their RHQ organisation, 
increase and decrease the power of RHQs or close RHQs down. Many authors have 
discussed the reasons for frequently reported RHQ failure. However, Parks (1969) 
points out that closing down RHQ does not necessarily mean that it has failed. Instead, 
it may indicate that the need for a HQ in the area has ended and the mission has been 
accomplished. (Parks 1969; Lasserre 1996; Piekkari 2008; Piekkari et al. 2010; Nell et 
al. 2011; Kähäri 2014)     
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RHQ studies debate how temporary structures RHQs actually are. Lasserre’s (1996) 
life-cycle model suggests that the last role of RHQ is an administrator and the full tasks 
of the RHQs will be taken over by local subsidiaries before the RHQ disappears 
completely (see also Pla-Barber & Camps 2012). Some other studies also indicate that 
the role of RHQs at the group corporate level possibly becomes less important over time 
(Lehrer and Asakawa 1999; Paik and Sohn 2004). RHQ live only as long as they add 
value to MNC and have the trust of a parent (Kähäri 2014). However, Ambos & 
Schgelmilch (2010) argue that RHQs in Europe are not a temporary structure but help 
the firm to better manage its international operations in the long run.  
 
The use of Lasserre’s (1996) model in a European context has been criticized since it 
was developed in Asian where the basic set up for the RHQ were different than it is in 
Europe (Schütte 1997; Ambos & Schlgelmilch 2010). MNCs went to the Asian market 
typically through a regional bridgehead, that had a mandate to enter the region, develop 
business, and become redundant as national markets become mature enough to take 
over the tasks from RHQs (Lasserre 1996). Ambos & Schgelmilch (2010) say that in 
Europe RHQ are usually not the first unit to be established in the market but much later 
after the subsidiaries are already running. We must notice that the Finnish subsidiaries 
with RHQ mandate have been in a gateway role to Eastern and Central European 
countries and have often been the first unit in the market before the subunits have been 
set up. The basic set up for some of the Finnish subsidiaries’ RHQ mandate has been a 
similar type as in Lasserre’s (1996) model. For 41% of them, the RHQ mandate has 
been a temporary structure. For some of the companies, the RHQ mandate has been lost 
in accordance with the subunits growing into independence under the Finnish 
subsidiary’s tutorship.  
 
It seems possible that for RHQ whom continue to live, at least some of them evolve 
through a life-cycle, as Lasserre (1996) suggests. However, without empirical study one 
cannot say that these RHQs are in different stages of development – or what stages 
RHQs meet while going through a life cycle - but natural evolution of RHQ 
responsibilities in the beginning and diminishing of responsibilities before the mandate 
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loss can be noticed in the population sometimes and the association of a possible life-
cycle model working behind sometimes can not be avoided.  
 
Lifespans of RHQ are an under-researched topic among RHQ literature. This study 
brings new information about the topic. The findings show that there has been great 
variation in the RHQs’ lifespans in the RHQ population. The shortest lifespan was 4 
years and the longest one 36 years. The average lifespans have been around  8-11 years 
(depending on a subunit country) and 59% of the RHQs continued to live with a 
lifespan minimum of 11 years. The exceptionally long lifespans of some RHQs, e.g. 30 
years, and the large group of RHQ that continue to live, give support to Ambos & 
Schgelmilch (2010) that RHQ help the firm to manage its regional operations in the 
long run and it does not necessarily have to be a temporarily structure.  
 
To interpret the duality of the RHQ population, to either be a temporary structure or 
have a long life span can be explained by the different arguments presented in the RHQ 
literature. We know that RHQs exist and survive as long as they create value for the 
MNC and tend to disappear when they become inefficient. A RHQs can also die if it 
loses its parent’s (CHQ) trust, or if something unexpected happens in the corporate 
environment or externally that affects its position within the MNC’s organizational 
structure. (Enright 2005; Piekkari et al. 2010; Kähäri 2014) 
 
7.2 Research question 3 
 
Have some RHQ relocated out of Finland?  
The relocation of RHQ was the most common way (42%) in which the RHQ mandate 
was lost in the population. Longitudinal research data shows 57 RHQs’ relocation cases 
and an average of 3,6 RHQ relocations per year out of Finland in 1994-2009 with the 
relocation rate of 6% a year. According to the literature, the relocation of RHQ is not an 
unusual event, and there has been found an increasing trend towards RHQ relocation in 
Europe during 1996-2006 (Perry et al. 1998; Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2007; Ambos & 
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Schlegelmilch 2010; Laamanen et al. 2011; Edgington & Hayter 2013; Kähäri 2014;). 
Also, based on a data about 30,000 HQs and management centres in the US, the average 
relocation rate has been 5% a year in 1996-2001 (Strauss-Kahn & Vives 2005).  
 
According to Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010), a large proportion of European RHQ 
change their original location during the course of operation. A fair degree of mobility 
has been predicted for RHQ on a medium term (5-8 year period) perspective (Ho 2000). 
There is likely to be more relocations of HQs from small European countries (e.g. 
Finland) to larger European countries in the future (Birkinshaw et al. 2006). Williams 
(1967) studied European regional offices and HQ and argued that a Scandinavian 
country is probably too far away from the centre of Europe to represent a practicable 
RHQ location.  
 
Perry et al. (1998) say that the relocation of RHQ occurs in the context of multiple 
influences. In this study, it was not uncommon for the interviewees to mention more 
than one motive for the relocation. The parent MNC regionalization was the most 
important motive to relocate RHQ out of Finland (29%), while parent MNC 
reorganising/restructuring was the second common motive (25%). The literature shows 
that RHQs typically relocate to mirror structural changes or relocate into a lead market 
(Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010). In this study, growth of market (16%) played a part in 
relocation, as well as, acquisitions (10%). Foreign firms and firms that are the outcome 
of a merger tend to relocate RHQs more often (Strauss-Kahn & Vives 2005; Benito et 
al. 2011). It is fair to say that relocation seems to be driven by many unpredictable and 
often firm-specific factors (Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010). Research results seem to be 
in line with the literature. 
 
Ambos & Schlegelmilch (2010) say that often soft factors, internal resource and power 
considerations have more impact on the decision to relocate than economic factors like 
tax benefits. In this study, not a single company brought up the taxation as a relocation 
motive. Even Laamanen et al. (2011, 3) have showed that high corporate taxation plays 
an important role in increasing the likelihood of HQs relocation decisions.  
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There were 38 companies that relocated the RHQ out of Finland between 1999-2010. 
48% of the RHQs relocated to Central and Eastern Europe, 29% to Scandinavia and 
24% to Russia and the Baltic countries. A single country that received most of the RHQ 
mandates was Sweden with 7 relocations. Poland received 5 RHQ and Estonia 4.  
Kautovaara (2000) found the three most popular RHQ target countries from his list in 
1999 but they were in a different order of importance. Sweden has kept its place with 
the most popular target country, but the position of Poland has changed the most, since 
in 1999 Poland received the smallest amount of RHQs. Also, Estonia has increased its 
popularity relatively. Laamanen et al. (2011) say that finding reasons for the existence 
of a large number of RHQs in a certain country is equivalent to analysing why 
companies choose to relocate their headquarters there. According to Strauss-Kahn & 
Vives (2005, 3), HQs relocate to a metropolitan area with good air traffic connections, 
low corporate taxes, low average wages, high levels of business services, and 
concentration of HQs in the same sector of activity. 
 
There is growing evidence that the world is becoming more regional and the importance 
of RHQs for managing business has grown (Ghemawat 2003; Rugman & Verbeke 
2004, 2007; Arregle et al. 2009; Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010; Rugman and Oh, 2013). 
This study has found support for regionalisation. The main motives for the relocation of 
RHQs out of Finland has been parent company regionalisation and parent MNC 
restructuring. Results show that some of the companies have been restructuring their 
Eastern European regional organisation – The region seems to be managed increasingly 
from Central-Europe. Eastern European countries have received more RHQ 
responsibilities than in 1999. Poland’s popularity as the RHQ target country has 
increased in ten years.  
 
Dunning et al. (2007) discuss an intra-regional effect, meaning that MNCs might be 
attracted to particular sub-regions or countries in a region. Firms try to exploit 
similarities and advantages across countries (Arregle et al. 2009). Literature lists a 
number of factors as to how the region can be defined: geographic proximity, market 
similarities, managerial consideration, cost efficiency, the future market-specific 
development of demand as well as cultural and political market characteristics 
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(Ghemawat 2005; Ambos & Schlegelmilch 2010; Laudien et al. 2011). The definition 
of a region tends to change in a response to market conditions and to a company’s own 
strategic decisions (Ghemawat 2005).  
 
In addition, inside the relocated RHQ population, there were five cases where the 
responsibilities of the RHQ were transferred away from Finland and split between two 
countries. Piekkari et al. (2010) found a similar type of division of regional 
responsibilities happening in the regional management centres that were dismantled or 
merged with new ones and their regional responsibilities were divided between other 
centres in the region. 
 
7.3 Responsibility transfer to the parent 
 
In 28% of cases where the RHQ mandate was lost, the RHQ responsibility of the 
subunits was transferred to the parent company. The RHQ literature does not directly 
discuss much this phenomenon, but finds it typical for MNCs to reallocate individual 
markets from CHQ to RHQ responsibility and back again (Piekkari et al. 2010; Nell et 
al. 2011). Barner-Rasmussen et al. (2007, 269) discuss HQs’ “de-internationalisation” 
and by this they refer to the relocation of HQ back to the home-base after being abroad. 
The same analogy can be applied to the RHQ mandate since in practice it becomes de-
international if the responsibility is transferred to the CHQ. Barner-Rasmussen et al. 
(2007, 269) note that HQ relocations abroad should not be interpreted as permanent or 
transfer back to home as erroneous or a step backwards. This is important to stress, 
since the return of RHQ mandate of certain country unit back to CHQ can not be 
considered as a RHQ failure, but the opposite in many cases: the mission of RHQs has 
been accomplished.  
 
We did not ask specific questions about RHQ failure or trust issues between the CHQ 
and the Finnish subunit, however, there were no indications about RHQ failure or 
transfer of the subunits under the CHQ as being as the step backwards. Many subunits 
under the study had grown into independence and were large enough, or growing 
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strongly (e.g. subunit Russia), when they started to report directly to CHQ. RHQs tend 
to disappear when they become inefficient, and it seems that in some cases the Finnish 
RHQ had become inefficient e.g. due to its size, resources or it was more convenient for 
the subunits to report somewhere else to a larger central unit. It seems that the Finnish 
subunit had existed as long as it created value for the MNC.  
 
The literature also discusses virtual RHQ arrangements that touch slightly this topic of 
previous RHQ responsibilities returning to CHQ. In a virtual arrangement, the RHQ as 
a separate unit with its own office and dedicated staff does not exist, but the 
responsibilities and functions of the RHQ could be delegated e.g. upwards in the 
corporate hierarchy (Schütte 1997a; Alfoldi et al. 2012). Alfoldi et al. (2012) have 
termed the virtual RHQ as regional management mandate (RMM) where a dedicated 
RHQ unit does not exist but the regional responsibilities are given to a subsidiary in a 
form of mandate and the unit dedicates some of its time to perform the regional roles. In 
this case, one can say that the RMM is transferred back to the CHQ.  
 
7.4 Acquisitions at all three levels of the organisation hierarchy 
RHQ literature that considers acquisitions behind RHQ mandate loss is limited. 
According to Strauss-Kahn & Vives (2005), firms that are the outcome of a merger tend 
to relocate RHQ more often. Kähäri (2014, 77) says that the RHQ will die if it stops 
adding value, or if something unexpected happens in the corporate or external 
environment that affects their position within the organizational structure of the MNC. 
This study found evidence that acquisitions often affect the position of RHQ in the 
organisation structure.  
 
In this study, acquisitions represent 14% of the motives that lead to the RHQ mandate 
loss in the population. The research data shows that the acquisition can happen on three 
organization levels and affect the RHQ position. If we look at the RHQ population, 
there were 14 cases where acquisition happened on a different organization hierarchy 
level but they all led to the mandate loss of the Finnish RHQ: 1) in the subunit 2) in the 
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Finnish subsidiary 3) in the parent company. Next, some of the cases are presented 
briefly as an example. 
 
In one case, the subsidiary of a US MNC specialized in information technology lost the 
RHQ mandate because its Baltic subunits were sold out of the group. In another case, 
the Finnish subsidiary of a French MNC sold its own subunits in Latvia and Lithuania. 
The subunit of Lithuania was sold inside the group and the Finnish subsidiary lost the 
RHQ mandate. There was a case where the US MNC sold its Finnish subsidiary 
together with the Baltic and Russian subunits and due to this acquisition the Finnish unit 
lost the RHQ mandate.  
 
In another case, the Finnish subsidiary of a British MNC lost the Scandinavian HQ 
mandate to the group due to an acquisition of a Danish company, since the 
Scandinavian HQ was relocated to Denmark. Also, there was an acquisition on a group 
level that lead to the loss of the Finnish RHQ mandate. The parent company of the 
Finnish subsidiary was sold that led to the Finnish subsidiary to lose its RHQ for Baltic 
subunits since the new parent company took these units under her responsibility.  
 
7.5 Decision on the RHQ mandate loss was sometimes made in the Finnish RHQ 
 
When the RHQ literature discusses companies eliminating their existing RHQs, the 
expression often describes that the decision is made by the company but does not 
specify where the decision has been made and at what organisation hierarchy level.  
 
The study results show that it is very common that decisions to terminate the RHQ 
mandate are made in in the CHQ. This was the case in 62% of the decisions. European 
RHQ made the decision in 9% of the cases, whereas only 2% were made in the Nordic 
RHQ. The strategic position of the Finnish subsidiary lies in 32% of the cases directly 
under the group, 32% of the cases under the Scandinavian unit, and 20% of the Finnish 
RHQs are under the European unit. From this perspective it is logical that most of 
decisions are made in the CHQ. However, what is noteworthy is that even the Finnish 
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subunit is under the parent company strategically as often as it is under the 
Scandinavian unit, this does not show in the decisions making when terminating the 
RHQ mandate. The decision is typically made elsewhere in the organisation than in the 
Scandinavian unit and is transferred to the higher level in the organisation hierarchy. 
Also, what is interesting is that the decision that led to the termination of the Finnish 
RHQ mandate was made ten times in the Finnish subsidiary itself (11%).  
 
To be specific, when the RHQ was lost and the RHQ responsibility of subunits was 
transferred under the parent company, the Finnish subsidiary was involved one time and 
responsible for the decision. When the RHQ mandate was terminated, the Finnish 
subsidiary was responsible for the decision five times. While the RHQ was relocated 
out of Finland, the Finnish subsidiary made the decision four times. These findings 
seem to be give a new perspective to the discussion of RHQ failure. Also, some studies 
have reported that regional managers complain about their need to fight constantly for 
their mandate (Piekkari et al. 2010; Nell et al. 2011). This study clearly shows that this 
in not always the case. Sometimes regional managers make decisions themselves that 
lead to the RHQ mandate loss.  
 
If RHQ mandate loss is a consequence of natural growth and evolution of subunits 
abroad and the need for the RHQ’s has ended, just as Lasserre (1996) presents in the 
life-cycle model that the final task of RHQ is to be closed down, then there is possibly 
no need to fight for the mandate. The interviews revealed that sometimes RHQ mandate 
was given away with the Finnish subsidiary’s own decision for somewhere else in the 
organisation if the market was very difficult and there were too many risks involved 
(e.g. Russian market) in doing business. In contrast, one CEO of the Finnish subsidiary 
of a Danish roofing company revealed deeper feelings in the interview about how does 
it feels to give up the RHQ responsibility of a subunit in Russia. The CEO explained: 
“After you have invested lot of effort to something [subunit Russia] and achieved strong 
growth and then someone takes away your baby, it hurts every time”. But he explained 
that later on one is satisfied because everybody knows how hard and painful it had been 
to operate over there [in Russia].  
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7.6 Conclusions 
 
Based on this research, one can say that the truth about RHQ development is stranger 
than fiction (theory)! What can actually happen to RHQ during its lifespan in reality, the 
whole picture and spectrum seems to be wider and more complicated than what the 
current literature has discussed or Lasserre’s (1996) life-cycle model has presented. 
  
The RHQ literature has too often recognized the closing of RHQ as a failure. However, 
this study argues that when the subsidiary loses the RHQ mandate, in many cases it is 
can be considered as more neutral phenomenon than failure – sometimes it can even be 
a relief from a subsidiary point of view. The RHQ mandate can be lost for variety of 
reasons, e.g. acquisitions on different organisational hierarchy levels. In the case where 
the subsidiary loses the RHQ mandate, the RHQ responsibility can be transferred to the 
parent, but it is also possible that it will not be transferred elsewhere in the organisation 
and the RHQ will simply be terminated. Also, RHQ relocations out of Finland to some 
other country are common and the RHQ responsibility can be split between two 
countries in the relocation. 
7.6.1 Managerial implications 
 
The strategic position of the Finnish subsidiary lies more often directly under the parent 
company in the case of RHQ retained than RHQ lost. The Finnish subsidiaries may 
have kept their RHQ mandate more often due to the MNCs organisation structure and 
because the Finnish subsidiary has been in a stronger role towards the parent company 
and the subunits strategically. On a managerial level, this means more trust from the 
CHQ and more influence inside the MNC.  
 
As we know, it is very common that the CHQ makes the decision about the RHQ 
mandate loss. However, contrary to expectations, a Finnish subsidiary has been more 
involved in the decision making than a European RHQ or a Nordic RHQ. The Finnish 
subsidiary has been involved most often in the decision making when its own RHQ 
mandate has been terminated. As one interviewee has said: “This kind of decisions does 
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not just come from the parent [alone]”. The study shows that the level of participation 
of the Finnish management in the MNC organizational decision making has varied 
between the subsidiaries. Some managers have been in a more active role in the 
decision making inside the MNC. They seem to possess more organisational influence 
and have trust from the CHQ. 
 
Luostarinen (2000) has said that it is essential that the Finnish subsidiary takes a 
proactive approach to developing its position within the respective MNC. He has 
suggested that the management of the subsidiary should take a strong role within the 
group in information gathering and decision making about the subunit’s market. He 
continues that the subsidiary should acquire the expertise of the market, to maintain a 
role of “organisation feeler” in the region, to become the centre of knowledge in the 
MNC of the market and always seek to be one step ahead of other units of MNC in this 
respect.  
 
This kind of value creation for MNC helps the Finnish unit to retain its RHQ mandate 
and not become just an extra layer of management. On the managerial level, it builds 
trust between the RHQ and CHQ and gives the subsidiary’s management more power to 
influence their own destiny – whether it will be to retain the RHQ mandate or lose it. 
On a personal level, it might even advantage the position of the Finnish RHQ managers 
in the MNC’s organisation hierarchy – and possibly make them stick with the mandate 
and help them to keep their position in the case of RHQ relocation out of Finland. 
7.6.2 Suggestions for further research 
 
The use of Lasserre’s (1996) life-cycle model in a European context has been criticised. 
However, some common situational characteristics can be found when comparing the 
basic set up of Lasserre’s model for Asian RHQ and the Finnish subsidiaries that were 
in the gateway role for Central and Eastern European countries. The model has never 
been empirically tested, but it has been widely cited in the literature. For example, 
Enright (2005a) has suggested that Lasserre (1996) should prove large-sample tests to 
determine the generalizability of the concept. An empirical life-cycle study based on 
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Lasserre’s work in the Finnish context with the current RHQ population would be an 
interesting addition to the discussion. 
 
In this research, interviewees have represented the view of the Finnish subsidiaries of 
foreign MNCs. However, in the organisational life the RHQ related change often 
concerns all three different hierarchy levels in the MNC organisation structure. For 
example, study results show that four different levels of the organisation hierarchy – the 
Finnish subsidiary, Scandinavian RHQ, European RHQ or CHQ – can participate in the 
decision making when the RHQ mandate is lost. A wider and more objective picture of 
the phenomenon could be painted if the research would include more levels of the 
MNC’s organisation hierarchy. 
 
We have been studying the RHQ related change without considering the financial part 
of the equation – management by numbers is totally missing in this RHQ research. One 
can expect that there has been a certain critical level of revenue growth or ROI behind 
the decision to drop out the RHQ from between the subunit and the CHQ. There remain 
open questions such as: Can there be found a certain level of growth when the business 
in the subunit is large enough to give up the RHQ mandate of the Finnish subsidiary? 
What common characteristics must the subunits posses to be able to make it on their 
own - can some be found? It would be interesting to continue the research and dig 
deeper with those subunits that have become independent with natural growth path and 
finally have let go of the tutor role of RHQ. The phenomenon clearly seems to exist in 
the population - the interviewees have described it intuitively with a similar kind of 
wording. This growth path to independence also exists in Lasserre’s (1996) model. 
 
In addition - related to Lasserre’s (1996) life-cycle model - the 131 RHQs that have 
retained the status must be kept under focus, since for some of them the length of RHQ 
lifespans are going to be especially long and I consider their independent life-paths as 
worth following in the future.  
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